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11Introduction
1.1 Background Dutch dairy sector and European policies 
The Netherlands is one of the main dairy producers in the European Union (EU). The Dutch 
milk production per cow is among the highest of all member states. Due to the optimal 
 climate conditions and the ideal strategic location in Europe, the international competitive 
position of the dairy sector is good. Thirty-five percent of the total Dutch milk production is 
marketed in the Netherlands, 45% in other EU member-states and 20% in the world market 
(Rabobank, 2017).
During the last 15 years the structure of the Dutch dairy sector changed significantly. 
 Compared to 2000, the total number of farms decreased by 29% to 16500 farms in 2016. 
Currently the average farm size is around 56 ha, which is an increase of 47% compared to 
2000. Also the number of animals increased by 64% to an average of 101 animals per farm 
in 2016. This growth resulted in an increase in average revenue per farm of 93% (CBS, 2017). 
The milk production per cow increased significantly due to increasing the quality of housing 
and animal health, better animal feeding techniques and more efficient breeding. Because 
of this, nowadays an average dairy cow provides more than 8000 litres of milk per year, 
compared to 2500 litres in 1910 (CBS, 2017). The Dutch dairy sector can be characterized as 
a highly productive and competitive sector (i.e. its market share on the world dairy market is 
increasing ( ZuivelNL, 2017) in the Netherlands as well as in Europe. 
As an EU Member State, the Dutch dairy sector is affected by the European Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), which was introduced in 1957. At the start, this policy was  developed 
in order to secure food supply to consumers and a reasonable income to producers in Europe. 
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For the Dutch dairy sector, which consisted of relatively small producers with no influence 
on market prices (i.e. they were so-called price-takers), this meant that they received guaran-
teed minimum prices for their production that were generally higher than the world market 
price level (Dutch government, 2015). This price support policy induced farmers throughout 
Europe to produce more milk, which eventually led to overproduction of milk in the late 
seventies. Therefore in 1984 milk quotas were introduced to limit milk production in the 
European dairy sector. The milk quotas became an integral part of the Dutch milk produc-
tion system. Dairy farmers were assigned a certain level of milk production rights which they 
could trade nationally (i.e. rent and buy or sell).
In the early 1990’s, the CAP gradually evolved from a price support system into a direct income 
payment system (DP system) with an additional rural development component. Important 
steps in this process were: the MacSharry reform in 1992, Agenda 2000 in 1999, the Midterm 
Review in 2003 and the Health Check in 2008. Under this DP system Dutch dairy farmers 
received direct payment entitlements based on historical production levels; each farmer was 
granted rights corresponding to the payments he received during 2000-2002. Due to the shift 
from price support to a DP system, the milk quota system was less needed as an instrument 
to keep budget expenditure with respect to dairy under control. Therefore, as part of the 
2003 reforms, it was decided to gradually increase milk quotas and fully abolish them in 2015 
(soft-landing). Contrary to many other European member states, in the Netherlands the milk 
quotas were still binding at the time of full abolishment (i.e. the Dutch milk production was 
more than the national reference level of milk quotas in 2015).
In 2014 the European Common Agricultural Policy for 2014-2020 was implemented. The 
main goal of this policy, implemented under two pillars (see figure 1.1), is to reach a more 
 sustainable development of the agricultural sector (Dutch government, 2015). The starting 
point is to make farmers less dependent on subsidy payments in order to induce them to inno-
vate and eventually to increase efficiency and competitiveness (European Commission, 2011). 
As part of the new policy, the DP system switched gradually from a payment system based 
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on historical production levels to a system in which fixed payments per hectare of agri-
cultural land are paid to farmers. In the Netherlands all eligible dairy farmers will receive 
equal payments per hectare in 2019. Also there will be targeted payments to specific groups 
(e.g. young farmers).
The Dutch dairy sector is a key user of land and water resources in the Netherlands. 
Maintaining a sustainable environment is high on the agenda of the European Union. This 
is reflected in the second pillar of the CAP which contains the rural development program. 
Amongst others, this program financially supports the improvement of (European) water 
quality and other environmental measures (European Commission, 2011). 
Besides the Common Agricultural Policy, there are European environmental policies in order 
to manage the use of (animal) manure. These policies are regulated through the European 
Nitrate Directive (Council of European Communities, 1991), which includes measures on 
the production and use of nitrogen and phosphate from animal manure, and which is linked 
to the Common Agricultural Policy through cross compliance. Farmers only receive their 
first pillar payments if they fulfil certain environmental and sustainability requirements 
(European Commission, 2011).
Market measures
Income support
Rural Development policy
public goods
First Pillar Second Pillar
Food production Environmental
Function
Rural function
Figure 1.1 Pillars of the European Common Agricultural Policy 
Source: European Commission (2017)
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Following the EU Nitrate Directive, the Netherlands is assigned a maximum level of total 
phosphate from animal manure production (national phosphate production ceiling). This 
level is equal to the phosphate production level of 2002. Also, as of 2006 the Dutch govern-
ment put constraints on the quantity of (animal) manure that legally may be applied on 
land. If a farm exceeds the norm, it has a manure surplus, or so-called farm surplus, which is 
 penalised by letting them pay a fine for every kg of animal manure in excess. 
In combination with the milk quotas, which put a maximum limit on milk production and 
thus indirectly on manure production as well, the Dutch manure production of dairy farmers 
stayed within EU policy norms on the production and use of animal manure. However, when 
the milk quotas were abolished, a potential environmental risk for the Dutch dairy sector 
emerged as limits to milk production, and thus manure production, disappeared. Therefore, 
the Dutch government sharpened its manure policy in order to ensure that the Netherlands 
satisfies European environmental standards in the future as well. As of 1 January 2016, dairy 
farms that have an overproduction of animal manure are obliged to process all of these 
surpluses off-farm. Moreover, if they want to increase their milk production (the reference 
level is their milk production level of 2013), they are obliged to increase in land as well, as 
more land means more application and disposal space for the (increased) animal manure. In 
addition, a system of phosphate rights will be introduced in 2018. Under this system farms are 
not allowed to produce more phosphate than the number of rights they have obtained based 
on their livestock at 2 July 2015 (Dutch government, 2016).
1.2 Problem statement
Already since the start of the European Common Agricultural Policy in the 1960s, there 
have been many changes and revisions of this policy in order to cope with a changing, and 
challenging European agricultural environment. These changes also had their impact on 
the Dutch dairy sector, which is regulated through Dutch and European agricultural and 
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environmental policies. In order to protect their competitive position in the European Union, 
the Dutch dairy farmers are challenged to adjust their farming strategies and become more 
sustainable through innovation of production techniques. Two main issues that significantly 
impacted Dutch dairy farmer behaviour are addressed below.
First, the changes in the Common Agricultural Policy regarding the subsidy payment system 
led to different responses and behaviour of farmers. Especially for intensive livestock systems, 
which include many Dutch dairy farms, the impact could be substantial. Under the DP system 
these (intensive dairy) farms received a substantial amount of subsidy, as payments were 
based on historical production levels. Under the new system, where payments are based on 
the amount of hectares a farm owns, these farmers will receive significantly less subsidy 
payments. We can expect dairy farms to adjust their farming strategy in order to maintain 
their income. 
Second, the transition to the direct payment system made the milk quotas less needed. The 
resulting gradual increase and eventual abolishment of the milk quotas affected the Dutch 
dairy sector as a whole. Because the milk quotas were still binding when they were abolished, 
it was expected that the overall milk production in the Netherlands would increase in 2015 
(Réquillart et al., 2008; Jongeneel, 2009; Jongeneel and Van Berkum, 2015). However, if the 
production of milk increases substantially it may eventually lead to lower market prices for 
milk, which makes production less profitable. Moreover, when farmers increase milk produc-
tion after quota abolition, their animal manure production will increase as well. Due to the 
Dutch manure policy, new limitations and obligations to the use of (animal) manure exist. 
This affects the farmer behaviour with respect to optimizing production. They have to take 
decisions on optimal land allocation and manure processing costs into account as well. 
The impact of policy changes on the agricultural sector as a whole and on the behaviour 
of farmers specifically, is a highly discussed topic in European policy analysis (e.g. Helming 
et al., 2010; Jongeneel et al., 2011; Bartolini and Viaggi, 2013). Farmers’ responses to European 
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farm policies are usually analysed using microeconomic producer theory (e.g. Gardebroek, 
2004; Benjamin and Kimhi, 2006; Bartolini and Viaggi, 2013). However, one of the limita-
tions of previous microeconomic models is that other aspects, such as physical conditions 
or socio-economic variables are not directly taken into consideration. This may reduce the 
predictive contents of such models. Especially the decision making process of farmers and 
their rationale behind specific farming strategies are most interesting to consider. This may 
improve the understanding of farmers’ responses to changes in agricultural policies.
The analysis on the effects of milk quota abolishment and a changing manure policy on 
manure surpluses and (economic) farm management decisions is relatively scarce in litera-
ture. On the one hand several studies exist on the specific modelling of mineral-flows within 
a farm (e.g. Aarts et al., 1992; Buysse et al., 2005; Hadrich et al., 2008; Nousianen et al., 2011). 
Although these studies recognize the (technical) interactions between the several sub- 
systems in a farm, i.e. milk output, feed production and manure management, they focus on 
optimal use of minerals and do not directly take manure policy measures into account. On the 
other hand, there are more applied agronomic studies that take manure policy into account 
and which focus on the Dutch dairy sector specifically (e.g. Evers et al., 2009; Krimpen et al., 
2010), but in these studies an economic framework capturing the milk-feed-manure-nexus is 
lacking. A modelling approach in which the interaction between milk and manure production 
is integrated would substantially contribute to the understanding of the dynamics of Dutch 
dairy farms, and the way dairy farmers adjust their production levels in a changing political 
environment. 
1.3 Research objective and research questions
All adjustments made in the Common Agricultural Policy and European manure policy had 
different impacts on the response and behaviour of the Dutch dairy farmers. Moreover, the 
impact of all individual farming choices together substantially affects the Dutch dairy sector 
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as a whole. It is important to understand the dynamics and decision making processes in 
this sector. Especially for the Dutch government, so they can regulate the dairy sector well in 
order to maintain its current export position in the European market.
This thesis focuses on analysing Dutch dairy farmer behaviour in this changing political 
environment. It contributes to the literature in two ways. First, by analysing farmers’ strate-
gies and choices, it takes into account non-economic factors such as social characteristics of 
farmers and changing policy regulations. Second, the interaction between milk and manure 
production is integrated in the modelling approach.
The general objective of this research is to analyse the responses of Dutch dairy farmers 
in the situation of a changing agricultural and environmental policy context (i.e. transition 
from DP system to a flat-rate payment system, milk quota abolishment and the reformed 
Dutch manure policy), thereby taking into account economic as well as non-economic factors.
This objective leads to the following research questions, which are assessed in the separate 
chapters of this thesis:
1. What is the effect of a transition from the direct payment system to a flat rate payment 
system on the farm income and farming strategies of Dutch dairy farmers? (chapter 2)
2. Which economic and non-economic factors determine milk production expansion by 
Dutch dairy farmers? (chapter 3)
3. What are the interactions between Dutch milk and manure production and how can 
these relations be integrated in one modelling approach to analyse the effects of agricul-
tural policy changes? (chapter 4)
4. Was the system of manure application norms restrictive for the dairy farms to increase 
in livestock? (chapter 5)
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1.4 Data and research methods
In order to study the research questions, yearly data (from the period 2001-2012) on various 
economic and non-economic variables were gathered from two databases. The first database 
is the Dutch Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN, LEI Wageningen UR). This database 
consists of detailed farm information (such as farm characteristics and financial  information) 
on a representative sample of farmers in the Netherlands. The second database is the 
LMM-database (Landelijk Meetnet Mestbeleid (in English: National Monitoring Network 
Manure), National Institute for Public Health and the Environment), which is used to monitor 
manure production in the Netherlands. This database contains detailed information (at the 
level of nutrients) on the production and use of organic and animal manure on Dutch farms. 
It also contains a representative sample of Dutch farmers. Originally, the analysis started 
with 2872 observations on 476 Dutch dairy farms, covering the period 2001 to 2010. Later this 
dataset was extended by including observations on farms in years 2011 and 2012. Due to data 
transformations and specification of variables, the final dataset includes 1193 observations 
on 334 Dutch dairy farms. Since farms usually remain in the panel for about five years, the 
dataset forms an unbalanced panel. The four research questions are analysed using different 
research methods. However, in every method economic and social factors are both taken into 
account. 
In chapter 2 the first research question is analysed using an economic simulation experiment. 
This approach, which originates from other scientific disciplines such as natural sciences 
and psychology and which uses experiments to obtain naturally occurring data, has been 
picked up by economists in order to bridge the gap between economic theory and observation 
(Davis and Holt, 1993). Compared to traditional microeconomic approaches, experimental 
economics has several advantages that make it possible to analyze the actual process of 
farming and the reasoning behind the choices made by farmers on specific farming strategies. 
This way, experiments can be used as an extension to traditional economic research methods 
in order to better understand farmers’ responses and behaviour to changes in the agricultural 
91
policy system. Besides analyzing the impact of an alternative direct payment system based on 
a flat rate and green payments in conjunction with an agri-environmental payment system, 
also the usefulness of economic simulation experiments in analyzing farmers’ attitudes 
towards providing these ecosystem services is analyzed. For this, the characteristics of the 
experimental research method are compared to more traditional microeconomic research 
approaches.
The second research question is analyzed in chapter 3 using microeconomic investment 
theory in which non-economic factors are incorporated as well. It is assumed that farmers 
base their decision to expand in milk production on a comparison of expected benefits and 
costs of expansion. Several factors are involved in this decision making process. The first 
two sets of factors are the European and national policies and market conditions. These 
are external factors that cannot be influenced by the farmer. Besides these external factors, 
there are also two sets of internal factors that potentially have an important direct relation 
to the expansion decision. These include the values, goals and strategy of the farmer and the 
 characteristics of the farm. The decision making on production expansion is analysed using a 
dynamic random effects probit panel data model.
The third research question is dealt with in chapter 4 where a microeconomic modelling 
approach is used that is extended by including manure production and policies. In this model 
the dairy farmer’s decision is characterized by a short-run profit maximization problem where 
output supply and variable input demand are chosen at optimal levels given exogenous output 
and input prices and levels of quasi-fixed inputs. In order to capture essential trade-offs in 
farmers’ decision making the production technology is decomposed in four sub- production 
functions: milk production, feed production, own roughage production and animal manure 
production. The interactions between these different production relationships are integrated 
in one approach in order to analyse the effects of agricultural policy changes. The production 
technologies for milk, feed and roughage are estimated using panel data, while an agronomic 
calculation approach is used to determine manure production.
10
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Chapter 5 answers the fourth research question using a short-run profit maximization 
problem. This problem is extended by including manure processing costs for dairy farms with 
a manure surplus. Using panel data techniques a shadow price equation for dairy cows is 
derived and estimated. From this equation the demand function for dairy cows is deducted, 
which allows to test for the interaction between manure surplus processing costs and the 
number of dairy cows demanded at farms. This approach specifically assesses the farmer 
behaviour towards making optimal choices on milk and manure production in the presence 
of manure policy regulations. 
Chapter 6 presents the general conclusion. In this chapter the separate chapters are inte-
grated and a general view on the research objective is given. Also a discussion on the results 
is provided.
11
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Analysing Dutch Dairy Farmer Behaviour  
 Towards the Provision of Public Goods:  
The Added Value of an Economic Simulation Experiment1
Abstract
The objective of this chapter is to examine the value of experiments for assessing 
the impact of the proposed Common Agricultural Policy of 2013 on farm income 
and farming strategies. We focus specifically on the impact of an alternative 
direct payment system based on a flat rate and green payments. We show the 
added value of an economic simulation experiment to existing economic micro- 
and sector modeling analysis when analyzing farmer behaviour. It is shown that 
the suitability of and rewards for the provision of green services play a signifi-
cant role in their uptake by farmers and the support for them. These results are 
useful in implementing a revised direct payments system in the Netherlands for 
the future.
1 Paper by Gerlinda S. Samson, Cornelis Gardebroek and Roel A. Jongeneel, Land Use Policy 34 (2013) 
321– 331. Doi: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2013.04.005
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2.1 Introduction 
Since the start of the European economic integration, agriculture has played a major role in 
European policies. Under the current European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), Dutch 
farmers receive payment entitlements based on historical production levels; each farmer 
is granted rights corresponding to the payments he received during 2000-2002 (Dutch 
Government, 2011). These so called direct payments are conditional on satisfying minimum 
standards with respect to nature, environment, sustainability and animal welfare (cross- 
compliance). If farmers fail to meet these criteria, their payments are decreased or completely 
cancelled. 
In 2013 the current CAP will be reformed. In October 2011, the European Commission 
published their proposal for this reform (European Commission, 2011). The main aim of 
the proposal is to redistribute, redesign and better target support to farmers, by enhancing 
competitiveness and improving sustainability. The base of allocating direct payments to 
farmers is planned to change from entitlements based on historical production levels into a 
flat rate payment per eligible ha. 
Helming et al. (2010) conclude that the transition to flat rate farm payments and the abolition 
of direct payments will potentially lead to a reduction in production and an induced increase 
in agricultural prices in the EU. The average gross value added per farm will decrease and the 
total area used for agricultural production will decrease as well (Helming et al., 2010: p. 12). 
Vrolijk et al. (2010: p. 47) argue that an abolishment of direct payments will result in less stable 
farm incomes, as the subsidies are a significant part of farm incomes  nowadays. Consequently, 
the abolishment of direct payments is argued to speed up the process of  structural change in 
the agricultural sector, although this will differ by country given the heterogeneity in  original 
subsidy levels and differences in the implementation of the direct payment system over EU 
Member States. Focusing on the Dutch dairy sector, Jongeneel et al. (2012: p. 75) state that the 
proposed changes of the direct payment system will negatively affect the financial position 
17
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of farms. On average, the loss of income for this sector is  estimated to be €7000 per year per 
farm. The relative more intense farms, i.e. the farms having a larger density of livestock per 
hectare, are affected more than extensive ones. 
A new element in the CAP reform proposal is the introduction of a so-called ‘green payment’ 
(European Commission, 2011). This will be paid for agricultural activities meeting climatic 
and environmental policy goals, such as payments for crop diversification, ecological focus 
areas and permanent grassland. For this greening component, the European Commission 
proposes three (controversial) requirements (European Commission, 2011). These include 
(i) uptake of permanent grassland per individual farm, (ii) growing at least three types of 
crops for farms with a minimum agricultural area of 3 ha, and (iii) 7% of the eligible farm 
area, excluding permanent grassland, needs to be an ecological focus area, i.e. set-aside 
area. This ‘package’ is highly criticized by many European national governments as too rigid. 
In May 2012, Commissioner Dacian Cioloş announced therefore some adjustments to the 
propositions of the European Commission. One option might be dispensation of the require-
ments for farms producing under a label (certification) or supplying agricultural landscape 
management services. Also the propositions on crop diversification and permanent grass-
land might be relaxed. Nevertheless, the 7% set-aside requirement will most likely be main-
tained (European Commission, 2012). Whereas generally greening has been associated with 
voluntary farmer behaviour (e.g. farmer participation in CAP agri-environmental schemes), 
the requirements associated with the green payment are compulsory in order to obtain this 
payment. The proposed green payments go beyond the already existing cross-compliance 
requirements (European Commission, 2011). 
The Dutch government supports these reform proposals in principle although they would 
like the greening component to be more ambitious (Dutch Government, 2012). One potential 
option to achieve this would be to move money from the first pillar to the second pillar of 
the CAP which could strengthen the provision of a broad array of green services. However, 
 questions arise whether it is realistic to involve more farmers in the provision of green 
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services in order to reach the policy goals set by the European Commission. Besides the 
standard agricultural activities, such as dairying, Dutch farms already exploit other agricul-
tural activities as well, such as agricultural landscape management. This means that farms 
in return for a financial compensation voluntarily provide so-called green and blue services 
to maintain the landscape (agri-environmental schemes). These activities are different from 
the  compulsory cross-compliance requirements. Figure 2.1 shows the number of Dutch farms 
involved in agricultural landscape management. 
As can be seen, after a period of rapid decline, in 2008 the number of farms participating 
in agricultural landscape management started to increase again. Nevertheless, this recent 
growth is very modest and there are doubts whether the total number of farms involved in 
agricultural landscape management will increase further in the coming years (Berkhout and 
Roza, 2012: pp. 91-92). 
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Figure 2.1 Number of farms participating in agri-environmental schemes.
Source: CBS (2012)
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In their study on social and green services by farmers, Prins and Smit (2011: p. 11) state 
certification as one of the most effective options to stimulate agricultural landscape 
management and communal awareness. One critique, however, seems the increasing 
administrative burden and complex control of the requirements for obtaining the certification 
label. Other measures, such as performance-related payments for supporting nature, where 
farmers obtain payments per implemented agricultural service, are found to be effective 
as well (e.g. a so-called points-system, where farmers can earn valuable points for services 
stimulating agricultural landscape management and contributing specific services to the 
local economy (Hodge, 2009: p. 43)). A reason why (voluntary) support for the greening 
component might not be that high in the Netherlands, could be the low trust farmers have 
in the government. Trust plays a significant role in the choice to supply public goods that 
are rewarded by the government (Jongeneel et al., 2008). Also farmers are afraid that the 
administrative burden will rise when providing (more and/or different) green services. Some 
farmers argue that if the subsidy for the (extra) effort they need to put in for providing the 
agricultural services is not sufficient, they rather prefer to not obtain the subsidy at all. 
Ideally a farmer is compensated for all the extra efforts in the provision of green services 
(Wilson and Hart, 2000; Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; Mettepenningen et al., 2013). However, 
there will be cuts in the agricultural budget. In the proposals on the Multiannual Financial 
Framework for the period 2014 to 2020, the European Commission advocates to reallocate 
direct payments between and within (i.e. transition from historical model towards a regional 
model) Member States. For the Netherlands, such a reallocation will lead to a decrease of 
around 11% of the net ceilings for direct payments in the period 2013 to 2020 (Venema et al., 
2013: p.14). Consequently, there will be less resources available for subsidies on landscape 
management as well, which will potentially reduce the number of farms involved in providing 
these services even further. Not surprisingly, the level of subsidy payments is therefore 
another hot topic in the current debate on stimulating the provision of green services by 
farmers. 
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The impact of the proposed changes of the direct payments on the agricultural sector as a 
whole and on the behaviour of farmers is a highly discussed topic in European policy  analysis. 
Farmers’ responses to European farm policies are usually analysed using microeconomic 
producer theory (see e.g. Gardebroek, 2004; Benjamin and Kimhi, 2006; Bartolini and Viaggi, 
2013). Traditionally, microeconomic models are based on a reduced form representation of 
the actual production process (i.e. a production function distinguishing inputs and outputs, 
but treating the actual process of farming largely as a black box) and on data subtracted 
from existing “natural” markets (Davis and Holt, 1993: p. 3). Nevertheless, when these models 
become more specific and complex, this leads to rather stylized results, as these traditional 
economic models rely on several assumptions and do not allow for deviations from these.
For this reason, one of the limitations economists are often accused of is not taking the 
 relevant natural environment into consideration accurately when developing models, 
which reduces the predictive contents of economic models. Other scientific disciplines, 
such as natural sciences but also psychology, make use of experiments to obtain naturally 
 occurring data. This approach has been picked up by economists recently in order to bridge 
the gap between economic theory and observation, and is nowadays known as experimental 
economics (Davis and Holt, 1993: p. 4). 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the value of experiments for assessing the impact 
of the proposed Common Agricultural Policy of 2013 on farm income and farming  strategies. 
We focus specifically on the impact of an alternative direct payment system based on a flat 
rate and green payments in conjunction with an agri-environmental payment system. In 
this study we focus on the Dutch dairy sector, which takes a special interest because this 
sector benefits from direct payments under the current CAP. The proposed reform potentially 
has a major impact on the income of dairy farmers and will possibly affect their behaviour 
significantly. The characteristics of the experimental research method are compared to more 
 traditional microeconomic research approaches. 
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This chapter contributes to the literature in two respects. First, we focus on changes in EU 
policies for providing ecosystem services on private land, a topic that is currently high on the 
agenda in both policy and academia. Second, we discuss the usefulness of economic simula-
tion experiments in analyzing farmers’ attitudes towards providing these ecosystem services.
This chapter continues in section 2.2 by providing a basic review on experimental economics, 
since this research method is relatively new and not frequently used in land use literature. 
This is relevant for a well-understanding of the principles of the method. In section 2.3 we 
outline, and critically evaluate, the experimental set-up of an economic simulation experi-
ment used by the Dutch Agricultural Economic Research Institute (Zijlstra et al., 2011). This 
experiment was performed to analyze Dutch dairy farmer behaviour towards the provision 
of public goods under an alternative direct payments system. The results of the economic 
simulation experiment provide input for the assessment on the added value of using such 
experiments in analyzing farmer behaviour. These results are presented in section 2.4. In that 
section we also further contribute to the current dialogue on the introduction of the proposed 
CAP reform in the Netherlands and the potential impact of this on farm income and farming 
strategies, as well as to the current debate on the provision of ecosystem services on private 
land. Finally, in section 2.5 we provide conclusions. 
2.2 Background on experimental economics
As stated in the introduction, experiments were recently introduced in (agricultural) 
economics (see e.g. Chan et al., 1999; Anderson et al., 2008; Uler, 2011). It therefore makes 
sense to first provide some background information on experimental economics before we 
move to investigating the added value of using an economic simulation experiment besides 
the traditional economic analysis methods.
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2.2.1 Types of experiments
Throughout the years, different types of experiments have been developed in economics. 
Depending on its goal, one should carefully set up an experiment as this influences the type 
of outcome obtained. It is also possible to combine different types of experiments. Harrison 
and List (2004) developed a useful classification of 4 types of experiments, which is based on 
the goal of the experiment. Table 2.1 summarizes this categorization.
The first category identified in Table 2.1 contains conventional laboratory experiments. In 
this type of experiments the participants are people that are not directly involved in the 
topic of the experiment. This is referred to as a standard subject pool, and often students are 
used for this. The experiments are conducted in an abstract environment, for example, the 
experiment may be carried out on a computer where the participants play a virtual game. The 
freedom respondents have in reacting is regulated beforehand.
The second category contains artefactual field experiments, which are the same as laboratory 
experiments, only instead of a standard subject pool, they use participants that are directly 
involved in the topic of the experiment such as policy makers or farmers. 
Class Type Participants
Natural 
environment
Imposed 
regulations
1 Conventional laboratory experiments Standard subject 
pool
No Yes
2 Artefactural field experiments Non-standard 
subject pool
No Yes
3 Framed field experiments Non-standard 
subject pool
Yes Yes
4 Natural field experiments Non-standard 
subject pool
Yes No
Source: Harrison and List (2004)
Table 2.1 Types of experiments
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The third category includes framed field experiments. This type of experiments also uses 
directly involved participants as subject pool and an imposed set of rules, but in contrast to 
the artefactual field experiment, they also include a natural setting in the experiment. This 
setting can be related to the product, assignment or information set, depending on the goal 
and experimental set-up. 
The fourth category consists of natural field experiments, which are similar to framed field 
experiments, but which are fully carried out in the natural environment of the participants. 
Often, these participants are not even aware of participating in the experiment, which shows 
that regulations are not set beforehand.
2.2.2 Objectives of experiments
As stated in section 2.2.1 different types of experiments lead to different outcomes. For 
this reason it makes sense to look at the different objectives of experiments in more detail. 
These objectives can be categorised in four groups (Schram, 2005). First, testing behavioural 
hypotheses; second, theory stress tests; third, testing for empirical regularities; and fourth, 
advising policy makers. 
Most experiments fall into the first category of testing behavioural theories. These experi-
ments contribute to traditional, neo-classical economic models by bridging the gap between 
theory and practice. Theory can be tested in an experiment in two ways; first, experiments 
can provide more insight into the working of institutions, and second, they can be used to 
test the underlying behavioural assumptions of economic theory. Experiments carried out for 
testing theories, may lead to adjusting these theories, and provide as such a way to speak to 
theorists. 
The second objective relates to defining the external validity of economic theories. This 
can be done by including so-called stress tests in the experiment. These allow for testing 
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assumptions by relaxing them in a controlled way, allowing for conclusions on the external 
validity of theories to be drawn. External validity can also be increased by comparing the 
results of the experiment with other empirical evidence. More about external validity is 
provided in section 2.2.5.
The third objective relates to experiments used for searching empirical regularities. 
Sometimes, research reveals relationships between variables which were not found before. 
Experiments can then be used to provide more insight into these specific relationships. This 
might then positively impact on the development of economic theory. 
Since experiments provide extensive information on the behaviour of economic agents, they 
can be used as a source for making policy, which is the fourth type of objective we describe 
here. The wide range of articles that describe experiments used for this purpose show the 
importance of it. One example is the study by Uler (2011), who investigates the net impact of 
tax levels on the provision of public goods by farmers, using a controlled laboratory experi-
ment. The results of his experiment provide important conclusions for setting better targeted 
government policies regarding the provision of public goods. Kachelmeier and King (2002) 
emphasize the usefulness of using laboratory experiments when assessing policy issues 
regarding accounting. Also the experiment described in this study provides important infor-
mation for the current debate on setting efficient future direct payments policies.
2.2.3 Design of a successful experiment
Besides selecting the type of an experiment, based on the objective of the research, there are 
several design and procedural issues which should be taken into account in order to set up a 
successful experiment (Davis and Holt, 1993: p. 20). 
First, there are ‘procedures and regularities’. In order to make replication possible, one should 
follow and report standard practices and procedures in an experiment. 
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Second, there is ‘motivation’. Rewards are helpful to motivate participants to take part in an 
experiment. Smith (1982) points out the importance of providing rewards to participants. He 
describes several principles (i.e. non-satiation, dominance and relevance) that must be satis-
fied in this context. Together these principles ensure the saliency of the experiment (Davis 
and Holt, 1993: p. 24). Furthermore, if the reward used is a monetary reward, it will reduce the 
concerns about heterogeneous individual preferences towards the reward since rationally all 
participants will put a value on money. 
A potential problem of monetary rewards is that it reduces the respondent’s focus on the real 
task. Using financial incentives to let respondents think more carefully about their task to 
perform, might lead to replacing intrinsic motives with extrinsic ones. This is not desirable 
if the objective of the experiment is to test for intrinsic motivations; actions maximizing 
intrinsic payoffs may not be the same as actions maximizing economic payoffs (Read, 2005). 
Moreover, even in case monetary rewards are successful in inducing respondents to take 
their task more seriously, it does not necessarily invoke them to make rational choices. In 
fact, some evidence exists of experiments with monetary payoffs in which respondents show 
 irrational behaviour even if they are confronted with their irrational behaviour (Read, 2005).
Monetary rewards might be helpful in taking away any biased (or sub-optimal) behaviour of 
respondents (Davis and Holt, 1993: p. 25). However, Holt (1992) shows that a successful experi-
ment can be designed where subjects show optimal behaviour without financial  incentives. 
Read (2005) states that many studies show that in experiments respondents can be motivated 
by monetary as well as non-monetary rewards. Moreover, if these non- monetary rewards are 
what we are interested in for studying, there is no reason to use monetary rewards instead 
(Read, 2005).
Third, there is ‘un-biasedness’. To achieve natural results, participants should be unaware 
about what type of behaviour is expected in the experiment. A researcher should therefore 
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find a balance between providing just enough relevant information to motivate participants 
without providing suggestive expressions to them. 
Fourth, there is ‘calibration’. Incorporating standardization into the generation of data 
provides a clear basis for analysing and evaluating the research. 
Fifth, there is ‘design parallelism’. This indicates that an experiment should correspond 
closely to the real world; it should be constructed in a way that economic events can occur 
naturally. Parallelism refers to the idea that behaviour of individuals and performance of 
institutions that have been tested in an experiment will be the same in a non-experimental 
setting where similar ceteris paribus conditions apply. There is a strong link with external 
validity which will be explained in section 2.2.5.
2.2.4 (Dis)advantages of experiments
Experiments are being discussed for their advantages and disadvantages as a tool for (micro)
economic analysis. Often stated advantages of experiments, compared to traditional, 
neo-classical microeconomic analytical methods, are the better possibilities to replicate 
and control an experiment. Traditional models are, in contrast, usually estimated based 
on non-controlled historical data (i.e. examining economic behaviour of agents via extra-
polation of data of the past). Using experiments has the possibility to test new arrangements 
or products and makes it possible to analyse new cases.
‘Replication’ is the possibility for other scientists to perform the experiment in the exact 
same way, thereby verifying the findings independently (Davis and Holt, 1993: p. 14). In order 
to use an experiment as a tool to analyse certain microeconomic behaviour, it should be set 
up carefully. Describing this process accurately makes it possible for other researchers to 
repeat the experiment. 
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‘Control’ is the ability to manipulate the imposed regulations of an experiment in such a way 
that observed behaviour can be used to evaluate alternative theories and policies (Davis and 
Holt, 1993: p. 15). Even natural field experiments can to some extent be used to provide a 
minimum test of theory. For this it is necessary that the environment, in which the experi-
ment is conducted, is fully understood by the researcher. Also potential changes in the 
environ ment should be taken into account. Through this control of experiments, researchers 
are able to systematically rule out alternative explanations and problems such as adverse 
selection, moral hazard or relational contracting (Just and Wu, 2009). If an experiment is 
performed under the appropriate conditions and in a controlled environment, one can test 
hypotheses accurately. 
Opponents of using experiments in economics argue that the real world is too complex to 
control for in an experiment, and therefore an experiment cannot provide exclusive conclu-
sions on theories. Technical difficulties in setting a controlled environment exist,  especially 
when the experiment tests individual preferences. For example, behavioural questions 
concerning risk attitude may be difficult to address in a laboratory. Some critics therefore 
claim that experiments are best used as complements to other empirical techniques (Davis 
and Holt, 1993: p. 18).
2.2.5 Validation of experiments
Two concepts that are important in validating any research, including experiments, are 
internal and external validity. Internal validity of an experiment refers to the degree to 
which confident conclusions about causal relationships can be drawn from the research, and 
external validity of an experiment refers to the possibility of generalization of the findings in 
the research and whether these can be extended to make predictions about the whole popu-
lation (Schram, 2005). Especially the external validity might be a problem in experimental 
economics (Just and Wu, 2009). Even if experiments are performed according to exact the 
same decision making processes as used in practice, they might not sufficiently reflect reality 
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(Loewenstein, 1999). For example, lack of reality is found in laboratory-type experiments 
where participants play a virtual computer game.
Often experiments take place in a laboratory environment instead of a realistic field context. 
Harrison and List (2004) however, point out the importance of including a field context in the 
experiment. The absence of a field context might influence participants’ perceptions of the 
importance of the research and their participation in it, and may lead to a failure in applying 
specific relevant field heuristics as well. For this reason there might exist contradictories 
between individual’s behaviour in the field and in the experiment. 
Just and Wu (2009) argue that in order to achieve external validity, the design of the experi-
ment should carefully incorporate economic theory. For this Binmore’s criteria are helpful 
(Binmore, 1999). These criteria state that economic theory can only be expected to predict 
well if the following requirements are met. First, the assignment provided to the participant 
is presented in an understandable way and is easy to perform. Second, participants are faced 
satisfactory incentives. Third, there is sufficient time reserved in the experiment to make trial 
and error adjustments.
2.3 The economic simulation experiment
A recent study on the impact of a changed direct payments system on the participation in 
green services and resulting incomes of Dutch farmers uses an economic simulation experi-
ment (Zijlstra et al., 2011). In this section we will outline the set-up of this simulation 
 experiment used, and critically evaluate it.
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2.3.1 CAP options
The economic simulation experiment was developed by the Dutch Agricultural Economic 
Research Institute (LEI) and carried out in November through December 2010. In commission 
by and consultation with the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation 
the purpose of the simulation experiment was to investigate the impact of the propositions 
concerning the direct payments by the European Commission for the 2013 CAP reform. Policy 
advisors and experts from the dairy sector were involved in the preparation and set up of 
the simulation experiment as well. The two key questions assessed were first, what are the 
choices (operational, tactical, strategic) made by farmers if new policies are used in order to 
determine the level of direct payments provided to them, and second, will these new policies 
lead to the desired farmer behaviour with respect to the provision of public goods. 
Before the actual simulation experiment took place, farmers were informed during plenary 
meetings with policy advisors and experts from the dairy sector about the contents of the 
simulation experiment. In this meeting, farmers got to interact and were asked for their 
first opinion regarding the proposed changes of the current direct payment system. Next, 
the simulation experiments were performed at the farm. Experts from the dairy sector ran 
the simulation experiment with each farmer individually. After all farmers were visited, 
their results from the simulation were discussed in plenary meetings with the same policy 
 advisors and experts from the dairy sector as before. Farmers deliberated on how they intend 
to respond with their farming strategy to changes in the current direct payment system, and 
gave their final opinion on the expected effects of these changes. This increased the value of 
the research by combining and underpinning the quantitative results of the experiment with 
qualitative information resulting from the plenary sessions with farmers. After these plenary 
meetings policy advisors came together to discuss and reflect on the results of the group 
meetings; this was useful in interpreting the results of the experiment in a wider context and 
checking the (external) validity of the results. The main results are provided further down in 
this chapter.
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In total 35 dairy farmers were selected to participate in the simulation experiment. Their 
farms were located in three different areas within the Netherlands, which are referred to as 
‘East-sand’, ‘West-peat’ and ‘South-sand’. Twelve dairy farms were selected in ‘East-sand’, 
11 dairy farms in ‘West-peat’ and 12 dairy farms were selected ‘South-sand’. The first two 
regions included areas that are ecologically valuable. In these regions it was interesting to 
see whether farmers change their participation in providing landscape services under the 
proposed CAP. In the South-sand region dairy farmers may experience a drop in income when 
transiting from the current to the proposed CAP, which made it worthwhile to investigate 
changes in farm strategy because of this expected income drop.
The simulation experiment consisted of two runs with different treatments; the first run was 
based on the current CAP, and the second run was based on the proposed CAP. Under the 
current CAP, farmers received direct payments based on historical production levels. There 
were no extra payments included for the provision of public goods, i.e. green and blue services.
Under the proposed CAP, which was based on the propositions by the European Commission 
to revise the direct payments from 2013 onwards, each group of farmers received direct 
payments in the form of a “flat rate” surcharge of €250 per ha. However, for each farmer the 
scenarios were different in receiving a “top-up” reward, these are payments for extra agricul-
tural effort, and rewards for green and blue services provision. The farmers located in ‘East-
sand’ received a top up payment of €500 per ha, if their farm was located in a Natura 2000 
area, and if they produced no more than the maximum manure excretion level of 250 kg N per 
ha. Farmers that did not fulfill the maximum manure excretion level of 250 kg per ha would 
not receive the top-up payment. However, these farmers were forced to reduce their emissions 
by investing in emission- reducing technologies and for that they could obtain an investment 
subsidy, e.g. to build a N-emission-free stable. Hence, some farmers in ‘East-sand’ chose to 
become more extensive. Moreover, in both situations, the maximum application standard of 
manure was 250 kg per ha. In exchange for receiving a top-up reward of €200 per ha, farmers 
in ‘West-peat’ were obliged to maintain permanent grassland. A second precondition was 
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that the farms should be located in a Less Favored Area, but this was already ensured with 
the selection of the farms for the simulation experiment. Farmers in ‘South-sand’ were not 
offered any top-up rewards.
2.3.2 Hypotheses tested in the economic simulation experiment
In the simulation experiment, two hypotheses were tested. It could be argued that the more 
intensive farms which receive a relatively large amount of direct payments under the current 
system, will face the largest effect, i.e. relatively biggest decrease in payments, when a 
transfer to a system based on a flat rate and top-up rewards is implemented, and vice versa. 
But, due to the availability of top-up payments, farmers in ‘East-sand’ and ‘West-peat’ can 
smooth this effect. 
The first hypothesis tested in the simulation experiment was that farmers will respond by 
focusing their farming strategy on generating more income if they expect a decrease in 
income from subsidy payments under the proposed payment system. A possible strategy 
change could be the uptake of green and blue services provision. 
Under the current CAP the organization of all kinds of green and blue services is  differentiated 
into ministries, provinces, water boards, water companies etc., and they are only partly linked 
to the direct payments. Under the proposed CAP in the simulation experiment all these 
services were included in one system only and paid for by the government in the form of 
green payments. The green- and blue services that farmers could choose to implement under 
the proposed CAP were based on the system as it currently exists under the current CAP, but 
they were adapted to local conditions and sometimes new requirements were set. Note that 
this were other services than the compulsory services farmers already needed to provide if 
their farm is located in a nature protection area, such as Natura 2000. The payments for these 
new service packages were determined relying on the compensation of income foregone- 
principle. As such it recognized the opportunity costs farmers face when deciding to supply 
32
2
the green and blue services, while it also tried to avoid over-compensation. Note that under 
the proposed CAP farmers could choose to provide services which they could not provide 
under the current CAP. 
The second hypothesis tested in the simulation experiment was that farmers are more willing 
to implement green and blue services, if the services fit better to the current farm situation 
and if the opportunity costs are feasible.
The green and blue services farmers could choose to provide under the proposed CAP in 
the simulation experiment, included three main categories; nature/biodiversity/landscape, 
recreation, and water. All these services were individual agreements between the government 
and the farmer. Collective agreements involving more than one farmer were not present in 
the simulation experiment. The appendix shows more details on the types of green and blue 
services as well as their rewards. 
2.3.3 Set-up of the economic simulation experiment
In this section we have a further look into how the simulation experiment was actually 
run. Figure 2.2 shows the construction of the economic simulation experiment, with the 
 (individual) farmer being the key-decision maker in the simulation experiment.
In the simulation experiment farmers were asked to indicate their farming strategy between 
2010 and 2020. The outcome of each simulation was the net income and land use of the farm 
in 2020, which were calculated based on the decisions made by the farmer during the run. 
After both runs of the simulation experiment, i.e. a first run using the current CAP and a 
second run using the proposed CAP, the differences between the two runs were reflected as 
changes in net income and land use in 2020. These differences were compared to analyze the 
impact of the proposed changes in the CAP on the behaviour of farmers. 
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CAP
Current
Hypothetical
Farm Characteristics
e.g. Location, Livestock,
Milk production
Exogenous Variables
e.g. Milk price, Interest rate
Outcome
Net income 2020
Set of Measures
e.g. Adjust amount of calves/heifers
Adjust nitrogen level
Adjust milk quota
Farmer
Decision-maker
Figure 2.2 Contents of economic simulation experiment
Source: adapted from Zijlstra et al. (2011)
 
The base situation, or starting situation of the simulation, was the situation of the farm in the 
year 2009. The selected farmers were all participating in the Dutch FADN, which enabled the 
researchers to allow a farmer to simulate different scenarios with information coming from 
his own farm. In this way, farmers are able to take realistic decisions when deciding on their 
farming strategy. Also they will face relevant and realistic outcomes of their decisions. This 
increased the value of the simulation results.
The farmers were asked to yearly adjust their farming strategy towards their expectations 
between 2010 and 2020. The simulation experiment incorporated several variables that could 
be modified by the farmers in order to do so. First, farmers could choose to make adjustments 
on their farm. These included 1) adjusting milk quota: farmers filled in the amount of own 
quota and amount of leased quota per year; 2) adjusting genetic quality of dairy herd: farmers 
indicated the annual percentage change in milk yield, which implicitly reflects their breeding 
strategy; 3) adjust fodder ration: farmers filled in the amount of concentrates intake per 
cow; 4) adjust amount of calves and heifers: farmers indicated the grow in their dairy herd; 
5) adjust amount of land (ha): farmers filled in the amount of own and rented land by year; 
6) adjust nitrogen output: farmers filled in the level of nitrogen output from their herd, 
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and 7) adjust grazing system: here the famers filled in two values. First, the percentage 
change of quality of grass they were planning to achieve by improved grassland management. 
Second, they indicated the percentage of cows grazing in the fields by year. During the second 
run, considering the propositions of the CAP reform, there was one more measure farmers 
could adjust: 8) provision of green and blue services: here farmers selected the services they 
would like to provide (see appendix). 
Second, farmers could modify several exogenous variables according to their expectations 
on the future. Although in reality these exogenous variables are determined by the market, 
in the simulation it was possible for farmers to change these currently unknown variables in 
correspondence to their expectations. The relevant exogenous variables include 1) price of 
milk; 2) price of concentrates; 3) private household income; 4) private household expendi-
tures, and 5) interest rate. 
Several technical and economic expressions (e.g. milk production, manure excretion level, 
labour costs) were underlying the economic simulation experiment and determined the 
calculation of the net income in 2020 based on the proposed farming strategy as indicated 
by the famers. The formulas used were fixed; only if a farmer chose to change the expected 
value of exogenous variables or implement certain measures, these changes influenced and 
worked through in the formulas and outcomes. The basis of the formulas is widespread: 
they are acknowledged accounting formulas, relationships based on economic theories and 
expert-knowledge (more information on formulas can be obtained from Agro Centre (2009).
2.3.4 Evaluation of the economic simulation experiment 
In sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 it was explained that different types of experiments, with different 
objectives exist. The experiment discussed in this study can be categorized as a framed field 
experiment: the participants are directly involved in the topic of the experiment (i.e. farmers 
from the field), the experiment is performed in a natural environment (on their own farm 
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with their own farm details) with a fixed set of rules (i.e. online simulation experiment using 
CAP policies), and the information-set includes a field context (i.e. based on farmers’ own 
company details and including (potential) policies on direct payments).
The setting of this experiment was primarily explorative and made it possible to investigate 
the acceptance of new policies and to reflect on farmer behaviour regarding these policies. 
Therefore, the results of this study are highly useful in supporting policy makers to design 
specific direct payments policy measures and to ex-ante learn more about their potential 
uptake by farmers and problems.
An important advantage of using an experiment is the possibility of collecting natural data; 
the farmers make their own choices in the simulation experiment, instead of decisions being 
generated by a model based on restrictive assumptions regarding rationality, single-objective 
maximization and ignorance of phenomena such as trust in policy makers (e.g. time incon-
sistency), heterogeneous expectations, etc. Since the experimental approach does not impose 
any restrictions on the participant’s behaviour beforehand, this contributes to realism in the 
experimental research approach relative to the one relying on neo-classical micro economics. 
The formulas used in generating scenario outcomes in the simulation experiment are 
widely acknowledged accounting formulas, and relationships based on economic theories, 
complemented by expert-knowledge. This combination of using fundamentals from theory 
and relying on standard accountancy practice is assumed to further contribute to balanced 
outcomes fitting closely to reality. Since the experiment uses simulation, in which the CAP 
policies are controlled and fully transparent, it is possible to repeat the experiment in the 
same way and obtain similar results. Nevertheless, in practice the same farmers may react 
differently when being confronted with the same choices and therefore different results could 
be obtained in a subsequent experiment. 
In the experiment no direct monetary reward is present. Instead of money, the  farmers 
 obtained insights into the current debate on possible changes in the European direct 
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payments system and how these changes may affect their own farm business. In contrast with 
non-selected farmers, participating farmers were offered the opportunity to simulate with 
their own farm details, which may help them to find the best farming strategy towards these 
CAP changes. With regard to the principles for ensuring saliency (Smith, 1982), the  principle 
of non-satiation is not applicable to this experiment since it did not include a  situation 
where participants had to choose between different options with equivalent rewards. The 
principle of dominance is met; participants were not required to make any costs to take part 
in the experiment (except for some time and travel costs). However, they under scribed that 
the outcomes of the simulation experiment were valuable to them in order to anticipate on 
 developments of the CAP in future. The principle of relevance is met; simulating with own 
farm data increased the willingness to participate in the experiment. Read (2005) confirms 
that respondents can also be motivated by non-monetary rewards in experiments, especially 
if these rewards match with participants’ interests. 
If one of the main reasons to use rewards in experiments is to provide an incentive to 
 participate, this experiment clearly succeeded. The advantage for farmers that participate is 
that they have the opportunity to anticipate on possible changes earlier than other farmers 
that are not participating in the experiment. In the context of the experiment, this is the 
reward that motivates farmers to participate. Hence, when asked, farmers explicitly confirmed 
this. A counter effect of this is however, that it could lead to farmers experimenting with their 
farming situation, instead of providing realistic answers. 
One can question the representativeness of the experiment. Limitations were set when 
selecting the participating farmers for the experiment; farmers needed to fulfil specific 
requirements (e.g. being a dairy farmer and being a participant in the Dutch FADN network) 
and were thus not randomly selected. Also the location of the different participating farms 
were pre-specified and not randomly assigned throughout the Netherlands. Although 
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this might be justified given the explorative character of the study, it precludes an easy 
 generalization or aggregation of the outcomes to the Dutch dairy farm population2.
2.4. Assessing the impact of the CAP reform using an economic simulation 
 experiment 
In this section we first list the results of the experiment on measuring farmer behaviour 
towards the proposed CAP reform. Second, we discuss the added value of experimental 
economic results to more traditional microeconomic studies. Thereby we will show the 
contribution of the simulation experiment to the current dialogue on the impact of an alter-
native direct payment system and the support towards the provision of green services, as well 
as the contribution to the debate on the provision of ecosystem services on private land.
2.4.1 General results economic simulation experiment
The first hypothesis tested in the economic simulation experiment was on the effects of a 
change from the current direct payment system towards a system with flat rate payments 
and top up payments. We argued that farmers will respond with their farming strategies to 
expected effects of a change in the payment system on their farm income.
The economic simulation experiment we described in section 2.3 estimated the impact 
on net farm income in 2020 under the different farming strategies. Large differences were 
found between the different farms in each group and between the groups themselves. These 
 differences were firstly due to variations in intensity in kg milk per ha and farm location, 
and were secondly dependent on the level of current direct payments and possible top-up 
levels under the proposed CAP as well. Compared to the current farm income, the average 
2 Zijlstra et al. (2011: 48) discuss how the farming types in the simulation experiment relate to the 
Dutch dairy farm population.
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income of farmers in ‘East-sand’ went up by €5500 when the proposed CAP, as studied in the 
simulation experiment, was implemented. For the farms in ‘West-peat’ this rise in income 
was estimated on average to be €7000. This was mainly due to the top-up rewards farms 
could apply for under the proposed CAP in this region. On average, the income for farms in 
‘South-sand’ decreased between €20.000 tot €40.000. According to the farmers this amount 
was comparable to the amount of direct payments they received under the current CAP. Note, 
that these findings differ from the results reported in Jongeneel et al. (2012: p. 75). The main 
reason for this is the difference in the number of farms under investigation; Jongeneel et al. 
(2012: p. 26) included all farms that receive direct payments under the current CAP, whereas 
the simulation experiment focused on a few farms in specific areas only.
The economic simulation experiment showed that in setting farming strategies two factors 
play a significant role. First, economic motives appeared to determine the optimal allocation 
of production factors, suggesting that farmers try to minimize costs or maximize profits, as is 
assumed as well in neo-classical microeconomic theory. Second, rewards and the possibility 
for uptake in the current farming strategy were the main drivers for farmers to provide green 
and blue services. These two factors will be outlined shortly below. 
Overall, the farming strategies showed a development towards an increase in farm scale 
and growth of production. Reflecting on the selected adjustments in farming strategies 
in the simulation, it was shown that this pattern is driven by motives concerning income 
 preservation, increasing milk production (which is possibly linked to the abolishment of 
the milk quota in 2015) and technical innovation aimed at increasing the labour produc-
tivity. Diversification, either through the provision of green and blue services or starting a 
new side-line, such as cheese-making besides dairying only, played a significant factor in 
farming  strategies in the farms selected for the simulation as well. Nevertheless, in general 
the  simulation experiment showed that hardly any differences exist between the strategic 
measures chosen by farmers under the current CAP or under the proposed CAP. Table 2.2 
shows the responses of the different farmer groups in the simulation.
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Table 2.2 shows four types of strategies with the measures taken under that specific strategy. 
Within the group ‘East-sand’, differences in strategies were found between intensive 
and extensive farmers. The majority of the farmers stayed or became less intensive; they 
increased both in milk production and in land size. This had to do with the manure policy; 
if farms produce at the maximum manure excretion level of 250 kg N per ha, they received 
an additional top-up payment. However, some intensive farms stayed intensive or became 
even more so, i.e. increased milk production, in combination with making an investment 
in emission reduction-technologies aimed at reducing nitrogen emissions. Although these 
farms chose to forgo the top-up payment, they intended to do so, given their preferences 
to combine  in creasing milk production (and by that expanding farm returns and increasing 
Strategy
Measures
Times selected by farmers
‘East-sand’ ‘West-peat’ ‘South-sand’
Current
CAP
Proposed
CAP
Current
CAP
Proposed
CAP
Current
CAP
Proposed
CAP
Obtain growth
Increase milk production 12 12 8 8 12 12
Increase land 6 6 6 6 6 6
Increase hired labour - - 2 1 2 2
Implement other activities
Provide green and blue 
services
- 3 4 5 7 8
Start new form of 
agriculture
1 1 1 1 2 2
Diversification - - 2 2 - -
Farm management
Optimizationa 7 8 10 8 8 8
Adjust arable land useb 6 6 1 1 3 3
Increase value added 
product
- - 3 2 - -
Other
Cooperation with other 
sectorsc
- 1 1 1 - -
Cease farming - - 1 1 - -
a “Optimization” means improving the farm management on feed and fodder, manure and animal health. 
b “Adjust arable land use” means changing the allocation of land used for pasture and land use for growing corn. 
c “Cooperation with other sectors” means dairy farmers working together with arable farmers.
Source: adapted from Zijlstra et al. (2011)
Table 2.2 Selected measures by farmers in the simulation experiment
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farm scale) with emission-reduction. Also in ‘West-peat’ and ‘South-sand’ the main strategy 
was farm scale increase. Nevertheless, farms there were implementing other activities than 
dairy-farming as well. Diversification and starting a new sideline were driven by motives of 
spreading risk and being less dependent on government subsidies. Providing green and blue 
services can be seen as a form of diversification as well. 
The second hypothesis tested in the economic simulation experiment was on the willingness 
of farmers to provide green and blue services. We argued that the willingness is higher if the 
services fit better to the current farm situation and if the opportunity costs are feasible.
As stated before, the European Union proposes compulsory requirements on greening in 
their member states. As reflected in the simulation experiment, which was commissioned by 
the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation, the Dutch government 
is interested to learn more about options of implementing a greening payment. The option 
of a so-called ‘choice-menu for green services’, in which farmers can choose the services that 
suit them best in their farming strategy, and the administrative burden is kept low, was inves-
tigated in the economic simulation experiment.
Although the green and blue services, as offered for adoption in the simulation experiment, 
were region-specific, the reasoning of many farmers about them was the same. In general 
farmers felt that providing services should be beneficial to them (i.e. generate income). In 
practice this means that the reward should at least cover the extra costs involved by providing 
the service. That opportunity costs for providing green services matter was already hypo-
thesized in section 2.3.2, and this was confirmed in this study. Farmers felt that the rewards 
for green services in the simulation experiment were too low. However, from the experiment 
it became clear that the opportunity costs have to be seen within a medium to long-run 
farm strategy choice context, whereas this inter-temporal optimization aspect is likely to 
be ignored either by the existing neo-classical approaches as well as in the formulas policy 
makers use to calculate the rewards.
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Table 2.3 shows the percentages of several green and blue services that were selected under 
the proposed CAP by farmers in the three groups. As was shown earlier, during the simulation 
every group had its own selection of green and blue services to choose from. Each farmer 
could choose more than one service.
From the simulation experiment it was found that when the proposed CAP will be imple-
mented, farmers will not often choose to provide green and blue services. However, if a farmer 
will provide green services, it mostly likely involves a combination of services. Also, it was 
found that if the service already (partly) was provided (i.e. through cross-compliance criteria) 
the farmers were less reluctant to provide more of this service. In that case the services were 
probably found to be not disruptive for their current farming practice and for that reason not 
considered as too ‘costly’. This finding was found in other studies as well (Wilson and Hart, 
2000; Defrancesco et al., 2008; Mettepenningen et al., 2013). The results of the simulation 
Service
Times selected by farmers
'East-sand' 'West-peat'a 'South-sand'
Nature/biodiversity/landscape
Field boundaries 0 - -
Improve habitat meadow birds - 4 -
Botanical meadows - 3 -
Implement hedgerow 0 - 4
Wet vegetation management 1 - 1
Permanent meadows - - 4
Recreation
Footpath on farmland 2 1 3
Water
Environmentally friendly banks - 0 -
Ecological ditch management - 1 -
Ecological maintenance water system 0 - 5
Rewetting - 1 -
Water conservation 0 - 7
a One farmer in ‘West-peat’ chose to implement all green and blue services in his farming strategy to get a clear 
view on the total impact of providing green and blue services on the net income of his farm. He was experimenting 
rather than providing realistic responses.
Source: adapted from Zijlstra et al. (2011: pp. 69-72)
Table 2.3 Selected green and/or blue services
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experiment showed that economic motives have priority over environmental motives and 
social responsibility. 
2.4.2 The added value of the economic simulation experiment towards 
 neo-classical economics
In this section we contrast the simulation experiment with neo-classical microeconomic 
modelling approaches. For this, we will set out the relevant aspects of neo-classical produc-
tion theory and state the assumptions made within. This is especially interesting because it 
allows us to show the added value of the economic simulation experiment to neo-classical 
theory. 
Scientists often refer to several criteria in order to evaluate theories. These criteria include 
congruence with reality, generality, tractability and parsimony (Wilkinson, 2008: p. 8). 
Congruence with reality means that a theory should be able to explain observations from 
reality well and make reliable predictions about economic behaviour. Generality and tracta-
bility are somewhat in the same direction. The first states that theories should be applicable 
to a wide range of phenomena and the second means that theories should be applicable to 
a wide range of different situations. Parsimony means that one should balance the amount 
of assumptions; too many assumptions make the theory too abstract to reflect real-world 
situations properly, but with too few assumptions it is hard to set a theory which is applicable 
in the wider context. Sometimes additional criteria are given such as precision and psycho-
logical plausibility. Precision means the ability to provide exact numerical figures to describe 
observed, or predicted, behaviour and psychological plausibility refers to incorporating 
human reasoning into models in order to make them more accurate and useful in predicting 
behaviour (Wilkinson, 2008: p. 10).
Neo-classical economic theory meets the first 4 requirements. Within neo-classical economics, 
several assumptions are stated in order to make theory applicable to reflect on reality in a 
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wider context (see e.g. Thijssen, 1994; Boots et al., 1997). One of these assumptions includes 
farm households behaving rationally. The requirements precision and psychological plausi-
bility, as stated above, are founded within the field of behavioural economics. This type of 
economic analysis uses emotional and cognitive factors for explaining the economic behav-
iour of agents. By making a combination of neo-classical economics and psychology, it puts 
the bounded rationality of agents at stake (Wilkinson, 2008: p. 11).
Experimental economics is a separate branch of economics. Although it is different from 
behavioural economics, i.e. information is gathered by using experiments, rather than by 
observing behaviour in the field, in this case several parallels can be shown and additions to 
neo-classical theory can be made. 
Via the simulation experiment, information on the selected measures of farmers was obtained, 
where it was explicitly allowed for that farmers make their choices within a multiple year 
time horizon. This way, it is possible to analyse the farmer behaviour behind the selection 
of farming strategies of farmers. Neo-classical microeconomic models usually treat several 
factors as quasi-fixed and as such leave no or limited space for farmers to specifically alter 
these choices. Moreover, they rather treat the decision process as a black-box (e.g. assuming 
profit maximization or cost minimization, see further in this section). For researchers using 
these models, it is therefore not possible to analyse these decisions in detail. This is where the 
economic simulation experiment can be of true added value in analysing farmer behaviour.
The simulation experiment is used to measure specific behaviour of farmers. By this, it does 
not impose prior assumptions, such as rationality, on farmer behaviour, but rather tests for 
these. Through this, the reliability of the results increases since in practice farmers some-
times make decisions which cannot be considered fully rational within a narrow profit 
 maximization-perspective. This is contradicting to neo-classical microeconomic theory in 
which heterogeneity among farmers would be captured beforehand by setting assumptions. 
We can stretch this a little further by pointing out the treatment of inter-temporal decisions. 
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In its essence, neo-classical theory is static; for example if prices go up, the supply of a 
product will go up as well. However, in practise this might not be the case. A farmer selling 
slaughter cattle might not increase supply directly if prices go up. If he is expecting prices 
to rise even further in future, he might consider to wait and see how prices develop. Using 
experimental economics makes it possible to analyse this kind of inter-temporal decisions as 
it easily allows for more dynamic analyses.
A second well-known assumption made in neoclassical microeconomics when analysing 
farm households is optimizing behaviour subject to technical constraints that limit produc-
tion possibilities (Jehle and Reny, 2011: p. 118). This can be translated into farmers acting 
according to cost minimization or profit maximization. In the simulation, optimizing 
 behaviour was not imposed in the analysis. Interestingly however, it was found that economic 
motives (i.e. cost minimization) play a significant role in setting farming strategies. In this 
sense the outcomes of the experiment support the assumption of optimization as made in 
neo-classical economics. 
Neo-classical theory further assumes that farm households maximize their short-run profits 
subject to in- and output prices by choosing optimal input and output levels (Thijssen, 1994). 
In the simulation experiment choosing farming strategies is also limited to adjusting in- 
and output quantities. However, by using an experiment one can be more flexible in setting 
farming strategies. For example, the result might be not choosing optimal levels in the 
short-run but in the long-run instead.
In the simulation experiment, farmers had to make expectations on future prices; input (e.g. 
price of concentrates) and output (i.e. milk price) prices were set by farmers in  accordance to 
their expectations on future prices, which may differ among farmers. Allowing for hetero-
geneous price expectations is a great advantage of the experiment. It makes it possible to 
distinguish between farmer behaviour and expectation formation of farmers. Although 
microeconomic models allow for price expectations, these are usually defined uniformly by 
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the researchers. Also, farmers could adjust the values of farm characteristics according to 
their farming strategies and set different values for the future. This means that the experi-
ment allows inputs to be variable rather than being fixed, as can be the case for some inputs 
in neo-classical economics. For example, land is often considered as a fixed factor input in 
the short run, but in the simulation experiment a farmer can increase or decrease the amount 
of land over time.
The neo-classical model also assumes production factors to be homogenous (Jehle and Reny, 
2011: p. 140) whereas an experiment does not impose this restriction. For example, the simu-
lation showed that the quality of land is determinative for the provision of green and blue 
services; farmers were located in different areas of the Netherlands, i.e. on different qualities 
of land. The experiment coped with this by allowing the farmers to provide different green 
and blue services. Also the top-up reward of one group (‘West-peat’) was linked to being 
located in a Less Favoured Area.
2.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter contributes to the current dialogue on the 2013 changes in the Common 
Agricultural Policy in the Netherlands and the potential impact of this on farm income and 
farming strategies, thereby focusing specifically on an alternative direct payment system 
based on a flat rate, and including green payments. For this the added value of using the 
economic simulation experiment besides traditional economic research methods was shown 
and evaluated. 
It is expected that the transition from direct payments based on historical references to flat 
rate payments will negatively affect the income of Dutch dairy farms, and make the income 
less stable. The economic simulation experiment analysed in this chapter shows that farmers 
make their short-run decisions within a longer run strategy-choice framework. With regard 
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to the provision of green services, it was found that the reward for the (extra) effort farmers 
need to put in should be sufficient to cover the additional costs. The importance of adequate 
 financial compensation confirms earlier findings obtained by more traditional microeconomic 
(modelling) approaches. Even when participation is not voluntary but rather compulsory, 
obligations will be imposed on farmers’ knowledge about the associated  financial cost-benefit 
implications. For example, enforcing farmers to participate in an unattractive deal is likely 
to induce or increase non-compliance behaviour of farmers with European legislation. As a 
result an increase and intensification of monitoring, inspection and sanction mechanisms 
might be necessary to still get farmers in line with European policy ambitions.
The experimental approach showed that allowing farmers to adjust the structure of their 
farm (optimize strategy choice), will have implications for the final income impacts. Studies 
using a static approach have a tendency to provide an upper-bound of the negative income 
effects and a lower bound of the positive income effects. Via optimizing their strategy farmers 
may further mitigate negative impacts on income. 
As regards the methodological approaches, it is concluded first that the use of a simulation 
experiment provides a more flexible approach than a neo-classical microeconomic model. It 
contributes to the neoclassical microeconomic theory in several ways. In particular where 
standard neo-classical models presume (short-run) cost minimization or profit  maximization; 
in the simulation experiment this was not presumed. Second, the simulation experiment 
is more flexible in the context of farming strategies; in neo-classical models strategies 
are limited to adjusting only in- and output quantities. Third, in neo-classical models the 
production factors are assumed to be homogenous, whereas in the simulation experiment 
we allow them to be heterogeneous. Fourth, the simulation experiment with farmers allows 
for hetero geneous price expectations, formulated by the farmers themselves whereas neo- 
classical models usually use uniform price expectations defined by the modeller. 
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Appendix 2.1
Hypothetical payments for green and blue services for different groups
Service
Annual rewards1
‘East-sand’ ‘West-peat’ ‘South-sand’
Nature/biodiversity/landscape
Field boundaries €1020 (pasture)
€1652 (arable land)
Improve habitat meadow birds €599
Botanical meadows €1165
Implement hedgerow €47 per a (new) €47 per a (new)
€27 per a (existing) €27 per a (existing)
Wet vegetation management €1211 €1211
Permanent meadows €144
Recreation
Footpath on farmland €84 per 100 m €84 per 100 m €84 per 100 m
Water
Environmentally friendly banks €77 per 100 m
Ecological ditch management €200 per 1000 m
Ecological maintenance water system €179 per 100 m €179 per 100 m
Rewetting €250
Water conservation €260 at once €260 at once
1 All rewards are indicated per ha unless stated otherwise (a = are)
Source: Adapted from Zijlstra et al. (2011: pp. 69-72)
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Explaining Production Expansion Decisions 
 of Dutch Dairy Farmers1
Abstract
The abolition of dairy quotas in Europe in 2015 has been accompanied by uncer-
tainty on expansion of the European dairy sector. The objective of this study is 
to analyse which factors determine milk production expansion by Dutch dairy 
farmers. A conceptual model is developed that shows how policies, market 
conditions, and farmers’ values and goals affect their expansion decisions. Three 
investment theories are combined and form the basis for a dynamic random 
effects probit model. Data are obtained from the Dutch Farm Accountancy Data 
Network (FADN) covering the period 2001 through 2010, with 1390 observa-
tions on 354 dairy farms included in the sample. The results indicate that Dutch 
dairy farms can potentially increase milk production in the future.
1 Paper by Gerlinda S. Samson, Cornelis Gardebroek and Roel A. Jongeneel, NJAS - Wageningen Journal 
of Life Sciences 76 (2016) 87-98. Doi: 10.1016/j.njas.2015.11.007
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3.1 Introduction
As part of the 2008 Health Check of the Common European Agricultural Policy (CAP), milk 
quotas were gradually increased since 2009 (soft landing), and fully abolished in April 2015 
(European Commission, 2011). Until 2004-2005 there was a net overrun of the total milk quota 
in the EU. However, as of 2005-2006 this overrun changed into a net underuse of the milk 
quota, which increased rapidly over the years. In the year 2011-2012 only Austria, Ireland, 
Germany, Cyprus, Luxembourg and the Netherlands were producing more milk than their 
national quotas allowed (European Commission, 2012). 
The impact of abolishing milk quotas on the dairy sector as a whole and on the behaviour of 
dairy farmers is a highly discussed topic in European agricultural policy. Especially since in 
the Netherlands milk quotas were still binding when they were abolished, it is interesting to 
study what happens to Dutch milk production after quota abolishment. Whereas the total 
amount of quotas was limited and the value of quotas was falling (eventually they lost value 
since they expired (Jongeneel et al., 2010)) a significant part of active Dutch dairy farmers 
followed an expansion strategy, thereby exploiting economies of scale. It is expected that 
the overall milk production in the Netherlands will substantially increase after abolishment 
of the quota (Jongeneel, 2009). Jongeneel and Van Berkum (2015) predict this increase to 
be 17 per cent in the next ten years, which can be attributed to changes in the expected 
market conditions (e.g. milk price), structural issues (e.g. land, buildings and machinery) and 
other drivers. 
Various studies analysed the effects of milk quota abolition on production levels in European 
Union Member States. Lips and Rieder (2005) used a CGE framework to analyse the effects of 
quota abolition together with an elimination of export subsidies on dairy production levels. 
For 2015, an overall increase of 33% in production levels and a 22% decrease of the milk price, 
relative to the base year 1997, was projected. Bouamra-Mechemache et al. (2008) analysed the 
impact of a gradual increase of milk quota for EU member states using a spatial equilibrium 
55
3
model that includes international trade flows. They found that when milk quotas are fully 
abolished, the international trade effects for EU member states will be similar to the effects of 
a 2% gradual increase in milk quotas starting in 2009. They found that, for the Netherlands in 
particular, the contribution to the overall increase in EU milk production after quota abolish-
ment is estimated to be 40%. Witzke et al. (2009) studied regional effects of quota abolition, 
using non-linear mathematical programming models. They found that the effects of milk 
quota abolition depend on quota rents. In regions with high quota rents (such as regions in 
the Netherlands or in Austria), production levels are expected to increase after abolition. 
An expected decline in milk prices will mostly affect regions with low quota rents (such as 
regions in UK or Sweden or the new EU member states), pressuring them to, partially, with-
draw from the market. De Frahan et al. (2011) evaluated effects of abolishing milk quotas in 
combination with milk price reductions on milk supply and farm income of Belgian dairy 
farms. They analysed effects by embedding cost functions into a profit maximization model 
using data of the Belgian farm accountancy data network. Their main results showed that 
after abolishment of the milk quotas and assuming a reduction in milk prices of 20%, aggre-
gate milk supply and farm income will be at the same level as in their base year 2006. Using an 
output distance function approach, Emvalomatis (2012) analysed changes in revenues from 
milk production and productivity growth on German dairy farms, using land, labour, capital, 
livestock and materials as explanatory factors. The total factor productivity growth rate was 
estimated to be 1.1% with technological progress as main contributor. Läpple and Hennessy 
(2012) simulated Irish production expansion after milk quota abolishment at different milk 
price scenarios. For their basic simulation model they used livestock size and milk yield as 
explanatory factors for milk output. They found that the rate of structural change, produc-
tivity growth and the level of milk prices will be important drivers for milk output in future. 
Relative to 2008, the aggregate milk supply of Ireland is estimated to potentially increase 
with 41% after quota abolishment. If the option to increase in land area is also taken into 
account, this increase can be even higher. The case of Ireland is especially of interest since 
Ireland, just as the Netherlands, compared to other EU countries, is considered to potentially 
expand most in milk production after quota abolishment.
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Most of the studies mentioned above try to assess how milk production changes after quota 
abolition. This study tries to shed some light on this issue indirectly, by focusing on the 
 decision process of milk production expansion at the farm level. The aforementioned studies 
are mainly based on pure economic perspectives and do not incorporate non- economic 
factors, which we believe are also relevant to the specific decision making process on produc-
tion expansion by dairy farmers. In this study we investigate Dutch dairy farmers’  decisions 
on milk production expansion taking both economic and non-economic factors into account. 
Although our analysis is based on data from the quota period, we do believe that important 
conclusions can be drawn that are useful to assess the dairy sector in the post quota period. 
This study contributes to the current literature in two ways. First, an inclusive analysis of 
the decision making characteristics that are relevant in explaining production expansion 
behaviour of Dutch dairy farmers has not yet been performed, and this can provide impor-
tant insights in the possible scenarios after quota abolishment. In our approach therefore 
not only economic, but also social and environmental variables are used in explaining 
 expansion  decisions. Second, several studies focus at a macro-level on possible impacts of 
quota abolishment (for a study in the Netherlands see Jongeneel et al., 2010). However, micro 
level  modelling specifically allows for heterogeneity between individual farms, and there-
fore provides more information on the specific behaviour of individual farmers. Such studies 
are relatively scarce in the current discussion on the impact of milk quota abolishment on 
milk production levels. Hence, research at the individual farm level of the Dutch dairy sector 
is conducted.
This chapter continues in section 3.2 with an overview of developments in the Dutch dairy 
sector. It is important to have some context information since several changes affected the 
Dutch dairy sector recently. Section 3.3 presents the conceptual model used as a basis for 
our empirical analysis. Next, in section 3.4 the data are described with specific attention to 
the included model variables and their definitions. Section 3.5 discusses various econometric 
issues and presents the empirical model. Estimation results are presented in section 3.6 and 
discussed in section 3.7. Finally, section 3.8 provides general conclusions.
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3.2 Developments in the Dutch dairy sector
This section describes several general developments in the Dutch dairy sector. This provides 
useful background information but also defines external factors that are present in the 
conceptual model defined in the next section. 
3.2.1 Milk prices and milk price volatility
Milk prices are an important element in the debate on impacts on milk production expansion 
after milk quota abolishment. The effect of changing milk prices on production expansion is 
complex. Based on several (macro-level) projections by FAO, FAPRI and EC on developments 
in the EU dairy sector, Jongeneel et al. (2010) show that the demand for dairy products will 
increase in the coming years. This has an upward effect on milk prices. However, it is expected 
that discussions with the WTO on further trade liberalisation will influence conditions on 
agricultural commodity markets and as such will also have impact on the market for milk. 
The trend towards more trade liberalisation reduces the use of agricultural trade distorting 
 measures. This will push down the EU prices for agricultural commodities, including milk 
prices, in the coming years. With the gradual reduction of guaranteed milk prices in the EU, 
milk prices are stronger related to world market prices. This increases price volatility for 
farmers (Jongeneel et al., 2011).
3.2.2 Manure policy
After the abolishment of milk quotas, dairy farms do not face production limits anymore. 
However, new bottlenecks for production expansion will most likely arise. One of these is the 
manure surplus production level.
Manure surpluses are a major problem in the Netherlands for decades, especially in  intensive 
livestock production, but also in part of the dairy sector. Farmers often produce more 
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manure than they can apply at their land. European guidelines (Nitrate Directive) prescribe a 
maximum manure application level of 170 kg N per ha. Until 2017 the Netherlands obtained a 
so-called derogation, which allows dairy farmers to apply 230 or 250 kg N per ha (depending 
on the location of the farm) on farms where 70% of the total farm area consists of grassland. 
Still it is expected that also in the future the nationally set maximum manure application 
level will be exceeded, especially after the milk quota abolishment in 2015, and dairy farms 
will increase production, often without obtaining more land.
The Dutch government implemented a new manure policy from 1 January 2015 onwards 
(Dutch Government, 2014a). Dutch dairy farms are restricted to so-called phosphate reference 
levels. If farms produce more manure than they are maximally allowed to apply on their land, 
they are obliged to dispose their manure production surplus (Dutch Government, 2014b), for 
example by exporting the manure to neighbouring countries as Belgium or Germany, getting 
involved in contracts with manure processing firms, or manure can be processed into energy 
by burning it.
Farmers have to anticipate these policy changes when considering milk production expan-
sion. Moreover, they need to consider more efficient manure production on their farms or 
arrange manure supply to other farms to remain below the maximum manure application 
level set on their farms. Hence, when analysing production expansion behaviour of Dutch 
dairy farmers, it is realistic to take the manure surplus production level into account. 
3.2.3 Land market
Another bottleneck for production expansion after milk quota abolishment is the avail ability 
of agricultural land. In attempting to reduce the manure emissions per ha, a farmer can 
consider to increase in land size. However, prices for agricultural land in the Netherlands rose 
between 2000 and 2010 on average by 3.65% per year from respectively 35985 euro per ha 
to 47500 euro per ha (LEI Wageningen UR, 2013). This makes investing in land for farms 
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relatively expensive. In the Netherlands agricultural land is scarce, and typically the only way 
to obtain more land is when neighbouring farms exit farming and agricultural land becomes 
for sale. 
3.2.4 CAP reform
As of 2014, a new Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was introduced in the EU. In the agree-
ment made by the EU commission, EU Parliament and EU Council (European Commission, 
2013), several obligations towards the use of agricultural land with respect to obtaining 
subsidy payments were set. Thirty per cent of the direct payments will only be paid to farmers 
if they comply with the following rules; they need to diversify land use and they need to 
maintain permanent grassland. Alternative measures for agricultural management may only 
be taken if their environmental effects are equal to the effects of the measures above. This 
new policy may have implications on the production systems of farmers as they cannot use 
all land freely in milk production. However, in practice the implications for the Dutch dairy 
sector will most likely be limited since several (national) conditions on these alternative 
measures are imposed (for example dairy farms may face limitations to renew grassland). 
3.3 Conceptual model
This section discusses the conceptual model that is the basis for the empirical analysis of 
decisions on dairy production expansion. It is assumed that farmers base their decision to 
expand on an intertemporal comparison of expected benefits and costs of expansion, making 
this a dynamic decision making process. 
Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the factors involved in this dynamic decision making process. 
The first two sets of factors are the policies and market conditions that were discussed in 
the previous section. These are external factors that cannot be influenced by the farmer. 
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The solid arrows indicate that policies and market conditions have a direct impact on the 
dynamic expansion decision making process. The dashed arrow indicates that policies also 
have an impact on market conditions, but this relation is less relevant in our model. Besides 
these external factors, there are also two sets of internal factors that potentially have an 
important direct relation to the expansion decision. These are indicated with solid lines and 
include the values, goals and strategy of the farmer and the characteristics of the farm. Also 
here interactions between the different sets of factors exist and are indicated with dashed 
lines (e.g. changes in market conditions may induce farmers to change their strategy). 
However, for the analysis of expansion decisions only the direct impacts are relevant. Note 
that decisions on expansion also affect the farm characteristics. 
In defining farm strategies, farmer attitudes and values have become more important over the 
years (Lans et al., 2014; O’Rourke et al., 2012; Solano et al., 2006; Van der Ploeg, 1993). A study 
using farmer attitudes and values is Bergevoet et al. (2004), who found that differences in milk 
Figure 3.1 Conceptual model explaining farm expansion decisions 
Source: own elaboration
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quotas can be explained by the differences in farming strategies of farmers, which are the 
result from variations in farmers’ goals and objectives. These results were obtained using 
the theory of planned behaviour, which states that differences in behaviour among others 
can be explained by differences in personal goals and intentions. Bergevoet et al. (2004) used 
the typology of goals developed by Willock et al. (1999) that distinguishes five categories; 
success in farming, sustainability, quality of life, status, off-farm work. Also Schmitzberger 
et al. (2005) recognizes the importance of considering farmers’ attitudes towards farming. 
Their classification of farming strategies resulted in the definition of eight types; the yield 
optimiser, the traditionalist, the innovator, the support optimiser, the idealist, the part time 
farmer, the forced farmer and the social farmer. The classification by Valbuena et al. (2008) 
is comparable and based on farmers’ attitudes towards four variables including continuity 
of farming, production strategy, diversification of farm, and subsidy schemes. This results in 
five different agent types: hobby, conventional, diversifier, expansionist conventional, expan-
sionist diversifier. 
Frawley and Reidy (1986) analysed farm strategies, among other production expansion 
behaviour, by studying which farm characteristics influence farm strategies. In figure 3.1 this 
is represented by the dashed arrow between farm characteristics and farmer’s values, goals 
and strategies. Frawley and Reidy (1986) found relevant relationships between several farm 
categories: farm structural factors (land area, milk supply), farm practices (feed character-
istics, degree of dairy specialization), farm performance (milk yield per cow, stocking rate), 
farmers’ demographic factors (age, fulltime farming), and farm planning (succession). 
The studies mentioned above show that it is important to take farm and farmer character-
istics into account when explaining milk production expansion behaviour. Ondersteijn et al. 
(2003) explain the strong link between farmer characteristics and strategies by the fact that in 
the Netherlands farms are mainly run as family farms where the farmer is the single manager 
and entrepreneur of the business. This means that the farming strategy chosen depends 
mainly on the farmer’s attitudes and preferences. The decisions taken by the farmer influence 
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the technical, financial and environmental farm results. In general, recognizing different 
farming strategies and farming styles is relevant in addressing various agricultural questions. 
Moreover, analysing underlying farming characteristics contributes to a better understanding 
of agricultural processes (Van der Ploeg et al., 2009).
That farmers have different strategies is also empirically observed. Samson et al. (2013) 
describe the evolvement in two different types of farms in the Netherlands. The relatively 
smaller farms, which cannot compete with larger farms, differentiate from their main produc-
tion and change farming strategy by implementing side-activities (such as cheese-making or 
recreation), or they exit farming. The relatively larger and more competitive farms potentially 
buy the land that becomes available when smaller farms exit. These farms grow larger and 
possibly become even more competitive by increasing production and decreasing the cost 
of production. In recent years, many Dutch farmers already invested in stable space which 
 indicates that they were already anticipating on production expansion after quota abolish-
ment. Figure 3.2 shows that the number of farms is steadily decreasing whereas the number 
of animals increases. This implies a development towards fewer, but larger farms. 
Figure 3.2 Development of the Dutch dairy sector 
Source: CBS (2013)
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A central element in the conceptual model as given in figure 3.1 is the farm-specific decision 
making process on production expansion, which involves comparing the stream of expected 
revenues from expansion with the costs of investment. This means that the decision making 
process of the farmer is actually a dynamic problem under uncertainty that is represented by 
the following optimal value function:
(1)V p K Z E p K Z C Iit it it I t t it it it it ittit
, , max , , |( ) = ( ) − ( ) 
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  
Subject to:
K I Kit it it+ = + −[ ]1 1 δ (2)
The optimal value function (1) states that farmer i in each period t has to decide on whether 
to invest in stable capacity (Iit > 0), disinvest (Iit < 0)
2 , or do nothing (Iit = 0) by comparing the 
stream of expected discounted future profits with the incurred cost of investment C(Iit) in 
year t, given all information that farmers have available at period t, represented by a set of 
 variables Ωit. The investment adds to the available depreciated capital stock in 
year t ([1- δ]Kit), where δ is the depreciation rate, so that in the next period Kit+1 is available, as 
given by equation (2). The total amount of capital available in year t is used in production 
together with other quasi-fixed inputs Zt (such as labour and land) and variable inputs (such 
as animal feed, veterinary costs and energy). The yearly optimal profits from production are 
given by the short-run profit function π(.), which implies that farmers choose optimal output 
supply and input demand quantities given output and input prices (represented by the 
vector pit), the amount of capital Kit, and other quasi-fixed inputs Zit. Optimal short-run profits 
in year t are discounted by a factor ρt, which is defined as ρt
tr= +[ ]1 1 , where r is an interest 
rate. The information available as captured by Ωit includes information on European and 
national  policies, and proposed changes therein, market conditions and local conditions that 
affect expansion such as local legislation regarding noise and odour nuisance. It also captures 
2 Although the theoretical model allows for disinvestments, these are hardly observed in our dataset, 
and therefore will not be considered any further.
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 farmer characteristics that define the way expectations are formed and personal values, goals 
and strategies as discussed above.
Farmers typically do not invest in stable capacity every year but only once in a while. This 
has been recognized in the empirical economic literature for long time and various explana-
tions have been given for this. Fixed asset theory (Chavas, 1994) states there exists a wedge 
between the new value of an investment (acquisition costs) and the scrap value (salvage value) 
when disinvesting. When the dynamic marginal value of investment (dynamic shadow price) 
is in between these values, farmers will not invest, nor disinvest. Another branch of litera-
ture states that the cost of investment function C(Iit) includes fixed adjustment costs, such as 
costs of building and environmental licenses, costs of restructuring the production process, 
search costs etc. The additional expected benefits of a relatively small change in production 
capacity would not outweigh these adjustment costs, providing an additional explanation 
for the many zero investments observed among farmers (Oude Lansink and Stefanou, 1997; 
Gardebroek, 2004). A third branch of literature stresses that due to (partial) irreversibility of 
an investment and uncertainty on future prices and policies it may not be optimal to invest 
immediately if the net present value of an investment only just covers the investment cost 
but instead it may be more optimal to wait. This option theory of investment states that the 
investment threshold that results is increasing in the sunk investment costs, revenue vola-
tility, the probability of a policy change, and the interest rate, and decreasing in the trend of 
the revenues (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Wossink and Gardebroek, 2006; Hinrichs et al., 2008). 
The fixed asset theory and adjustment cost theory lead to formal investment decision rules 
based on comparing dynamic shadow prices (marginal benefits) with marginal investment 
costs, whereas option theory results in investment decision rules based on net present value 
calculation, so focusing on total expected benefits and costs. This makes it mathematically 
difficult (and beyond the scope of this chapter) to derive a unified decision rule based on these 
three theories. Nevertheless, all three theories explain the existence of investment thresholds 
and provide insight in relevant variables that determine these thresholds. Moreover, once the 
65
3
(marginal) value of investment exceeds the threshold, the expected benefits determine the 
size of the investment. Therefore, we can write the decision to expand as:
Iit =
>1   if  (marginal) expected investment benefits investment threshold
   if  (marginal) expected investment bene0 fits investment threshold≤



(3)
if (marginal) expected investment ben fits > investment threshold
if (marginal) expected investment ben fits ≤ investment thres old
3.4 Data and included variables
Data for this study were obtained from the Dutch Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). 
Farms having dairy farming as their main source of income were selected for the sample. 
Originally, the analysis started with 2872 observations on 476 Dutch dairy farms, covering the 
period 2001 to 2010. Since farms usually remain in the panel for about five years, the dataset 
formed an unbalanced panel. A total of 111 (23%) farms were in the panel the whole period 
(10 years), 60 (13%) farms were in the panel from year 2006-2010, and 50 (11%) farms were in 
the panel from year 2006-2009. Together these farms included 47% of the total observations 
in the panel. Due to data transformations and specification of variables, the model was esti-
mated using 1390 observations on 354 farms.
It is challenging to assess production expansion behaviour of Dutch dairy farms under a 
milk quota regime. However, as stated earlier, Dutch dairy farms anticipated on production 
expansion after quota abolishment by increasing stable capacity, although it might have not 
been fully utilized (for example because farmers were not prepared to invest in additional 
quota anymore, but rather preferred to invest in the ‘hardware’ of their farms). The average 
 occupancy of stable places at Dutch dairy farms in our dataset is 0.71 (0.18 sd.) in 2010, 
 indicating that farms indeed underutilized stable capacity. This is partly due to the combined 
impact of the prevailing milk quota system and steady annual increase in milk yields per cow. 
Contrary to the use of herd size in literature on production expansion and structural change 
of farms (Läpple and Hennessy, 2012; Huettel and Jongeneel, 2011), production expansion of 
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Dutch farmers is measured as investments in extra stable space. It is a binary variable that 
takes the value one when farms invested in capital and increased in stable places at the same 
time (i.e. so we catch the investments in stable place only and filter out other type of invest-
ments, such as investments in machinery), and zero if one of these conditions is not met. 
Based on the conceptual model discussed in the previous section various economic, social 
and environmental variables are selected that explain production expansion behaviour. 
Below we hypothesize the relations between the selected variables and production expansion 
behaviour of farmers. We also provide definitions of the variables included. 
Since the FADN mostly includes economic information, we were limited in which variables to 
include in the analysis. This especially affected the selection of non-economic factors, such 
as psychological factors and the (social) attitude of the farmers, which were not present in the 
database. In general such types of social variables are difficult to measure and information 
is hardly available. Information on location is relevant to include as well. In the Netherlands 
several farms are located in, or close to, Natura 2000 areas and Ecological Focus Areas. This 
means that they cannot expand in land, which is eventually needed to expand in milk produc-
tion. However, information on this variable was only available for a small part of our sample. 
Including this variable would lead to many missing observations and as such the represent-
ativeness of the sample. Information on relevant municipal or provincial polices regarding 
farm expansion was also not available. Although no specific policy variables are included, the 
effects of policy changes are likely to be implicitly included in the way farmers form expec-
tations on their future benefits and costs of expansion. Moreover, the farm-specific means of 
these relevant unobserved variables are captured by the unobserved farm-specific effects that 
are dealt with in the empirical approach.
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3.4.1 Market conditions
Milk price. Equation (1) shows that optimal expansion decisions are based on maximizing the 
expected stream of benefits minus costs of expansion. An important element in the expected 
stream of benefits are the expected milk prices that determine yearly profits. We therefore 
hypothesize that if milk prices are expected to go up farmers will expand in milk production 
capacity. Expected milk price is measured per kg milk production in euros. Therefore the milk 
prices vary over farms and over years. The way expectations are approximated is discussed in 
the empirical section.
Milk price volatility. According to the option theory of investment that was discussed in 
section 3.2, volatility in revenues increases the threshold for investment. We therefore 
hypothesize that the higher the milk price volatility, the less eager farmers are to expand 
in milk production. In order to create a variable to measure (expected) milk price volatility, 
we follow the approach of Aramyan et al. (2007) and Oude Lansink et al. (2001). They use the 
following formula to generate a weighted farm-specific price variance measure:
(4)var p = 0.5 p - E p +0.33 p - E p +it it-1 t-2 it-1
2
it-2 t-3 it-2
2( ) { }( ) { }( ) 0.17 p - E pit-3 t-4 it-3
2{ }( )
 
The expected prices are based on an estimated panel AR(1) process. 
Manure production surplus. It is expected that after quota abolition a new limit for produc-
tion (expansion) will be the manure production surplus (section 3.2.2). We hypothesize that 
manure surplus increases the threshold for expansion so that the higher the current manure 
production surplus per ha, the less likely farmers are to expand in production. The manure 
production surplus is measured as the costs of manure disposal per ha. For the amount of ha 
the agricultural area is taken. 
Nitrogen. As stated in section 3.2.2, application norms for nitrogen from manure are set. 
Similarly to the manure production surplus variable, we hypothesize that the higher the 
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nitrogen production level per ha, the less likely farmers are to expand in production. The 
balance between the level of nitrogen production at the farm at the beginning and at the end 
of the year is called the nitrogen balance, and is measured in kg nitrogen per ha. 
Land area. Different values for the use of agricultural land can be distinguished. Land can be 
used for feed production, and it provides space for manure disposal. For years, milk quotas 
were linked to land. This means that farms could only increase milk quotas by increasing their 
land as well. Since 2006 transactions of milk quotas without land became possible, and the 
coupled payments were replaced by decoupled payments. These payments are freely trans-
ferable, however a farm needs to have 1 ha of land in order to be able to utilize the direct 
payments. This provides a third value of land. If a farm is able to press down their variable 
costs, it becomes more competitive and has better possibilities to expand in milk production. 
The above mentioned values for land reflect the three ways for a farm to reduce their variable 
costs by increasing in land area. Although options to expand the land area are limited and 
depend on the local land market (Cotteleer, 2008), we hypothesize that a positive change in 
land area positively influences the production expansion behaviour of farmers. Land area is 
measured in number of hectares. 
3.4.2 Farmer’s values, goals and strategies
Age. We hypothesize that younger farmers are more eager to invest in order to expand produc-
tion than older farmers who may exit farming in the upcoming years (Aramyan et al., 2007; 
Oude Lansink et al., 2001). They may form expectations in different ways and value  expansion 
differently. In order to allow for a non-linear effect also the square of age is included in 
the model.
Continuity. We hypothesize that almost retiring farmers without a successor are less likely to 
expand in production compared to almost retiring farmers with a successor (Aramyan et al., 
2007; Oude Lansink et al., 2001). The latter may have the objective to expand in order to leave 
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a more viable farm business to the successor. Farm’s continuity is measured as the farmer 
having a successor or not and is linked to the age of the farmer; it is a binary variable which 
takes the value one if a farmer is below 50 years old or if a farmer is over 50 years old, but has 
a successor. It is zero if the farmer is over 50 and/or has no successor. 
Fulltime farming. We hypothesize that if a farmer works fulltime on dairy production, he is 
more willing to expand in milk production, than if he has other sources of income besides 
dairying. To indicate fulltime farming a binary variable is included, which takes the value one 
if farmers work fulltime on dairy farming (i.e. 1976 hrs. per year or more = 38 hrs. per week 
times 52 weeks per year).
Diversification. Different farming strategies represent differences in farming behaviour (Van 
der Ploeg et al., 2009). By deriving information on diversity in farming strategies, for example 
a farmer involved in cheese-making or involved in landscape management, distinctions can 
be made between production oriented dairy farmers, diversifying farmers and more envi-
ronmentally focused farmers (Bergevoet et al., 2004). Farmers having dairying as their only 
source of income are expected to show different behaviour than farmers that have additional 
sources of income as well. Dependency on other sources of income determines the expan-
sion behaviour of farms. We hypothesize that if farms are less focused on pure milk produc-
tion, they are less likely to expand in production. Three variables are included to measure 
other sources of income besides dairy production. They are calculated as the income from 
these activities per kg milk production and include: landscape management, recreation, and 
on-farm milk processing such as producing cheese or butter.
42% of the farms in the dataset were engaged in diversification; 54% in landscape manage-
ment, 15% in recreation and 2% in on-farm milk processing. If these percentages are 
compared with the situation for the Netherlands as a whole, comparable numbers are 
found. Most of the diversifying Dutch dairy farms are engaged in landscape management 
(76% in 2009). Besides this, farms mainly engage in recreation and on-farm milk processing 
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(resp. 14% and 10% in 2009). The total number of farms engaged in some kind of side-activity 
lies in reality a bit lower, at 23% (Berkhout and Van Bruchem, 2010). Although only 2% of the 
farms are engaged in on-farm milk processing, the ratio of total earnings from that activity 
to the total income from all side-activities together is almost as high as the ratio of total 
earnings from landscape management; respectively 40% and 46%. The ratio of earnings from 
recreation is 15%.
Livestock. A farm can have different strategies to increase its dairy herd; they can buy more 
dairy cows, or they can keep and grow more calves and heifers. Most Dutch farmers choose the 
second option in order to increase the dairy herd. It takes two years before calves and heifers 
can be considered as productive dairy cows. An increase in dairy herd eventually then leads 
to an increase in milk production on farm. Nevertheless, keeping more calves and heifers also 
increases the feed costs, which makes the farm less competitive. This might press the effect 
on production expansion down. We hypothesize that an increase in livestock, has a positive 
effect on production expansion, since more livestock means more stable capacity needed. 
Livestock is measured as the number of calves and heifers. 
3.4.3 Farm characteristics
Farm size. An important variable in de the context of investment theory is farm size (Aramyan 
et al., 2007; Oude Lansink et al., 2001). Reasoning from neoclassical economic theory, smaller 
farms, compared to larger farms, have the benefit to reduce their costs relatively easily due to 
economies of scale (i.e. increasing in production). The higher the margin between the market 
milk price and a farm’s costs of production, the more competitive a farm is. We therefore 
hypothesize that, although it may be harder for smaller farms to expand (due to financial 
constraints, specialization and skills of the operator, etc.), smaller farms are more likely to 
expand in production than bigger farms, in order to increase their profitability. Farm size is 
measured as the milk production in kg.
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Modernity. The current state of the machinery and other capital-stock on farm is an important 
determinant for production expansion (Aramyan et al., 2007). The more modern the farm is, 
the more up to date is the capital stock, and the more capable a farm is to expand in produc-
tion. It is more difficult for farms to expand production when the capital stock is relatively 
old. However, if a farm just invested in new capital, for example by building a new stable, it 
might reduce investments to increase production for a while, in order for a farm to financially 
recover. Modernity measures the status of the current capital and is calculated as the balance 
sheet value divided by the replacement value of buildings, machines, tools and installations. 
Feed costs. Feed costs determine for a large part the marginal costs of farms, and are expected 
to increase further in the future due to increasing agricultural commodity prices (Jongeneel 
et al., 2010). This means that if farms expand in milk production, they will face a relatively 
large increase in feed costs, which affects the margin between the market milk price and a 
farm’s production costs. It is likely that feed costs will determine the pattern of expansion in 
milk production in the future. We hypothesize that the larger the feed costs, the less likely 
farms are to expand in milk production. Feed costs is a compound variable of the expected 
expenditures on concentrates, roughage, and milk products feed to livestock, and is calcu-
lated per kg milk production. Expected feed costs are an important determinant of the stream 
of expected short-run profits in equation (1).
Production intensity. Intensive farms have a relative benefit in fixed costs compared to exten-
sive farms; they can divide the costs over a larger amount of milk production, keeping the 
average fixed costs per production unit low. However, compared to extensive farms, they 
face a relative loss in variable costs; they have higher costs associated with feed and manure 
disposal. The question arises whether the effect of low average fixed costs per unit production 
can overcome the effect of high variable costs. It is tested whether intensive farms have more 
potential to expand in production than extensive farms. Production intensity is measured as 
the amount of milk production in kg per ha. For the amount of ha the area used for fodder 
and grassland is taken. 
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Labour productivity. In the Netherlands, most farms are family farms run by mainly family 
labour. Therefore, labour is considered a fixed factor of production. If labour productivity 
is high, farms are pressing down their fixed costs per unit of production. Facing lower costs 
makes the farms more competitive. We hypothesize that labour intensive farms are more 
likely to expand in production than less labour intensive farms. Information on labour is 
measured as the total time (in hours) worked on the farm, either by family members or hired 
workers. Labour productivity is calculated as the amount of milk production in kg per labour 
time in hours.
Excess production. Since the data used for estimating our model were collected in the period 
when milk quotas were binding, it is relevant to incorporate this in the model. If a farm 
produced permanently more milk than was allowed under the farm’s milk quota, it might 
have been a reason to buy more milk quotas, and expand in production. We hypothesize that 
excess milk production is an indicator for explaining production expansion decisions; if there 
was excess production during the last years, the farmer might be more willing to increase in 
milk production this year. Excess milk production is measured as the reference milk quota 
level of the farm minus the actual milk production level of the farm. It is a binary variable 
which takes the value one if the calculated amount is negative. 
External finance. If a farmer wants to invest in order to expand production, he might opt for a 
loan at the bank. Whether or not the bank decides to provide finance depends on the financial 
situation of the farm. The financial status of the farm is indirectly linked to farm expansion; 
the higher the level of external finance of a farm, the less likely a farmer is to obtain another 
loan in order to invest in production expansion (Aramyan et al., 2007; Oude Lansink et al., 
2001). This is a form of adjustment costs as hypothesized in section 3.3. However, if a farm 
obtains a loan to invest, for example in order to expand in production, the level of external 
finance will go up. Therefore, a high level of external finance might indicate that the farmer 
already invested to expand in production. We hypothesize that the higher the current level 
of external finance, the less likely a farmer is to expand in production. Because in the process 
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of opting for a loan the bank especially considers the amount of external finance per kg milk 
production, this variable is used as a variable to measure the dependency on external finance. 
Landownership. A farm with a higher share of rented land has a different position when opting 
for a loan at a bank than a farm having relatively more land in ownership. This is because 
owned land can serve as collateral for external finance. We hypothesize that the higher the 
share of rented land towards the total land of a farm, the less likely a farmer is to expand in 
production. Landownership is measured as the share of rented land and calculated as the 
amount of rented land divided by the sum of rented and owned land.
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics of variables in dataset
Category Variable Dimensiona
Sample mean 
(s.d.)
Dependent variable Investments in stable capacity Binary, 1=yes 0.07 (0.25)
Market conditions Milk price Euros 0.32 (0.03)
Milk price volatility Euros 0.45 (0.06)
Manure production surplus (Euros/ha)*102 0.17 (0.61)
Nitrogen (Kg/ha)*102 0.02 (0.22)
Land area Ha*101 0.07 (0.26)
Farmers’ values, 
goals and strategies
Age Years*102 0.50 (0.10)
Age-squared Years-squared*104 0.27 (0.11)
Continuity Binary, 1=yes 0.80 (0.40)
Fulltime farming Binary, 1=yes 0.95 (0.22)
Diversification Landscape management 
income
(Euros/kg)*10-1 0.04 (0.08)
Recreation income (Euros/kg)*10-1 0.01 (0.09)
On-farm milk processing 
(cheese, butter)
(Euros/kg)*10-1 0.03 (0.29)
Livestock Number of calves 
and heifers*101
6.35 (4.02)
Farm 
characteristics
Farm size Kg*106 0.65 (0.38)
Modernity Ratio 0.35 (0.12)
Feed costs (Euros/kg)*10-1 0.66 (0.18)
Production intensity (Kg/ha)*104 1.34 (0.44)
Labour productivity (Kg/hour)*103 0.16 (0.07)
Excess production Binary, 1=yes 0.48 (0.39)
External finance Euros/kg 1.57 (0.66)
Landownership Share 0.34 (0.28)
a Kg refers to kg milk production.
Source: own elaboration
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Table 3.1 gives definitions, units and mean values of the included variables. This table also 
shows that about 7% of the farms in the sample invested in more stable capacity in the 
period 2000-2010. 
3.5 Empirical model 
The conceptual model introduced in section 3.3 provides the basis for a binary choice model 
to analyse production expansion decisions. In section 3.4 the explanatory variables to be 
included were introduced. In this section we will discuss various econometric specification 
issues which eventually lead to our empirical model. 
Farm production expansion may change some of the farm characteristics in the same period 
(e.g. an increase in production expansion indicates an increase in farm size, and vice versa). 
To solve for these potential endogeneity problems, lagged values of some variables are 
included in the model. Taking lags of variables enables to force the order of events. Moreover, 
in the conceptual model it is assumed that farmers maximize the expected stream of benefits 
and costs from expansion, leading to optimal expansion decisions for each year. Although 
farmers may differ in the way they form expectations, we assume that developments in 
certain  variables in recent years have an impact on this process. Therefore, for variables on 
which expectations are formed on development patterns in the past, we combine values of 
the three most recent years into a weighted lagged variable. If both endogeneity is expected 
and the past is important to take into account as well, weighted one-year, two-year and three-
year lags are combined into a weighted lagged variable. 
The weighting of the lags is chosen to vary over years, allowing for recent information to be 
more important in taking current decisions, than earlier years (i.e. weightings for the lags are 
chosen as 0.5, 0.3 and 0.2 respectively). Using weighted lags is preferred over including lags of 
each of the years separately, in order to impose uniformity of the sign of the estimated effects. 
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With separate lags included, parameters may have different signs, which make analysing the 
composite effects difficult. Moreover, multicollinearity problems arise if multiple lags are 
included separately in the model. Our solution for endogenous variables and the inclusion of 
weighted lagged values to mimic expectation formation leads to four possible data transfor-
mations that are summarized in table 3.2.
In the section 3.3 it was already stated that major investments are usually done once in a 
certain time period; it takes several years before an investment needs to be replaced. If a farm 
just made an investment to increase production capacity, it will most likely not invest in the 
next year. Therefore, a lagged dependent expansion indicator is added in the model, which is 
in line with the dynamic decision making process described in section 3.3. 
Include past development patterns
Yes No
Av
oi
d 
en
do
ge
ne
it
y
Yes Include weighting of lag 1, 
lag 2, lag 3 of:
- Milk price
- Milk price volatility
- Excess production
- External financea
- Landownershipb
Include lag 1 of:
- Manure production surplus
- Nitrogen
- Farm size
- Modernity
- Feed costs
- Production intensity
No Include weighting of current value, lag 1 
and lag 2.
Include current value of:
- Land area
- Age
- Age2
- Continuity
- Fulltime farming
- Diversification
- Livestock
- Labour productivity
a The weighted lag is used because it is likely that the financial situation of a farm in the past is 
considered when opting for a loan, and not just one year.
 b The weighted lag is used for the same reason as at the external finance variable.
Source: own elaboration
Table 3.2 Dealing with endogeneity and expectations in the dataset
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Farmers base their decisions on production expansion on the performance of the farm over 
the past years. This impels the use of panel data in analysing expansion decisions. The use 
of panel data enables us to deal with unobserved heterogeneity among farms, including 
 unobserved factors that are relevant in expansion decisions as discussed in section 3.3. 
Given the large number of farms included in the sample and because of estimation reasons, 
we assume that the residual terms consist of a conventional residual element and a farm- 
specific random effect. The latter captures unobserved time-invariant differences in farmers’ 
 attitudes, values and goals, but also unobserved farm characteristics such as differences in 
efficiency and productivity and local conditions3. These assumptions lead to the use of a 
dynamic random effects probit model to analyse expansion behaviour of Dutch dairy farmers. 
Taking into account the above mentioned econometric specification issues, our empirical 
model is specified as follows:
I I x s u
I I I
it
*
it it
'
i it
it it
*
it
= + + +
= > =
−α β1
1 0 0where  if  and  if Iit
* ≤ 0
(5)
where Iit
* is a latent variable which is the unobserved difference between the (marginal) 
expected investment benefits and the investment threshold as explained in section 3.3. Iit-1 is 
the first lag of the dependent variable (lagged production expansion) and α is the corre-
sponding parameter to be estimated; β is the parameter vector for the included explanatory 
variables xit, si are time-invariant individual specific effects that are assumed to be normally 
distributed, homoscedastic and time invariant across individuals; uit is the remaining distur-
bance. It is assumed that the error terms uit are i.i.d. across farmers and time and independent 
of all xit . Assuming random farm effects, the dynamic random effects probit panel data model 
is estimated using the Gaussian-Hermite quadrature method (Baltagi, 2008: 242-243). 
³ There is a rich literature on efficiency and productivity analysis on dairy farms in various European 
countries, including the Netherlands. Some examples are (Reinhard et al., 1999; Reinhard and Thijssen, 
1999; Emvalomatis et al., 2011). However, since this requires rather different approaches we do not 
explicitly deal with this but rather assumes that average differences in efficiency are captured by the 
 unobserved farm-specific effects.
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A well-known problem for dynamic random effects probit models is the initial conditions 
problem (Wooldridge, 2005). For the first year of observation the lagged dependent variable 
will correlate with random effects leading to inconsistent estimates. In order to solve for 
this initial conditions problem Wooldridge’s (2005) solution is used. Wooldridge models the 
distribution of the unobserved individual specific effects conditional on the initial value and 
any exogenous independent variables. The approach of Wooldridge is based on balanced 
panels. However, if no attrition bias (selection bias) is present, the approach is also consistent 
for unbalanced panels. Using the Wooldridge approach the final equation estimated is:
I I x I x ait it vit v
v
V
i vi v
v
V
i
si
* ' ´= + + + + +−
= =
∑ ∑γ β α ρ λ1
1
0 0
1  
+ uit (6)
where v=1,...,V indicates the explanatory variables and V is the total number of explanatory 
variables; α0 is the constant of the equation; Ii0 is the production expansion of each farm i for 
the first year they are present in the model and ρ is the corresponding parameter to be 
 estimated; xvi  is the average for every independent variable v of farm i; λv is the corre-
sponding parameter vector to be estimated; αi are the time-invariant individual specific error 
terms of the equation measuring si and are assumed to be normally distributed,  homoscedastic 
and time invariant across individuals.
3.6 Results 
In this section the estimation results are presented. Since the probit model is nonlinear, the 
parameter estimates are not equal to the marginal effects of the included variables. Therefore 
the parameter estimates are presented in the appendix. Table 3.3 shows the calculated 
marginal effects the model variables have on the decision to expand in stable capacity. The 
pseudo R-squared of the model is 0.19 and the count R-squared is 0.77. 
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As table 3.3 shows, the lagged dependent variable expansion variable is significantly different 
from zero and negative. This indicates that indeed last year’s expansion has an impact on 
current expansion. Investments in stable size generally require a significant amount of 
money, and so it is not likely that farmers will invest in two subsequent years. Investments 
in stable size are made for a long term, and not on a yearly basis. Moreover, the significance 
of the lagged dependent variable shows that using a dynamic model, rather than a static 
model, for our analysis is relevant. This was also confirmed by estimating a static model and 
comparing both models.
Category Variable
Marginal 
effecta
Standard 
error
Dependent variable Lagged investments in stable capacity (yt-1) -0.03
*** 0.01
Market conditions Milk price (x1) 0.26 0.50
Milk price volatility (x2) -0.08 0.19
Manure production surplus (x3) 0.02
* 0.01
Nitrogen (x4) 0.01 0.02
Land area (x5) 0.02
** 0.01
Farmers’ values, 
goals and strategies
Age (x6) -0.52 0.66
Age2 (x7) 0.47 0.64
Continuity (x8) 0.00 0.02
Fulltime farming (x9) -0.13 0.11
Diversification Landscape management income (x10) -0.36
** 0.16
Recreation income (x11) -0.28 0.23
On-farm milk processing (cheese, butter) 
(x12)
0.04 0.06
Livestock (x13) 0.01
*** 0.00
Farm 
characteristics
Farm size (x14) -0.23
*** 0.08
Modernity (x15) -0.34
*** 0.08
Feed costs (x16) 0.03 0.04
Production intensity (x17) 0.06
*** 0.02
Labour productivity (x18) 0.06 0.19
Excess production (x19) -0.02 0.02
External finance (x20) -0.10
*** 0.03
Landownership (x21) 0.17
* 0.09
a Significance *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10 
Source: own elaboration
Table 3.3 Marginal effects
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3.6.1 Market conditions
Until 2004 milk prices were relatively stable, but thereafter milk prices started to fluctuate. 
Remarkable in the years as of 2004 was a high price peak in 2006-2007, which reduced quickly 
again in 2008-2009. This price peak can be explained by several factors. Among other, at the 
world-level the dairy sector was facing high input costs and a reduction in milk production 
because of unfavourable weather conditions (Jongeneel et al., 2011). Also, at the European 
level, several decisions taken during the policy reforms in 2003, affected the milk prices 
(i.e. reduction of intervention prices; introduction of dairy premium; decoupling of direct 
payments (Jongeneel et al., 2011). These changes in policy led to fluctuating milk prices in 
the years 2004-2010. 
In section 3.4 we hypothesized that milk prices and milk price volatility are important indi-
cators for analysing the impacts of quota abolishment and production expansion. However, 
for both variables no significant effects were found, which indicates that (fluctuations of) 
milk prices do not affect production expansion decisions. Apparently short run milk price 
developments (i.e. over the last 3 years) are not important in the decision making process on 
milk production expansion of Dutch dairy farmers. This could possibly be explained by the 
fact that Dutch dairy farmers had to deal with relatively stable milk prices for years. The price 
peak in 2006-2007 was the first one since years to happen. This means that dairy farmers were 
not used to it and perhaps needed some time to adjust their management plans in order to 
cope with the higher price volatility. 
Currently manure is a widely discussed topic in context of the abolishment of milk quota and 
production expansion in the Netherlands. Farms are able to expand in production after the 
abolishment, however new limits in the form of manure policy regulations will arise. This 
implies that when farms want to increase in production they need to increase in land as well. 
The new legislation does not allow dairy farmers to expand their manure production without 
at least partly applying this to owned or rented land, which will lead to an increase in the 
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costs for manure disposal relative to the past period. However, manure production surplus 
was surprisingly found to have a positive statistically significant effect, indicating that the 
higher the costs for manure disposal, the more likely a farmer was to expand production in 
the sample period. An explanation could be that farmers with high manure disposal costs 
have different expectations on the future and expect higher benefits of expansion compared 
to farmers with lower manure disposal costs. Whether these expectations are realistic is of 
course another issue, but farmers differ in the way expectations are formed. Another expla-
nation for this counterintuitive finding could be that these farmers realised that new policies 
in the dairy sector for curbing manure surpluses were inevitable and that they expected that 
manure production rights would be introduced and based on historical manure production 
levels or numbers of cows.
The importance of land market developments is indicated by the statistically significant 
effect of land area. It was estimated that if the farmer increases land by 10 ha, the proba-
bility to increase in production increases by 0.02 (‘land area’), which is a rather small effect. 
However, buying land in the Netherlands is a major investment and (agricultural) land is 
scarce. Therefore increasing in land area is often difficult for farmers. 
We also included a time trend variable in our model in order to capture the effect of antici-
pating quota abolishment over time. However, the parameter was not significantly different 
from zero so we deleted this variable from the model. Moreover, we included a dummy  variable 
with value 1 after 2008 to capture the effects of the announced quota abolition in the EU 
Health Check. Also this parameter was not significantly different from zero (p-value 0.631).
3.6.2 Farmer’s values, goals and strategies
In the category farmer’s values, goals and strategies a significant effect was only found for 
income from landscape management. In the model it was tested whether or not diversifi-
cation, measured as the income from three types of side-activities (landscape management, 
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recreation and on-farm milk processing), influenced the expansion behaviour of farmers. It 
was expected that if farmers diversify more, they will be less eager to expand in production. 
The statistically significant negative effect for landscape management shows that indeed if 
farmers focus more on landscape management, they are less eager to expand in production; 
being involved in landscape management, lowers to probability to expand in production 
with 0.36. Apparently farmers that focus on nature and landscape management are different 
from regular dairy farmers who do not focus on these issues. An interesting finding is the 
correlation between the different types of diversification and production intensity. These are 
for landscape management, recreation and on-farm milk processing -0.23, -0.05 and -0.03 
respectively, meaning that particularly farms involved in landscape management have a 
lower production intensity.
When a farm wants to increase in production expansion, it often needs to increase its dairy 
herd as well (i.e. when planned expansion exceeds growth in milk yield per cow). The statis-
tically significant positive effect for livestock shows that if a farmer increases the number of 
calves and heifers with 10, the probability to expand in milk production increases with 0.01. 
3.6.3 Farm characteristics
With respect to farm characteristics, significant effects were estimated for farm size, produc-
tion intensity, modernity, availability of external finance and landownership. 
As hypothesized in section 3.4, the statistically negative effect for farm size (-0.23) shows 
that indeed smaller farms are more eager to expand in milk production. 
The variable measuring production intensity shows that the probability to expand in milk 
production is significantly higher for the relative intensive farms (0.06). Seemingly, the 
benefits of having relatively lower fixed costs outweigh the costs of having relatively higher 
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variable costs. Also the correlation between production expansion and production intensity, 
which is 0.08, indicates that the relative intensive farms are more expanding in production. 
As was stated in the hypothesis, the expected effect of modernity on investments could be 
in either direction. However, a negative effect (-0.34) was found, indicating that farms with 
newer equipment, have a probability to expand in production that is 0.34 lower than for farms 
with older equipment. It was argued that this could be the consequence if farms just invested 
in capital and first need some time to fully recover financially before actually increasing 
production. 
This statement is in line with the significant effect of external finance. This effect was 
measured to be negative (-0.10); a high rate of external finance presses down the proba-
bility to expand in production. Farms that expanded in recent years may have a higher level 
of external debt. But whatever the reason for this high level, it reduces the probability of 
further expansion.
The last significant effect that was found is for landownership. Contrary to our hypothesis, it 
was found that the higher the share of rented land towards the total land of a farm, the more 
likely a farmer is to expand in production (0.17). This effect can possibly be explained by the 
fact that the variable landownership is measured using information on rented and owned 
land of the last three years. It could be that farms were already anticipating on production 
expansion, and therefore they increased in land size by renting more land as buying land 
is difficult.
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3.7 Discussion
Surprisingly, the estimation results did not show significant effects for milk price and milk 
price volatility, which is an interesting finding. As was shown before the milk price shows 
an increased volatility as compared to the period before 2007. However, the medium term 
prospect for the farm gate milk price appears to be favourable, which is mainly due to the 
projected world-wide increase in demand for dairy products, in particular in Asia  (OECD-Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2013). Although expected otherwise, 
this research does not significantly show that the projected milk price evolution will affect 
the expansion of Dutch milk production after quota abolition. The absent response to price 
volatility is rather surprising given the strong price swings between 2006 and 2010. It could 
be that Dutch dairy farmers have been used to a long period of relatively stable and policy 
supported prices. The experience after 2007 was in that respect rather new to them. If price 
volatility becomes a structural element of the new policy and market context in dairy this 
may induce farmers to learn to better optimize their behaviour in this respect and therefore a 
negative response to price volatility could still be possible in the future.
Also important in the context of milk quota abolishment and production expansion is diversi-
fication. The pattern of a development into two types of farms (on the one hand more inten-
sive farms and on the other hand more diversified farms) that was found by Samson et al. 
(2013) will most likely continue in future. Our results show that diversification has a down-
wards effect on milk production expansion. This implies that after quota abolition diversified 
farms are less expected to expand in production. 
At the moment, obtaining external finance at banks is difficult for farmers. Banks are more 
reluctant to offer (long-term) loans, and set more stringent requirements to the loans they 
supply (for example banks increase the level of collateral needed). An important reason for 
this is the agreement on the Basel-III norms (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2010). These result from the economic crisis in 2008, and contain, compared to the former 
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Basel-II norms, more stringent international norms for the ratio of internal finance to 
external finance at banks. The stricter requirements to loans possibly put a brake on invest-
ments and  production expansion by farmers in future. The effect of external finance on 
 production expansion, which was found to be negative and significant, will then become even 
more important in decision making.
It has been argued that land plays a multi-functional role in the dairy sector (feed production, 
manure disposal). In sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 it was stated that the level of manure production 
surplus and the scarce availability of land respectively are possible new bottlenecks to milk 
production after quota abolishment. It was found that an increase in land area is a driving 
factor for increasing milk production. The availability of land is likely to be a constraining 
factor for increasing milk production in future.
With respect to the variable measuring the manure production surplus a positive statistically 
significant effect was found, indicating that the higher the costs for manure disposal, the 
more likely a farmer is to expand in production. In the results section possible reasons for 
this increase in milk production capacity were pointed out; it stated that farmers differ in 
the way they form expectations on the benefits and costs of manure production (disposal) 
in the future. During the period considered here (2000-2010), intensive dairy farmers have 
been able to dispose their manure surplus (for example farm to farm-exchange, processing, 
and export) at reasonable economic conditions. This suggests that when a well-functioning 
manure-market can be established, milk production expansion might continue even when 
milk production per hectare is already high. However, through the milk quota indirectly a 
barrier on manure production was set as well. With the adjustments in agricultural policy 
(i.e. milk quota abolishment and manure policy) this will change and manure becomes a more 
critical issue for dairy farmers when considering expanding milk production. 
The low value for the pseudo R-squared of the model (0.192) indicates that apparently much 
of the variation in the model is still unexplained. The results also show that there are hardly 
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any effects of the included non-economic factors (farmers’ values goals and strategies) in 
our model. However, there could be effects of other non-economic factors, which we were 
not able to include in the model, as well. Some non-economic factors (e.g. intrinsic prefer-
ences of farmers in favour or against nature management and environmental stewardship) 
are difficult to measure and were therefore not available. Also specific policies and structural 
developments at higher scales are not included. For this reason we cannot conclude (yet) that 
non-economic factors do not play a significant role in explaining production behaviour of 
farmers. This is clearly a limitation of the available dataset. Although it is rich in variables 
relating to the farm economics, and includes measurable farmer characteristics, other less 
tangible characteristics are not available and therefore could not be included explicitly in our 
empirical analysis. 
An example of such a not-included factor is the changing political support to the agricultural 
sector in the Netherlands, due to shifts of political parties in the government. In combination 
with the often continuous and lasting political discussions on the national implementation 
of agricultural policies, this leads to uncertainty about the future for farmers. Farmers are 
more reluctant to invest when there is an uncertain political climate. Moreover, differences 
in regulations and permits between local governances exist, which constrain in some cases 
the possibilities for production expansion. These may be strengthened by local protests 
against farm expansion which may also have an impact on the possibilities to expand for the 
farms. Such information on protests is difficult to measure and its impact on the expansion 
 behaviour of the farmers is therefore hardly quantifiable.
86
3
3.8 Conclusions
The objective of this study is to investigate Dutch dairy farmers’ decisions on milk  production 
expansion taking both economic and non-economic factors into account. The conceptual 
model described in this study shows that a combination of economic, social and environ-
mental variables can be used to analyse farm-level expansion decisions (i.e. increasing staple 
capacity). This shows that purely economic approaches are too narrow in understanding 
developments in expansion decisions at the farm level. The more formal description of the 
decision making process explains why Dutch dairy farmers do not invest in stable capacity 
every year but only once a while. Also our data recognize this as many zero investments are 
observed among the farms included in the sample population. Possible explanations are to 
be found in fixed asset theory (Chavas, 1994), adjustment cost theory (Oude Lansink and 
Stefanou, 1997; Gardebroek, 2004), and the option theory of investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994; Wossink and Gardebroek, 2006; Hinrichs et al., 2008). Our model combines these three 
theories in formulating that the expansion decision of Dutch dairy farmers depends on the 
balance between the expected marginal value of expansion (benefits) and the threshold for 
expansion. Positioning the model like this provides a solid base and a new approach to look 
at Dutch dairy farmers’ production expansion behaviour. 
This decision making framework includes expectations on EU, national and local policies, 
market conditions, farmer’s values, goals and strategies and farm characteristics. However, 
as we discuss above, in practise it turns out that it is rather complex to include these other 
dimensions explicitly (e.g. politics, intrinsic preferences of farmers, measurement scale). Our 
research shows that there are external influences that are hard to catch in purely traditional 
economic research work. In order to have a full understanding of the investment decision 
making one should think beyond the possibilities of modelling using microeconomic theory. 
One such, relatively new, branch of literature is called experimental economics (Davis and 
Holt, 1993), which is developed in order to bridge the gap between economic theory and 
observation. This theory uses perceptions from the field of psychology and biology in order 
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to explain human behaviour, and as such can provide useful and complementing insights to 
the findings based on purely economic theory. Samson et al. (2013) show in their study the 
added value of using experimental economics in the context of assessing the impact of policy 
changes on Dutch dairy farmers’ farm income and farming strategies. In future research such 
an analysis on the intrinsic preferences and attitudes of farmers with respect to investment 
decisions could possibly be an added value to this study as well. 
Empirically, we find that several market conditions, variables relating to farmers’ values, 
goals and strategies, and farm characteristics are main drivers for farmers to increase in milk 
production. While many factors were expected to affect these expansion decisions, only a few 
and mainly economic factors, were found to be statistically significant in  estimation. These 
factors include lagged investments in extra stable capacity (negative), manure  production 
surplus (positive), land area (positive), landscape management (negative), livestock  (positive), 
farm size (negative), production intensity (positive), modernity of equipment (negative), 
external finance (negative) and landownership (positive). 
Although the findings show a limited increase in milk production so far (until 2014 most 
farmers still respected their quota limits, but the quota showed a gradual annual increase as 
part of the EU’s soft landing strategy), the data show that Dutch dairy farms can potentially 
increase milk production in the future, even already with limited investments. Currently 
farms underutilize their stable space, as the occupancy of stable space is 71%. After milk 
quota abolishment farms can therefore increase livestock herd with limited investments.
In the introduction we hypothesized that one of the contributions of our study to the liter-
ature is the possibility to draw conclusions at the individual level, as our study is based 
on micro level data. Individual farms might strongly differ in opportunities to expand in 
 production. We found that farm characteristics such as access to external finance and the rate 
of modernity of a farm influence the farms’ individual capabilities to make investments in 
order to increase milk production. Although in this conclusion we mainly describe results for 
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the whole sample population, viz. estimated parameters are the same for all farms, hetero-
geneity among  individual farms is present as well. Due to the specifications of our model, 
this heterogeneity is captured in an unobserved farm-specific error component in our model. 
These farm-specific effects highly differ per farm since they include all farmers’ individual 
attitudes, values, goals and characteristics that are not specified elsewhere in the model. 
Also the non-measurable non-economic effects, as we described above, are included in this 
farm-specific effect.
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Appendix 3.1 
Estimation results of the model used in this study
Category Variable
Estimated 
coefficienta
Standard 
error
Dependent variable Lagged investments in stable capacity (yt-1) -0.57
** 0.26
Market conditions Milk price (x1) 3.31 6.46
Milk price volatility (x2) -1.00 2.43
Manure production surplus (x3) 0.29
* 0.17
Nitrogen (x4) 0.18 0.30
Land area (x5) 0.24
** 0.10
Farmers’ values, 
goals and strategies
Age (x6) -6.64 8.52
Age² (x7) 5.98 8.21
Continuity (x8) 0.04 0.30
Fulltime farming (x9) -0.85
* 0.50
Diversification Landscape management income (x10) -4.64
** 2.06
Recreation income (x11) -3.55 2.96
On-farm milk processing (cheese, 
butter) (x12)
0.57 0.82
Livestock (x13) 0.16
*** 0.06
Farm 
characteristics
Farm size (x14) -2.90
*** 1.03
Modernity (x15) -4.42
*** 1.05
Feed costs (x16) 0.43 0.54
Production intensity (x17) 0.73
*** 0.26
Labour productivity (x18) 0.75 2.49
Excess production (x19) -0.20 0.32
External finance (x20) -1.28
*** 0.36
Landownership (x21) 2.14
* 1.13
a Significance *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10  
Source: own elaboration
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Analysing Trade-offs between Milk, Feed and Manure 
Production on Dutch Dairy Farms1
Abstract
The abolition of milk quota fuels environmental concerns in the Netherlands. 
A microeconomic model is developed to analyse the technical relations between 
milk, roughage and manure production. Production functions for milk, feed and 
roughage are estimated based on milk quota and manure constraints. Together 
with an equation for manure production these are used to calculate the costs 
and benefits of dairy livestock expansion. It turns out that at the margin and 
at prevailing input and output prices and manure processing costs, it will be 
attractive for dairy farms to expand production, unless regulatory constraints 
prevent them from doing so.
1 Paper by Gerlinda S. Samson, Cornelis Gardebroek and Roel A. Jongeneel, European Review of 
Agricultural Economics 2017, 44: 475-498. Doi: 10.1093/erae/jbw025
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4.1 Introduction
In grass-based dairy production system dairy farmers jointly produce milk and animal 
manure. Animal manure and fertilizer are combined with land in order to produce an inter-
mediate roughage product that is fed to their livestock. In intensive production systems that 
occur in specific EU Member States (e.g. Netherlands, Denmark) or regions within Member 
States (e.g. Brittany in France) this may lead to surplus production of manure, which, if 
unregulated, may lead to over application and damages to the environment and nature. Until 
recently the EU milk quota policy contributed to curbing the production and application of 
animal manure in the Dutch dairy sector. This study, which focuses on the Dutch dairy sector, 
investigates the implication of environmental regulation applied to intensive grass-based 
dairy production system while the milk quota are being phased out.
Whereas in many European Union (EU) Member States the milk quota were already no longer 
restricting milk production before 1 April 2015, which was partly due to the EU’s soft landing 
policy of 2009-2014, in the Netherlands they still were. Due to the annual increase in milk 
yield per cow, the number of dairy cows needed to produce the milk quota level steadily 
declined, which reduced the manure production at the farm level. In the period from 1984, 
the year in which milk quotas were introduced, to 2012 the milk quota only declined by 5%, 
whereas the milk yield per cow increased by 51% (LEI Wageningen UR, 2013).
April 1, 2015 the milk quota were abolished in the EU and policy makers as well as the agri-
business (milk processing, feed industry) were and still are interested in its effects on milk 
and manure production. Several studies (e.g. Réquillart et al., 2008; Jongeneel and Van 
Berkum, 2015) indicated that Dutch milk supply might substantially increase after abolish-
ment (estimates roughly vary from +15% to +25%). Consequently, the production of manure 
will increase as well. As such the abolition of milk quota fuels environmental concerns in the 
Netherlands, as the indirect limit on manure production has disappeared.
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Already since the mid 80-ties, the Dutch government carries out a manure policy in order to 
manage manure production and the use of it (Dutch Government, 2014). The current policy 
is based on the European Nitrate Directive (Council of European Communities, 1991), which 
regulates the application of both Nitrate and Phosphate. Following this policy there are 
constraints on the quantity of (animal) manure that may legally be applied on land. When 
a farm produces more animal manure than can be applied on owned or rented land, there 
is a manure surplus which has to be disposed at a cost (i.e. processed, transferred to other 
farmers, exported). Moreover, the fifth Action Plan (2014-2017) of the Nitrate Directive and 
the derogation allowance of the European Commission require the Netherlands to restrict 
its total phosphate production to 172.9 million kg (which is currently the most restrictive 
nutrient and the level of which is equal to the amount that was produced in the year 2002).
Recently, the Dutch government, after consulting the sector, has sharpened its manure policy 
in order to ensure that the Netherlands will satisfy European environmental standards in the 
future as well. The manure policy is changing in the direction of more stringent regulation on 
animal manure excretion standards, and more stringent application norms of animal manure 
on land (Dienst Regelingen Loket, 2014; Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2015). As an 
example, the 5% uncertainty margin on animal manure excretion has been abandoned from 
1 January 2014 onwards, which will most likely lead to a one time increase in the registered 
manure production. As another example, the application norms for animal manure on sandy 
soils might become more strict as an amendment to the current so-called derogation norm 
is likely to be made. 
In order to assess the impact of milk quota abolition on production of milk and manure, 
more insight into the dairy production technology is required. The current literature on 
the effects of agricultural policy changes (i.e. milk quota abolishment and manure policy 
changes) on manure production surpluses and (economic) farm management decisions is still 
 relatively scarce. On the one hand several studies exist on the specific modelling of miner-
al-flows within a farm (e.g. Nousianen et al., 2011; Hadrich et al., 2008; Buysse et al., 2005; 
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Aarts et al., 1992). Although these studies recognize the (technical) interaction between the 
several sub- systems in a farm, i.e. milk output, feed production and manure management, 
they focus on optimal use of minerals and do not directly take manure policy measures into 
account. On the other hand, there are more applied agronomic studies that take manure 
policy into account and which focus on the Dutch dairy sector specifically (e.g. Evers et al., 
2009; Krimpen et al., 2010), but in these studies an economic framework capturing the milk-
feed-manure-nexus is lacking. 
The objective of this chapter is to develop a microeconomic modelling approach that is 
capable of analysing the effects of agricultural policy changes on the trade-offs between milk, 
feed and manure production in one coherent framework. In comparison with existing micro-
economic studies (e.g. Boots et al., 1997; Ooms and Peerlings, 2005), this implies that along-
side the traditional production technology, the feed input side, as well as the role of manure 
(and manure policy measures) are properly taken into account. In contradiction to sectorial 
approaches, the advantage of using micro level data is that it can take regulatory constraints 
holding at micro or farm level into account. It should be recognized that animal manure is not 
only a by-product of milk production, but also an intermediate input used for fertilization. As 
such manure is a valuable product that can be a substitute for fertilizer. We follow a primal 
approach and estimate the production technologies for milk, feed and roughage, while an 
agronomic calculation approach is used to determine manure production. Trade-off effects 
between inputs and the implications of these on milk, roughage and manure production are 
presented and analysed. 
In section 4.2 we continue by explaining the theoretical model of this study indicating the 
technical relations between milk-, roughage- and manure production. Section 4.3 presents 
the data used in this study which are based on a sample of the Dutch dairy sector. Section 4.4 
presents the empirical specifications and estimation methods used, and section 4.5 provides 
and discusses the results. We end with concluding remarks in section 4.6. 
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4.2 Theoretical model
The dairy farmer’s decision problem can be characterized by a short-run profit  maximization 
problem where output supply and variable input demand are chosen at optimal levels given 
exogenous output and input prices and levels of quasi-fixed inputs. There are however 
two important complications to the standard textbook profit maximization problem. First, 
farmers that are constrained by milk quota cannot produce an optimal milk quantity that 
exceeds the quota level. For them the quota level is the maximum attainable output level and 
their profit maximization problem basically becomes a cost minimization problem at given 
output (quota) level (De Frahan et al., 2011). Second, cows not only produce milk but also 
manure. This manure can to some extent be applied to grassland to produce roughage but 
only as far as environmental regulations allow since there are limits to manure application 
per hectare. The surplus has to be disposed of at a cost. 
Since this study focuses mainly on the technical relations between milk-, roughage- and 
manure production, the model we use is formulated in its primal form where the various 
production technologies are discussed below. The profit maximization problem is defined as:
(1)max
,
pi
Y x
Y Otp Y p Ot w x c Ms subject to production technolo= ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ gies
where π is short-run profits, Y is milk output, py is the milk price the farmer receives, Ot is 
other output, pOt is the price for other output, x is a vector of variable inputs (including bought 
roughage, own produced roughage and concentrates), w is a vector of variable input prices, 
Ms is the manure surplus, and c is unit cost of disposing manure. The manure surplus is the 
difference between what is produced and the amount of manure that can be placed on the 
(owned and rented) land which is in use by the farmer. Manure production is a function of the 
number of dairy cows and milk production levels, where the manure that can be placed is a 
function of the available land and the maximum application standards. Short-run profits are 
maximized subject to a composite production technology, consisting of a milk production 
component and roughage and manure production components. Note that in this general 
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notation the milk production level (Y) can be equal to or less than the quota level. In both 
cases the milk output Y is produced according to the following technology:
(2)Y f Fd Li Lb Cy Ot= ( ), , , ,
where Fd is animal feed, Li is dairy cows, Lb is an aggregate of family and hired labour, Cy is 
capital for milk production such as buildings and installations, and Ot is other output. Animal 
feed is considered a variable input that is partly produced on the farm (see below), whereas, 
livestock, labour and capital are considered as quasi-fixed inputs. Other output is included 
recognizing that dairy farms not only produce milk, but also calves and meat. Following Ooms 
and Peerlings (2005) this other output is considered as a negative input in the milk  production 
function. Y is assumed to be non-decreasing in Fd, Li, Lb, and Cy and non-increasing in Ot and 
concave in inputs.
Animal feed consists of three major components, notably concentrates (Co), own produced 
roughage (Ro), and bought roughage (Rb), where Ro and Rb include products like fresh grass, 
grass silage, maize, and others. Ro, Rb and Co are partly substitutable, particularly own and 
bought roughage, and partly complementary due to different nutrient contents. The relation-
ships among these three fodder types are captured by the following feed production tech-
nology, where the production of feed (measured in metabolizable energy units) is written as:
(3)Fd g Co Ro Rb= ( ), ,
where we assume that Fd is non-decreasing and concave in Co, Ro, and Rb. Whereas concen-
trates and bought roughage are purchased and therefore lead to variable costs in equation (1), 
the (intermediate output) own roughage is produced on the farm itself according to the 
following intermediate output production function:
(4)Ro h La Ma Fr Ra Tp= ( ), , , ,
where La is own and rented farmland, Ma is applied animal manure, Fr is purchased  chemical 
fertilizer. Besides these three inputs, own roughage production also depends on weather 
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conditions, represented by rainfall (Ra) and temperature (Tp). Ro is assumed to be increasing 
in La, Ma, and Fr and since we are interested in optimal production decisions among milk, 
roughage and manure production, we also assume concavity in applied manure (Ma), due 
to diminishing returns to scale. Note that manure application is restricted by (maximum) 
application standards. The amount of manure applied may equal the amount of manure 
produced (standards are not restricting application) or less than the total amount of manure 
produced on the farm (standards are restricting application). In the latter case a farm will 
have a manure surplus. 
Following (legal) Dutch dairy cow manure excretion standards (Remmelink et al., 2012: 76), 
manure production (and nutrient excretion) is an increasing function of the number of dairy 
cows (Li), calves and heifers below 1 year (Lic<1), calves and heifers above 1 year (Lic>1), and 
the milk yield per dairy cow (y = Y/Li). This leads to the following function for total manure 
production on the farm:
(5)Mp k Li Li Li yc c= ( )< >, , ,1 1
Note that several connections between the different production relationships exist. Milk 
production (Y) is a function of the number of dairy cows (Li), but this variable also (partly) 
determines manure production (Mp). Own produced roughage (Ro) is an (intermediate) 
output at dairy farms, whereas at the same time it is part of total feed input (Fd), and there-
fore indirectly an input for milk production (Y). Moreover, (part of) the produced manure 
(Mp) is applied (Ma) to land in roughage production. Finally, the intensity of milk production, 
which is an implicit outcome of the input-output mix chosen, and which is reflected in a 
certain milk yield per dairy cow (y), is a determinant of manure production. By choosing a 
particular feed input mix/level farmers can affect the level of manure produced, as well as the 
excretion of nitrogen and phosphorus nutrients.
The total quantity of animal manure that farmers can apply to their owned and rented 
land is restricted by manure application norms (Man) for nitrogen and phosphate use 
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(Remmelink et al., 2012: 71-74). According to these standards farmers can apply maximally 
170 kg nitrogen to each ha of agricultural area. An exception is assigned to farms that have 
over 70% of grassland; they are temporarily allowed to apply more (i.e. 250 kg) nitrogen 
per ha of agricultural area (derogation). Application standards for phosphate from animal 
manure differ between grassland and land used for crop production, accounting for differ-
ences in crop uptake of phosphate. At its introduction in 2006, the application norm for grass-
land was 95 kg phosphate per ha of agricultural area, and for land used for crop production 
it was 110 kg phosphate per ha of agricultural area. However there is a gradual reduction 
of the application norm for phosphate over time. Depending on the condition of the land, 
in 2015 the  application norm for grassland is 90 kg phosphate per ha of agricultural area 
(neutral phosphate status), and for land used for crop production it is 60 kg phosphate per ha 
of agricultural area (neutral phosphate status). The aim of the manure application norms is to 
reach a so-called balanced fertilization in 2015; implying that the level of phosphate applied 
to agricultural land should not exceed the level of phosphate that the agricultural land can 
process (Krimpen et al., 2010). 
Based on the most binding application norm (N or P) as discussed above, the quantity of 
animal manure that can be applied to owned and rented farm land can be defined. The 
animal manure surplus (Ms) is the difference between the quantity produced from animal 
manure (Mp) and the quantity that can be legally applied at the farm according to the manure 
 application norms (Man) described above2 :
(6)Ms Li y La
Mp Li y Man La if Mp Li y Man La
if Mp Li y Ma
, ,
, ,
,
( ) = ( )
− ⋅ ( ) > ⋅
( ) ≤0 n La⋅




where for simplicity Li includes dairy cows, calves and heifers below 1 year (Lic<1) and calves 
and heifers above 1 year (Lic>1). Farms are obliged to dispose their animal manure surplus 
outside the farm at a unit costs c as indicated in eq. (1). From this definition it also follows 
2 In the Netherlands most dairy farms do not apply animal manure from outside the farm to their land. 
In this model we therefore assume that farms only apply own produced animal manure.
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that applied manure in eq. (4) equals produced manure for farms that are not manure 
constrained and it equals the manure application norm for farms that have a manure surplus.
The above model can be used to derive optimal allocation rules for the variable inputs concen-
trates (Co) and bought roughage (Rb) without and with a manure surplus:
Co, no surplus: (7)
∂
∂
= ⋅
∂
∂
⋅
∂
∂
− =
pi
Co
p Y
Fd
Fd
Co
wCo 0
Co, surplus:  (8)
∂
∂
= ⋅
∂
∂
⋅
∂
∂
− − ⋅
∂
∂
⋅
∂
∂
⋅
∂
∂
=
pi
Co
p Y
Fd
Fd
Co
w c Mp
Y
Y
Fd
Fd
Co
Co 0
Rb, no surplus: (9)
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Rb, surplus: (10)
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Note that the farmer not only optimizes with respect to Co and Rb, but implicitly at the same 
time also with respect to own roughage production Ro (see equation 3). This optimization 
has two aspects: (i) the farmer considers the own roughage-output trade-off (assuming an 
implicit price wRo of Ro this yields a similar optimum condition as those that are derived 
with respect to Rb and Co; see the optimum conditions (7) to (10)); (ii) the farmer optimizes 
with respect to all the inputs Ro, Rb and Co in such a way that Fd is produced in a least cost 
way. This requires that the technical rate of substitution between the Ro, Rb and Co inputs is 
equal to the input price ratio (Varian, 1992: 50). Alternatively, this implies that the shadow 
price wRo of Ro will be a function of the prices of bought roughage Rb and compound feed Co, 
or wRo = wRo(wRb, wCo). In case the farm is having a manure surplus the shadow price wRo is a 
function of the price for manure disposal as well; wRo = wRo(wRb, wCo, c).
The first order conditions show that manure constrained farms have an additional marginal 
costs next to the input price of feed in the form of marginal manure disposal costs. Due to 
concavity of the production function in Fd manure constrained farms therefore have a lower 
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optimal feed use level. Also expressions for the shadow prices of quasi-fixed inputs can be 
derived. Two interesting shadow prices are obtained for livestock (Li) and (La), again both for 
farms without and with a manure surplus:
Li, no surplus: ∂
∂
= ⋅
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∂
∂
⋅
∂
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⋅
∂
∂
⋅
∂
∂
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 (note  ∂ = ∂Ma Mp ) (11)
Li, surplus: (12)
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∂
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La, no surplus: (13)
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La, surplus: (14)
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For farms without a manure surplus, the shadow price of a dairy cow (equation 11) consists 
of the direct marginal value of livestock in milk production and the indirect value of live-
stock via manure and roughage production on milk production. Farms with a manure surplus 
cannot apply more manure on their land and therefore lack this second indirect effect (see 
equation 12). Instead, their shadow price of livestock is lower due to the additional marginal 
manure disposal costs. The shadow price of land for farms without a manure surplus 
 (equation 13) represents as a first effect the (indirect) marginal value of land derived from 
the additional milk production via roughage production, and as a second effect the change 
in roughage production (and derived milk production) as a consequence of the additional 
manure that is produced, which in this case is all applied to the land. The shadow price for 
constrained farms (see equation 14) also has as a first term the value of the land as a result 
of the value of the additional milk that can be produced. The second component is the addi-
tional costs for surplus disposal because the additional milk will lead to additional manure 
excretion. The third component in equation 14 is the manure placement space generated by 
the additional unit of land (which equals the maximum manure application standard, i.e. the 
amount of manure that at maximum can be applied on an additional hectare), which is valued 
at its opportunity cost c. Looking at the combined effect of livestock and land, the above 
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shows that due to the indirect effects of the input variables to manure and feed, the total 
marginal value of product is greater than the direct (partial) marginal value of the products 
in the situation without a surplus, and inferior to the direct (partial) marginal value of the 
products in the situation with a surplus. 
4.3 Data
The data for estimating and calculating the production functions were obtained from the 
Dutch Farm Accountancy Network Data (FADN, LEI Wageningen UR) and the LMM-database 
(Landelijk Meetnet Mestbeleid, LEI Wageningen UR), which is used to monitor manure 
production in the Netherlands. The data include 1193 observations on 334 Dutch dairy farms, 
covers the period 2008 to 2012 and forms an unbalanced panel. 
In the empirical analysis three groups of farms are discerned. Group 1 consists of farms that 
were neither constrained by milk quotas, nor were they having a manure surplus in the sample 
period. This is by far the smallest of the three groups with only 220 observations on 70 farms. 
Group 2 consists of 125 farms with 445 observations that were constrained by milk quota, but 
did not have a manure surplus in most of the years in the dataset. Finally, group 3 consists of 
139 farms with 528 observations that were both milk quota and manure constrained in the 
sample period.
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the data used in this study. Data are presented for the 
total sample and by the three subgroups. We gathered data on the value of milk production 
(in euros) from FADN and divided this value by the quantity of milk production (in kilos) of 
farmers as reported in the FADN as well. This way we obtained the actual milk price farmers 
received on average for their production each year. This price differs per farm per year, as all 
farmers receive different prices based on quality differences (i.e. fat- and protein content). In 
order to get the same price for each farm per year, we took the means per year of these prices. 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
Sample mean (st.dev.)
Variables Dimension All farms Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Outputs
Milk production (Y) kg * 105 7.736
(4.468)
6.275
(3.769)
6.639
(3.439)
9.269
(5.003)
Other output (Ot) euros * 104 -1.781
(1.431)
-1.287
(1.204)
-1.605
(1.313)
-2.135
(1.524)
Variable inputs
Feed (Fd) energy level * 105 7.611
(4.210)
6.848
(3.805)
6.668
(3.316)
8.725
(4.750)
Concentrates (Co) kg * 105 1.975
(1.138)
1.801
(1.008)
1.715
(0.949)
2.267
(1.262)
Bought roughage (Rb) kg * 105 2.209
(2.510)
2.106
(2.638)
1.269
(1.533)
3.044
(2.815)
Produced roughage (Ro) kg * 106 1.517
(0.889)
1.383
(0.776)
1.468
(0.731)
1.613
(1.033)
Applied animal manure (Ma) (effective) kg * 10³ 3.179
(1.840)
2.860
(1.542)
3.161
(1.631)
3.327
(2.088)
Applied fertilizer (Fr) kg * 104 2.595
(1.771)
2.339
(1.666)
2.566
(1.521)
2.724
(1.987)
Quasi-fixed inputs
Labour (Lb) hours * 10³ 4.508
(2.134)
4.287
(2.463)
4.305
(1.464)
4.772
(2.418)
Capital for milk prod. (Cy) euros * 105 7.173
(4.541)
7.035
(5.260)
6.183
(4.133)
8.064
(4.372)
Dairy Livestock (Li) number * 101 9.596
(5.358)
8.939
(4.883)
8.541
(4.555)
10.759
(5.923)
Land (La) ha * 10² 0.563
(0.326)
0.539
(0.286)
0.576
(0.295)
0.564
(0.353)
Other variables
Rain (Ra) mm * 10² 9.195
(0.520)
9.163
(0.536)
9.174
(0.520)
9.225
(0.511)
Temperature (Tp) °C * 101 1.030
(0.061)
1.033
(0.058)
1.030
(0.062)
1.029
(0.062)
Manure production (Mp) m³ manure * 10³ 3.541
(1.962)
3.100
(1.634)
3.129
(1.580)
4.073
(2.234)
Milk yield per dairy cow 
(y(=Y/Li))
kg * 104 0.807
(0.130)
0.717
(0.170)
0.783
(0.115)
0.865
(0.089)
Manure Surplus (Ms) m³ manure * 101 8.643
(100.835)
-11.145
(95.833)
-50.573
(83.002)
66.796
(82.853)
n farms (N observations) 334 (1193) 70 (220) 125 (445) 139 (528)
Source: own elaboration
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Next, we divided the value of milk production (in euros) obtained from FADN by this average 
milk price to calculate the quantity of milk produced (in kilos). Calculation of milk produc-
tion in this way is recommendable since it turns differences in quality of milk as reflected in 
different milk prices, into quality differences as reflected in produced quantities. 
In order to obtain the value of other output (in euros), we gathered data on the total value 
of livestock production (in euros) from FADN and divided this value by a corrected price 
for dairy cows (in euros, all prices relative to the price of base year 2008, obtained from LEI 
Wageningen UR, 2013). 
Information on labour is taken directly from the FADN and measured as the time (in hours) 
worked on the farm by the farmer, (hired and fixed) employees and volunteers. 
The new values on different types of capital are reported directly in the FADN. Capital used 
for milk production is measured as a compound new value (in euros) for installations and 
buildings. 
The number of dairy cows is taken directly from the LMM-database and measured in average 
numbers per farm per year.
Feed is measured in ‘kVEM’ and derived directly from the LMM-database (kVEM is a ratio to 
represent the net-energy of foddertypes, feed is the sum of all fodder fed to livestock). The 
level of concentrates use (in kilos) is derived directly from the LMM-database. The level of 
bought roughage used for milk production (in kilos) is measured as the total value spent on 
roughage as reported in the FADN, divided by the price for roughage (maize price, in euros per 
kilo for each year) obtained from LEI Wageningen UR (2013). The total quantity of roughage 
(in kilos) fed every year to livestock is directly available in the LMM-database. By subtracting 
the quantity of bought roughage (in kilos) from this total quantity (in kilos) we obtain the 
total quantity of own produced roughage fed to livestock per year (in kilos). 
For land we take the total agricultural land area (grassland and land for fodder production) as 
reported in the LMM (in ha). 
Data on animal manure production were obtained from the LMM-database. We calculated 
the total on-farm animal manure production by summing the manure production in m³ of 
the dairy cows, calves and heifers on the farm. In order to calculate the animal manure that 
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is really applied to the land, we first added the total on-farm animal manure production, 
the initial stock of animal manure and the inflow of animal manure from sources off-farm. 
Second, we subtracted the farm outflow of animal manure and the final stock of animal 
manure from this amount (all in m³). 
The level of applied fertilizer (in kilos) is obtained from the LMM-database. 
Information on rain is taken from the official statistics of the Netherlands (CBS, 2013) and is 
measured as the quantity of rain in average total millimetre per year. 
Information on temperature is also taken from the official statistics of the Netherlands (CBS, 
2013) and is measured in average degrees Celsius per year.
The animal manure surplus is derived by adding the total animal manure production, the 
initial stock of animal manure and the on-farm supply of animal manure. From this amount 
we subtracted the final stock of animal manure and the farm specific manure application 
norm (all in m³). The result is the animal manure surplus; when the result is positive, the 
farm is constrained by manure application norms. And when the results is negative, the farm 
is unconstrained by manure application norms. 
4.4 Empirical model and estimation
Equations (2)-(4) for milk, feed, and roughage are estimated. During the sample period milk 
production is subject to a (binding) supply constraint, the milk quota. The specification of the 
production function for milk however, is not affected by the presence of a supply quota. In 
order to comply with neo-classical economic theory, equations (2)-(4) need to be continuous, 
non-negative, strictly increasing in inputs, and strictly quasi-concave in variable inputs. 
Many empirical studies estimate production functions using a flexible quadratic functional 
form (e.g. Ooms and Peerlings, 2005). However, with many inputs this implies a large number 
of quadratic and interaction terms, potentially leading to multicollinearity. To avoid this 
problem, we include quadratic and interaction terms for the key inputs Li and Fd but only 
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single terms for fixed inputs on which the farmer does not optimize in the short-run. This 
leads to the following specification for milk production:
(15)
Y Ot Fd Li Lb Cy Fd Fht h ht ht ht ht ht ht= + + + + + + +α β β β β β β β1 1 2 3 4 5 12 11
2
12 d Li Liht ht ht ht+ +12 22
2
1β ε
where h expresses dairy farmers (h=1,...,H and H is the total number of farms), t expresses 
time (t=1,...,T and T is the total number of years), α1h are farm-specific effects capturing 
 unobserved heterogeneity among dairy farms in milk production, e.g. management quality 
but also average quality differences in livestock and feed, and ε1ht  is a residual term varying 
over farms and time. Symmetry between feed and livestock is imposed via β12= β21. 
The empirical specification for feed production is: 
(16)
Fd Co Ro Rb Co Co Ro Coht h ht ht ht ht ht ht= + + + + + +α γ γ γ γ γ γ2 1 2 3 12 11
2
12 13 ht htRb
                                                                           + + +1
2 22
2
23
1
2 33
γ γ γRo Ro Rb Rbht ht ht ht
2
2+ε ht
where symmetry between all variables is imposed via γij=γji.
The production function for own roughage is specified as:
(17)Ro La Ma Fr Ra Tp Maht h ht ht ht t t ht ht= + + + + + + +α ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ε3 1 2 3 4 5 12 11
2
3
The production function for manure (equation 5) is based on an agronomic accounting system 
applying the standards as they are defined in the Dutch manure legislation (Dutch Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 2010; Remmelink et al., 2012: 2-44). By using these accountancy rules the 
model is able to reproduce results that comply to reality which increases the representative-
ness of the results. The total level of manure production is the sum of the manure produced 
by dairy cows (Li), calves and heifers below 1 year (Lic<1) and calves and heifers above 1 year 
(Lic>1). This function is defined as:
(18)Mp y Li Li Liht ht ht c c= +( ) + +< >13 44 0 0019 6 5 14 91 1. . . .
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In estimating equations (15)-(17) there are a number of econometric issues to be dealt with. 
First, a standard residual term εjht is added to these equations to capture unobservables that 
vary over time and farms. Even though we include farm-specific effects αjh in our equations, 
there could still be heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation in the data. Therefore, cluster- robust 
standard errors (Verbeek, 2012: 390) are used, where clusters are defined by farms. 
Second, all three equations include farm-specific fixed effects (FE) αjh. The equations are 
therefore estimated using a Fixed Effects estimation approach based on a within transfor-
mation of the data. 
Third, some of the explanatory variables could be endogenous. This is a problem  generally 
considered in estimating production functions since producing a certain quantity of output 
may require a certain amount of inputs. E.g. in order for a dairy cow to produce a certain quan-
tity of milk (output), this dairy cow is to be fed a certain amount of feed (input). Moreover, a 
farmer may choose a certain quantity of inputs given its unobserved character istics, captured 
by εjht (Ackerberg et al., 2006). This already indicates that this problem is most likely for  variable 
inputs and quasi-fixed inputs that are easily adjustable such as feed, but not for inputs such 
as capital or labour. Moreover, variables that are determined within our system of produc-
tion functions are expected to be endogenous (milk, feed and feed  components, manure). 
Ooms and Peerlings (2005) tested for endogenous inputs in production functions for Dutch 
dairy farms and found that exogeneity was accepted for labour, cattle and other output, but 
rejected for aggregate non-factor input. Based on their results we initially assume that feed is 
 endogenous in the milk production function (15), concentrated feed, own produced roughage, 
and bought roughage are assumed endogenous in the feed production function (16), and 
manure and fertilizer are endogenous in the roughage production function (17). Therefore, 
these equations are estimated using Fixed Effects Instrumental Variable Generalized Method 
of Moments (FE-IV-GMM) using the following general set of moment conditions:
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(19)E z jht jht jhε ε−( )  = 0
where for each equation j ((15)-(17)) zjht is a vector of instruments including all exogenous 
variables in equation j (depending on the equation these are for example land, labour, capital, 
or weather variables like rainfall and temperature) supplemented by additional instrumental 
variables, which are either the exogenous variables from other equations (thus either land, 
labour, capital and/or weather variables) or additional variables such as market prices for milk 
or feed. The term ε εjht jh−( )  are the within transformed residuals where ε jh  are the farm- 
specific average residuals. In the results section we provide more details which instrumental 
variables are used in estimating the equations. 
Overidentifying restrictions tests are applied to assess the overall validity of the model and 
the instruments chosen. Rejection of the null hypothesis in the overidentifying restric-
tions test would indicate that either the model is incorrectly specified or that one or more 
of the instrumental variables is invalid. Without additional information it is difficult to tell 
what the exact problem is. However, note that non-rejection of the null hypothesis does not 
 guarantee model and instrument validity, since there could exist parameter values such that 
these conditions hold even with invalid instruments. (Verbeek, 2012: 169). Hausman tests are 
applied to test whether the standard FE are consistent or whether we should use the panel 
IV-GMM estimates. Estimation is performed using xtivreg2 in Stata 13 (Schaffer, 2010).
Fourth, the equations are estimated for the sample as a whole and for the three groups defined 
in section 4.3. Chow tests are applied to test whether parameters are significantly different 
among these groups (Verbeek, 2012: 72).
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4.5 Results and discussion
4.5.1 Milk production function
The parameter estimates for the milk production function (equation 15) are given in table 4.2 
for the complete sample and the three subgroups. 
The second column of results are the FE-IV-GMM estimates where Fd, Fd2 and FdLi are assumed 
to be endogenous and Lb2, LbCy, La, La2, LbLa, Ra, Tp, Ra2 and Tp2 are used as  instruments. 
Tests for weak instruments indicate that these are strong instruments for the three assumed 
endogenous variables. Moreover, the overidentifying restrictions test has a test-statistic of 
3.59, which is smaller than the χ2(6) critical value of 12.59, indicating that we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are zero (given the parameters at 
hand). This provides some confidence in the validity of the model and the instruments. 
However, with a Hausman test (p-value 0.654) we could not reject the null hypothesis that 
standard FE estimates are consistent, indicating there is no need to rely on the less efficient 
FE-IV-GMM estimates3. Therefore, we proceed using the standard FE  estimates as given in 
the first column of results for the whole sample and in columns 3-5 for the subgroups. The 
 coefficients for the whole sample all have the correct signs. For the three subgroups this 
is also often the case, at least for all coefficients that are significantly different from zero. 
A Chow test firmly rejects the null hypothesis of equal parameters across groups with the 
test-statistic of 53.53 much larger than the critical F9,1184 value of 1.88. For the three subgroups 
there are some interesting differences. Labour only has a significant parameter for the group 
of farms that were quota and manure constrained. Table 4.1 in section 4.3 already showed 
that these are intensive dairy farms with large output, a large dairy herd, much capital and 
relatively more dependent on bought roughage and concentrates. Apparently labour is also 
important in the production process of these farms. All three groups have a significant linear 
3 We also tested a model where other output is assumed endogenous, but in a Hausman tests we could 
not reject the null hypothesis that the FE-GMM estimates are consistent, confirming the results by Ooms 
and Peerlings (2005) who also concluded that other output is not endogenous.
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term for feed, and groups 1 and 2 also have a significant negative quadratic term, indicating 
a positive but decreasing marginal return for feed. However, for group 3 the quadratic term is 
positive, though not significantly different from zero. A similar observation can be made for 
livestock. 
Based on the estimated production functions elasticities were calculated for each observation 
and averaged for each farm using the parameter estimates for the sample as a whole and for 
the estimates based on subgroups. These are presented in table 4.3.
Table 4.2 Estimation results for milk productiona
Milk production
FE-GMM
All farms
FE-IV-GMM
All farms
FE-GMM
Group 1
FE-GMM
Group 2
FE-GMM
Group 3
Other output (Ot) 0.004
(0.018)
0.008
(0.031)
-0.029
(0.061)
-0.032
(0.034)
0.046
(0.031)
Labour (Lb) 0.071**
(0.033)
0.106**
(0.042)
-0.023
(0.085)
-0.017
(0.067)
0.193***
(0.052)
Capital for milk prod. (Cy) 0.006
(0.011)
-0.007
(0.019)
0.035
(0.044)
0.015
(0.018)
0.002
(0.030)
Dairy cows (Li) 0.483***
(0.087)
0.583**
(0.258)
0.485
(0.467)
0.472***
(0.153)
0.329***
(0.124)
Feed (Fd) 0.655***
(0.121)
0.611
(0.438)
1.043**
(0.471)
0.801***
(0.189)
0.688***
(0.172)
Li*Li -0.044***
(0.012)
0.287*
(0.155)
-0.116**
(0.050)
-0.077***
(0.023)
0.013
(0.024)
Fd*Fd -0.061***
(0.020)
0.480**
(0.235) 
-0.209*
(0.108)
-0.120***
(0.044)
0.014
(0.039)
Li*Fd 0.094***
(0.031)
-0.757**
(0.384)
0.271*
(0.144)
0.176**
(0.067)
-0.031
(0.062)
Intercept b -1.196***
(0.305)
-2.007
(1.899)
-1.584**
(0.754)
-0.728
(0.444)
Within R2 ,c 0.77 - 0.41 0.80 0.91
F-test slope parameters 95.23*** 108.12*** 12.36*** 170.18*** 815.14***
Overidentifying restrict. test 3.59
n (N) 334 (1193) 303 (1162) 70 (220) 125 (445) 139 (528)
a Standard errors between parentheses. Significance level: *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10 
b Intercept in standard FE is the average of all farm-specific effects, FE-IV-GMM does not include this
c For FE-IV-GMM the R2 is not reported since it has no interpretation due to correlation between covariates and 
residuals (Verbeek, 2012: 158) 
Source: own elaboration
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On average most of the signs of the input elasticities are positive, as one would expect based 
on economic theory, with labour being an exception for groups 1 and 2. The average values 
also show that livestock and feed have the biggest impact on milk production. The (average) 
production elasticities for milk production are comparable to values found in earlier research 
on the Dutch dairy sector (Ooms and Peerlings, 2005; Thijssen, 1992: 26). Boots et al. (1997) 
however, found higher elasticities for capital (0.31 for buildings and 0.43 for machinery). 
This difference in elasticities could be due to the aggregation of data for measuring capital 
in our model. Also our model is based on more recent data. The average scale parameter 
derived from the elasticities for milk production is 1.13 for the whole sample. This indicates 
increasing returns to scale. This average value is somewhat larger than value of 1.04 found by 
Ooms and Peerlings (2005). Note that the averages are somewhat larger for groups 1 and 2, 
but lower for group 3. However, the standard deviation for groups 1 and 2 is also substantial, 
indicating large heterogeneity in returns to scale within these groups.
Table 4.3 Average elasticities of milk productiona
All farms Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Other output (Ot) -0.001 0.008 0.011 -0.011
(0.001) (0.008) (0.028) (0.004)
Labour (Lb) 0.050 -0.024 -0.020 0.109
(0.028) (0.035) (0.071) (0.043)
Capital for milk production (Cy) 0.006 0.050 0.020 0.001
(0.003) (0.068) (0.064) (0.001)
Dairy cows (Li) 0.432 0.472 0.554 0.405
(0.201) (0.637) (1.955) (0.048)
Feed (Fd) 0.638 0.788 1.007 0.566
(0.132) (1.009) (2.542) (0.070)
Scale parameter 1.125 1.293 1.572 1.071
(0.267) (1.590) (4.443) (0.073)
a Standard deviation in parentheses
Source: own elaboration
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4.5.2 Feed production function
Estimation results for the feed production function (equation 16) are presented in table 4.4. 
The feed equation reflects how total energy from feed is derived from concentrates, own 
roughage and produced roughage. 
Feed production
FE-GMM
All farms
FE-IV-GMM
All farms
FE-IV-GMM
Group 1
FE-IV-GMM
Group 2
FE-IV-GMM
Group 3
Concentrates (Co) 0.683***
(0.256)
0.967**
(0.492)
-0.950
(1.001)
-0.612
(0.967)
0.322
(0.687)
Own roughage (Ro) 2.285***
(0.290)
3.798***
(0.397)
2.690
(2.345)
3.702***
(1.325)
4.773***
(0.459)
Bought roughage (Rb) 0.264***
(0.049)
0.332***
(0.087)
0.202
(0.277)
0.278
(0.192)
0.567***
(0.058)
Co*Co -0.013
(0.090)
-0.190*
(0.100)
1.190***
(2.613)
-0.567***
(0.159)
-0.046
(0.055)
Ro*Ro -0.059
(0.119)
-0.336***
(0.111)
1.212***
(0.405)
-1.380***
(0.515)
-0.265***
(0.102)
Rb*Rb -0.004
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.016)
0.029*
(0.015)
0.028
(0.033)
-0.017
(0.014)
Co*Ro 0.024
(0.234)
0.341
(0.253)
-2.237***
(0.473)
2.159***
(0.597)
0.133
(0.199)
Co*Rb 0.046*
(0.027)
0.071
(0.078)
-0.210**
(0.095)
0.232*
(0.131)
0.096
(0.064)
Ro*Rb -0.069**
(0.033)
-0.091
(0.063)
0.194
(0.134)
-0.389*
(0.225)
-0.200***
(0.036)
Intercept b 2.405***
(0.621)
Within R2, c 0.72 - - - -
F-test slope parameters 82.12*** 44.44*** 139.95*** 172.47*** 87.42***
Overidentifying restrict. test 11.24 11.47 12.35 8.80
n (N) 334 (1193) 303(1162) 62(212) 114(434) 127(516)
a Standard errors between parentheses. Significance level: *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10 
b Intercept in standard FE is the average of all farm-specific effects, FE-IV-GMM does not include this
c For FE-IV-GMM the R2 is not reported since it has no interpretation due to correlation between covariates and 
residuals (Verbeek, 2012: 158) 
Source: own elaboration
Table 4.4 Estimation results for the feed equationa
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Since concentrates, own roughage and bought roughage are all variables inputs that the farmer 
decides upon in the short-run, we assumed that these variables and their cross- products are 
endogenous. Therefore, we estimated this equation using FE-IV-GMM using Lb, Cy, La, Ra, 
Tp, and their cross-products as instrumental variables (19 instruments in total). The need 
for estimating this equation using FE-IV-GMM was confirmed by a Hausman test in which 
the null hypothesis that the more efficient FE-GMM estimates (given in the first column) are 
consistent was rejected (test-statistic of 125.26 is larger than the  critical χ2(9) value 16.92). 
The FE-IV-GMM parameter estimates have the correct signs for the whole sample (column 2). 
Total energy is increasing in all three food components (concentrates, own roughage and 
bought roughage) at a decreasing rate. For the sample as a whole, all three parameters for the 
single terms are significantly different from zero, as well as the  quadratic terms for concen-
trates and own roughage. The other parameters for cross-products are not significantly 
different from zero, suggesting there is no complementarity or substitution between the 
three feed components for the sample as a whole. Looking at the subgroups (columns 3-5) the 
results are different though, suggesting substitutability between own and bought roughage 
for groups 2 and 3 as expected. Farms in group 2 also show complementarity between concen-
trates and roughage, both own and bought. Note that the results for group 1, which has 
the smallest number of observations, are not in line with microeconomic theory. All three 
 quadratic terms are positive and statistically significant, suggesting increasing marginal 
products for all three feed types. This suggests that farmers are not using these feed types 
optimally, since they could gain from increasing feed use.
For the sample as a whole and for the three subgroups the overidentifying restrictions test 
has test-statistics (values given in table 4.4) that are smaller than the χ2(10) critical value of 
18.31, indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restric-
tions are zero for all four models. This provides some confidence in the validity of the model 
and the instruments used.
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Based on the different sets of parameter estimates for the full sample and the subgroups, we 
calculated individual farm elasticities for the three feed types in total energy. Averages and 
standard deviations of these individual farm elasticities are presented in table 4.5.
Total feed is most responsive to changes in own roughage, and least in bought roughage. 
Interestingly, there are no large differences in average elasticities for own and bought 
roughage between the groups, although farms in group 3 (quota and manure constrained) are 
on average most responsive to changes in bought roughage. Total energy is on average not 
very responsive to concentrates in group 1, whereas the average for this elasticity is highest 
for group 2. Interestingly though, the spread in individual elasticities is also large for group 2, 
whereas it is rather small for group 3.
4.5.3 Roughage production function
The final function that was estimated is the roughage production function (equation 17; see 
table 4.6).
Table 4.5 Average elasticities of feed productiona
All farms Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Concentrates (Co) 0.225 0.010 0.199 0.161
(0.054) (0.307) (0.329) (0.055)
Own roughage (Ro) 0.658 0.540 0.616 0.671
(0.136) (0.288) (0.247) (0.166)
Bought roughage (Rb) 0.097 0.082 0.059 0.129
(0.074) (0.083) (0.094) (0.087)
a Standard deviation in parentheses
Source: own elaboration
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Assuming Ma, Ma2 and Fr to be endogenous and using Lb, Cy, Lb2, Cy2 and LbCy as instrumental 
variables, the FE-IV-GMM model was estimated. Tests for weak instruments confirmed the 
strength of these instruments and the test statistic of the overidentifying restrictions test, 
1.44 is smaller than the χ2(3) critical value of 7.81, indicating that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are zero. The Hausman test does not reject 
the null hypothesis that the standard FE-GMM estimates are consistent (p-value 0.111), 
suggesting that manure, manure squared and fertilizer are not endogenous and we can 
proceed using the standard FE-GMM estimates as given in the first column of results in table 
4.6. For the overall sample, all slope parameters are significantly different from zero and with 
the theoretically correct signs. Estimation results show that the level of rain and temperature 
significantly influence the production level of roughage. Both are necessary in the production 
Table 4.6 Estimation results for roughage productiona
Roughage production
FE-GMM
All farms
FE-IV-GMM
All farms
FE-GMM
Group 1
FE-GMM
Group 2
FE-GMM
Group 3
Land (La) 1.453***
(0.504)
-0.529
(1.753)
0.695
(0.475)
1.201**
(0.501)
2.198***
(0.639)
Applied animal manure (Ma) 0.225**
(0.095)
1.298*
(0.680)
0.201
(0.133)
0.288**
(0.126)
0.068
(0.141)
Applied fertilizer (Fr) 0.044**
(0.017)
0.138
(0.189)
0.062**
(0.024)
0.017
(0.023)
0.057*
(0.033)
Rain (Ra) 0.059***
(0.016)
0.076**
(0.032)
0.075*
(0.041)
0.027
(0.023)
0.072***
(0.024)
Temperature (Tp) -0.638***
(0.113)
-0.750***
(0.158)
-0.777*
(0.405)
-0.562***
(0.161)
-0.646***
(0.168)
Ma*Ma -0.029***
(0.009)
-0.097**
(0.040)
-0.018
(0.026)
-0.030*
(0.017)
-0.027**
(0.011)
Intercept b 0.367
(0.258)
0.596
(0.514)
0.534*
(0.311)
0.398
(0.419)
Within R2 ,c 0.19 - 0.14 0.12 0.27
F-test all parameters 14.26*** 5.79*** 12.07*** 4.91*** 13.33***
n (N) 334 (1193) 302 (1153) 70 (220) 125 (445) 139 (528)
a Standard errors between parentheses. Significance level: *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10 
b Intercept in standard FE is the average of all farm-specific effects. FE-IV-GMM does not include this
c For FE-IV-GMM the R² is not reported since it has no interpretation due to correlation between covariates and 
residuals (Verbeek, 2012: 158) 
Source: own elaboration
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process. The results show that the more rain and the lower the temperature, the higher 
the production of roughage is. Rain and temperature may relate non-linearly to roughage 
production, but for simplicity we only included linear terms of these variables in the model. 
For the three subgroups the parameter estimates have the same signs, although coefficient 
size and statistical significance differs among groups. A Chow test rejects the null hypothesis 
of equal parameters among the three groups, with the F-test statistics of 3.75 exceeding the 
critical F7,1172-value of 2.01, confirming differences in roughage production structures among 
the three subgroups.
Also for roughage production farm-specific elasticities were calculated and these are 
presented in table 4.7.
Not surprisingly roughage production is mostly responsive to land, although varying widely 
among groups, and weather conditions. Changes in applied manure and fertilizer have much 
less pronounced effects on roughage production. The average negative elasticity for applied 
manure for group 3 could be due to the fact that these farms are manure constrained. They 
simply cannot apply more manure to their land, leading to little variation in applied manure 
within farms over time, which is reflected in the statistically insignificant linear parameter for 
Table 4.7 Average elasticities of roughage productiona
All farms Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Land (La) 0.517 0.251 0.452 0.729
(0.233) (0.065) (0.103) (0.337)
Applied animal manure (Ma) -0.001 0.164 0.147 -0.303
(0.730) (0.101) (0.278) (0.777)
Applied fertilizer (Fr) 0.072 0.096 0.029 0.091
(0.044) (0.044) (0.011) (0.052)
Rain (Ra) 0.403 0.547 0.184 0.447
(0.144) (0.157) (0.070) (0.133)
Temperature (Tp) -0.487 -0.649 -0.439 -0.450
(0.175) (0.186) (0.167) (0.135)
a Standard deviation in parentheses
Source: own elaboration
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manure for group 3. In other words, the manure elasticities for group 3 are poorly  estimated. 
This is also reflected in the large standard deviation for this group.
4.5.4 Effects of dairy livestock expansion
After the milk quota are abolished, it is expected that the overall Dutch milk production 
will increase (Jongeneel and Van Berkum, 2015). From the data it can be seen that farms 
were already anticipating on this increase by investing in extra stable capacity a few years 
in advance of 2015. After quota abolishment these farms are likely to further increase milk 
production by increasing the number of livestock. When more milk is produced, also more 
animal manure will be produced. More milk production will result in higher income from 
production. In the following the (marginal) trade-offs farmers will face are further explored 
using the estimation results and assumptions on milk, roughage, and feed prices and manure 
disposal costs4.
As regards the effect on the manure-side, different scenarios exist. In this chapter we divided 
the farms in three groups. Since the first group was not restricted by their milk quota, their 
situation will not change, price effects apart, when milk quota are abolished. Therefore, in the 
following we focus on the second and third group. Farms that are not constrained by manure 
application norms are able to increase in milk production (and manure production) without 
facing manure surplus disposal costs directly. But farms that are constrained by manure 
application norms and possibly producing a surplus of manure have to pay manure surplus 
disposal costs. The effects on the cost-side are different for this group of farms. 
4 Ideally assessing the implications from quota abandonment and manure regulation should be analy-
sed using a micro-simulation exercise (see De Frahan et al., 2011 for an example) but such an exercise 
was beyond the scope of this chapter.
121
4
Table 4.8 shows the effects of increasing the livestock herd by one dairy cow on the  revenues 
and costs for dairy farms evaluated at 2012 data56 (which is the most recent year of the 
 available panel data). Assuming profit maximizing behaviour, farmers will only expand if this 
contributes to their profits. It is shown that the additional revenue from milk production 
5 For reasons of transparency and in order to be complete, calculations for farms in group 1 are also 
provided in table 4.8.
6 The results in table 4.8 are calculated based on the estimations for the sample as a whole. The estima-
tions per group were not usable (i.e. wrong sign and/or not significant) and provided unreliable results.
Table 4.8 Average marginal effects on revenues and costs of increasing livestocka
All farms Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Manure surplus
Quota 
unconstrained
no manure 
surplus
Quota 
constrained
no manure 
surplus
Quota 
constrained
manure surplus
Change in physical units
Milk (kg) 7805.57
(1793.62)
7362.90
(1706.60)
7152.10
(1184.01)
8363.88
(1965.04)
Own roughage (kg) 3685.96
(1388.61)
 3991.59
(832.27)
3638.96
(976.63)
-
-
Manure (m3 slurry) 28.27
(3.41)
27.43
(3.24)
27.03
(2.25)
29.33
(3.73)
Manure (kg P) 42.41
(5.11)
41.14
(4.86)
40.54
(3.37)
44.00
(5.60)
Feed demand (kEUM) 7069.71
(946.12)
6763.72
(825.86)
6927.75
(1047.44)
7260.94
(880.09)
Revenues (€)
Milk 2784.25
(639.79)
2626.35
(608.74)
2551.16
(422.34)
2983.70
(700.93)
Own roughage 212.50
(80.05)
230.12
(47.98)
209.79
(56.30)
-
-
Costs (€)
Manure disposal & handling 424.10
(51.12)
-
-
-
-
439.97
(56.00)
Manure P processing 84.81
(10.22)
-
-
-
-
87.99
(11.20)
Feed (bought) 1102.88
(147.59)
1055.14
(128.83)
1080.73
(163.40)
1132.71
(137.29)
Revenues – Costs (€) 1385.00
(501.01)
1307.59
(525.76)
1599.13
(358.77)
1322.73
(620.40)
aStandard deviations between parentheses
Source: own elaboration
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from adding one dairy cow is €2551 for farms in group 2 and €2983 for farms in group 3. The 
average for all farms is €2784. The average farm gate raw milk price was €35.67/100kg in 2012 
(LEI Wageningen UR, 2016). For farms in group 2 that are not constrained by the amount 
of manure they produce, the manure will have a value as an (organic) fertilizer that can be 
applied on the land where it induces a roughage yield increase. 
Roughage is in turn, via the production function for feed, an input for milk production. Since 
farms do not have to buy this input at the market, the value of animal manure can be seen as 
an (intermediate) benefit instead of a cost of production (see explanation Section 4.2). It is 
shown that the additional revenue of roughage production from adding one dairy cow is €210 
for farms in group 2. Farms that have a manure surplus are already applying organic manure 
to the maximum rate allowed by the application standards and cannot further increase the 
application levels (hence, in table 4.8 the change in physical units of own produced roughage 
for group 3 is zero). As a consequence they do not derive a benefit from the additionally 
produced manure, but rather face a cost associated with the additional manure disposal7. 
The average for all farms is €213. The average price for roughage was €57.65/1000kg in 2012 
(LEI Wageningen UR, 2016). The lower part of Table 4.8 represents the manure disposal 
costs where it is assumed that the additional manure produced for a surplus farm will have 
to be handled and processed, with a cost of €15 per m³ of slurry handled and a phosphate 
processing cost of €2 per kg phosphate (Alfa Accountants, 2015). Attracting an additional 
dairy cow, while keeping the land input fixed requires that additional feed is bought. The 
change in feed demand (expressed in thousand Energy Units Milk), provided that the dairy 
cow herd increases with one dairy cow, can be derived from the demand function for feed (this 
can be solved from equation 2). For feed (consisting of compound feed as well as roughage) 
a price of €0.156/kEUM is used (based on market prices prevailing in 2012, Wageningen UR 
Livestock Research (2016)).
7 Assuming full compliance with the manure legislation. If this does hold not and farmers would over 
apply manure this potentially could also generate a negative impact on roughage production.
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The calculations in Table 4.8 show that for all farms together extending the dairy herd has 
a positive return of revenues over costs. Farms in group 2 would benefit most. These include 
the farms that do not have a manure surplus, and therefore do not face manure disposal costs. 
It can be seen that the manure disposal and processing costs take a significant part in the 
additional costs of expanding the livestock stable. Even more interesting is it to look at the 
spread around the calculated values; the standard deviations are relatively high compared to 
the averages, particularly for group 3, the manure constrained farms. This indicates that the 
variation within each group is large.
Whether it is attractive for a farmer to expand his herd also depends on other costs such 
as labour costs and the costs of a cow place. A dairy farmer according to our data spends 
about 54 hours per dairy cow a year (standard deviation 23.8 hours). The investment costs 
of a cow place are about €5000 (Alfa Accountants, 2015), which implies an annual cost of 
about €500 (assuming 5% interest and 5% depreciation). In case a farmer in group 2 has 
still to invest in his stable when adding a cow, the average gross  remuneration for his 
labour will be €1599 - €500 = €1099 / 54 hours = €20.35 per hour. The same  analysis 
holds for a farmer in group 3, the average gross remuneration for his labour will be 
€1323 - €500 = €823 / 54 = €15.24 per hour. Given these calculated gross remunerations and 
taking into account the variation in the average net revenues of farms, it still is at the margin 
attractive for several of them to expand in production, especially when there is slack family 
labour or stable capacity available. Note that in these calculations no costs are taken into 
account that might come from additional regulatory constraints with respect to manure 
production, but only processing costs of manure are accounted for. 
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4.6 Concluding remarks
In order to better understand the constraints Dutch dairy farmers face before and after quota 
abolition, this chapter focuses on estimating the production technology in such a way that 
the milk-feed-manure interactions and trade-offs are explicit. The technical information 
derived from this model provides a framework to analyse questions on relevant agricultural 
policy changes.
A major concern that is often addressed in estimating production functions is the supposed 
endogeneity of certain inputs. This was explicitly taken into account in the empirical analysis. 
Estimating the production functions separately for three groups based on quota and manure 
constraints was also supported empirically. This underlines that farms in these subgroups 
differ in their production processes.
The model opens up possibilities to further analyse the farmers’ potential response to the 
abolishment of the milk quota, taking into account the heterogeneity between farms with 
respect to being quota and/or manure constrained. A first assessment of our results suggests 
that it might be attractive for dairy farmers that are currently not having a manure surplus as 
well as for several of those that are already having a manure surplus to (marginally) expand 
their number of livestock and milk supply. The slack capacity with respect to their stable and 
own labour are important factors that determine the final benefit of production  expansion 
for these farms. It is not so much the manure processing costs, but rather new regulatory 
constraints with respect to manure production and application on own land that will affect the 
possibilities for future milk supply growth in the Netherlands. When future legislation would 
require dairy farmers that expand their dairy herd also to buy additional land, for example, 
this will have a further negative impact on the attractiveness to expand milk production.
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Were Manure Application Norms Effective in 
Limiting Dairy Cattle on Dutch Dairy Farms?1
Abstract
This chapter investigates whether manure application norms were effective in 
limiting the number of dairy cows on Dutch dairy farms in the period 2008 to 
2012. Assuming short-run profit maximization including manure processing 
costs for dairy farms with a manure surplus, a shadow price equation for dairy 
cows is derived that is estimated using panel data techniques. A parameter test 
shows that the marginal processing costs of additional manure did not lower the 
shadow price of dairy cows for surplus farms, suggesting that this policy in the 
period 2008 to 2012 was not effective in preventing expansion of dairy cows on 
surplus farms.
1 Unpublished paper by Gerlinda S. Samson, Cornelis Gardebroek and Roel A. Jongeneel.
5
130
5
5.1 Introduction
One of the environmental issues in the European Union is the overproduction of phosphate 
from animal manure (European Sustainable Phosphorus Platform, 2017). For this reason, the 
European Union assigned maximum phosphate production levels to each member state. In 
2015, the Dutch phosphate production passed its national ceiling of 172.9 million kg phos-
phate for the first time in five years. Due to an increase in the number of livestock (mainly in 
the Dutch dairy sector) the phosphate production increased to 180.1 million kg in 2015. In 
2016, the total phosphate production decreased to 177 million kg, however this is still above 
the national ceiling (Statistics Netherlands, 2017a).
Figure 5.1 shows the development of the total phosphate production for the livestock sector 
in the Netherlands. As can be seen, the dairy sector is responsible for a large part of the total 
phosphate production. The increase in the number of livestock was a response of the dairy 
sector to the abolishment of milk quota in 2015. Between 2008 and 2015, the total number of 
dairy cows of 2 years and older increased on average with 1.6% per year. The average number 
of dairy cows per ha increased from 1.61 to 1.83 between 2008 and 2016. As a result the phos-
phate production per ha increased from 100.1 kg per ha to 108.3 kg per ha between 2008 and 
2016 (Statistics Netherlands, 2017a). 
As of 2006 the Dutch manure policy already directed maximum animal manure applica-
tion norms for the use of phosphate in order to cope with the overproduction of phosphate. 
Between 2006 and 2016 the application norms for phosphate from animal manure production 
decreased and became more strict every year (Dutch government, 2005). When the phosphate 
production per hectare increases and the maximum application norms for phosphate from 
animal manure decrease, the problem of overproduction of phosphate becomes even more 
significant. The Dutch government therefore introduced several other manure policies during 
the years as well. This led to a complex system of different regulations for manure production 
and application, nevertheless there was still phosphate overproduction.
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In this chapter, we focus on the period 2008 and 2012, when the Dutch manure policy  consisted 
of only the system of application norms, and analyse whether or not this manure policy was 
restrictive for the dairy farms to increase in livestock. If the average farm is producing more 
phosphate than allowed, it does not necessarily mean that all farms produce more phos-
phate than allowed. We analyse whether different growth strategies between dairy farms 
can be distinguished. Moreover, we investigate the differences in characteristics between 
farms that increased in livestock while producing more phosphate than the application norm 
allowed and farms that increased in livestock while producing within the application norm 
of phosphate.
Our chapter contributes to the current agricultural economic literature in two ways. First, our 
analysis provides more insights about growth strategies and characteristics of Dutch dairy 
farms operating under a system of manure regulations. These insights could be helpful in 
making effective decisions in the current debate on the Dutch manure policy. Second, we 
provide a detailed and complete overview of the development of the complex Dutch manure 
policy. In light of recent developments of Dutch animal phosphate production levels, 
Figure 5.1 Phosphate production Netherlands
Source: Statistics Netherlands (2017b)
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the Dutch government revised its manure policy. These revisions are included in this chapter 
as well. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides a detailed 
overview of Dutch manure policy. Section 5.3 discusses the data used in this study. In section 
5.4 a first exploration of the data, focusing on developments in the Dutch dairy sector, is 
provided. Section 5.5 outlines the model specification and estimation, and section 5.6 shows 
the results of this chapter. Finally, in section 5.7, some concluding remarks are presented.
5.2 Overview Dutch manure policy
5.2.1 Development of the manure policy in the Netherlands
For Dutch dairy farmers, the Dutch manure policy officially came into force on 27 November 
1986 when the ‘Meststoffenwet’ (in English: policy on fertiliser use) was introduced (Dutch 
government, 1986). Its main purpose is to protect the soil as a result of the use of animal 
manure and other fertilizers. The policy contains directives on the production and use of 
manure, and on the trade, processing and tariffs on manure surpluses. Over the years the 
policy was adapted several times in order to comply with new EU policy. 
From 1998 until 2005, an important part of the Dutch manure production was regulated 
via the mineral accounting system (in Dutch: Mineralenaangiftesysteem, MINAS) (Dutch 
government, 1996). This system contained several regulations on the production and use 
of minerals in animal manure. Although the protocols were clear and regulated, the fines 
for over production were low and the farmers often used more (animal) manure than they 
were officially allowed (Hees et al., 2012). This resulted in major overproduction, and the EU 
 regulations on maximum levels of manure production were not met. 
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As a response, and in order to comply with EU policy, the Dutch government abolished MINAS 
and instead presented a more detailed and structured system of manure application norms. 
On 15 September 2005, the government introduced three different application norms for the 
use of animal manure and fertilizers (Dutch government, 2005). These norms, which came 
into force as of 2006, determine the maximum use of animal manure, phosphate and nitrogen 
on land in kg per farm. If a farm exceeds either one of the three norms, it has a manure 
surplus, or so-called farm surplus, which is penalised by letting them pay a fine for every kg 
in excess. 
With respect to the maximum norm for use of animal manure, the European Commission 
allowed derogation to the Netherlands in 2006 (Dutch government, 2007). This implies that 
the norm for use of animal manure for derogation-farms temporarily was allowed to be 250kg 
nitrogen per ha instead of the legally prescribed 170kg nitrogen per ha. Every four years the 
derogation is reviewed and it will be determined whether or not The Netherlands will get 
derogation for the next period. The next revision is in 2018. 
The system of application norms is more strict on the use and production of minerals than 
the old MINAS system. In 2014, the system became even more tight in managing the use of 
animal manure and fertilisers when the Dutch government made it compulsory to process 
part of the farm surpluses (Dutch government, 2013). On top of the fine that needs to be paid 
for the surplus, a farm is obliged to process part of the farm surplus as well. 
In combination with the milk quota (already introduced in 1985), which put a maximum 
limit on milk production and thus indirectly on manure production as well, the Dutch 
manure production stayed within EU policy norms. However, in 2015 the milk quota were 
going to be abolished (European Commission, 2010). This meant a potential environmental 
risk for the Dutch dairy sector as limits to milk production, and thus manure production, 
would disappear. 
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In July 2014 the Dutch government expressed its concerns about the situation in the dairy 
sector and proposed a new component of the manure policy; the act on a responsible growth 
of the dairy sector (Dutch government, 2014a). This act provides guidelines for the dairy 
sector to grow within European environmental policy limits. To this end, the increase in the 
phosphate production of dairy livestock with respect to the phosphate production level in the 
base-year 2013 (the so-called dairy phosphate surplus) must be compensated with additional 
land and/or should be processed.
In October 2014 an ex-ante evaluation study on this act showed that the proposed guidelines 
were not sufficient in order to cope with the major increase and overproduction of phosphate 
in the dairy sector (Dutch government, 2014b). Amongst other, the policy would not put a 
stop to the growth of dairy livestock and the EU limit on the maximum level of phosphate use 
would be exceeded. As a response, the Dutch government asked the sector itself to manage 
manure production to stay within EU production limits. Although the sector monitored its 
production well, and even introduced new technologies such as feed with lower phosphate 
content (Agricultural Organization Netherlands, 2010), the manure production exceeded the 
maximum allowed phosphate production level for the first time in five years in 2015. At that 
time, the total phosphate production of the Dutch dairy sector was 90.4 million kg (Statistics 
Netherlands, 2016). This manure overproduction is so high that the derogation is at risk; 
if the Dutch manure production is not quickly to decrease, the European Commission will 
withdraw the rights for derogation as of 2018. This means that the need to force the Dutch 
farmers to produce within EU manure production limits is even more urgent. The goal is to 
reach a manure production level of 84.9 million kg phosphate (or less) in 2018.
In order to reach that goal, the Dutch government adapted the proposed act on a responsible 
growth of the dairy sector and made it more strict. In March 2015 the definite act, which 
eventually came into force on 1 January 2016, was presented (Dutch government, 2015). The 
main purpose of this act is to guarantee land-based growth in the dairy sector. To this end 
the government set up a structured system of clear regulations on the amount of manure the 
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farms with a dairy phosphate surplus need to process or buy additional land for (these clear 
regulations were not present in the proposed act yet).
In addition to the act, the Dutch government proposed another component to the manure 
policy in order to also guarantee Dutch phosphate production levels to stay within the 
EU maximum limits. In September 2016 the system of phosphate production rights was 
presented (Dutch government, 2016a). Under this system, a farm is not allowed to produce 
more phosphate than the total number of phosphate production rights it has been assigned 
to. The number of phosphate production rights assigned to a farm is based on the number 
of livestock a farm has at 2 July 2015. In order to reach the goal of 2018, a general reduction 
is applied to the number of phosphate rights the farmers obtain. This reduction is aimed to 
be 8% at its maximum (Dutch government, 2016a). The phosphate rights will be tradable 
between farms, but rights will be siphoned off when they are traded until the total phosphate 
production is below the national ceiling. 
At first, the system of phosphate production rights was supposed to come into force on 
1 January 2017. However, in October 2016 the Dutch government announced that the system 
conflicts with EU policy regulations on state support (Dutch government, 2016b), and there-
fore needs to be adapted. Currently the Dutch government discusses the content of the 
system with the EU. The new proposed date to introduce the phosphate production rights is 
1 January 2018.
 The system of phosphate production rights (as of 2018) is an addition to the already existing 
Dutch manure policy components of application norms (as of 2006), compulsory manure 
processing (as of 2014) and the act on a responsible growth of the dairy sector (as of 2016). 
Together these components form the Dutch manure policy.
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5.2.2 Two types of manure surplus
Based on the application norms that were introduced in 2006, we can distinguish farms that 
have a farm surplus and farms that do not have a farm surplus. Every dairy farm is confronted 
with three different application norms for the use of nitrogen and phosphate in manure and 
the use of animal manure. The norm assigned to each farm depends on the size of the agri-
cultural land, the soil type and the type of crop that is produced on the land. If they use more 
manure than their application norm prescribes, they have a farm surplus. 
Farms can handle these farm surpluses in different ways. They have to pay a fine for every 
kg manure that they produce in excess. However, farms can also arrange contracts with other 
farms in order to offset their manure and decrease their farm surplus. As of 2014 farms are 
obliged to process part of their farm surplus. The percentage of farm surplus that needs to be 
processed differs per year and depends on the region where the farm is located. In 2016 these 
percentages were 55%, 35% and 10% for farms located in the southern, eastern and other 
regions respectively (National Organization for Enterprises Netherlands, 2016).
Farms having a farm surplus can be further distinguished into farms that have a dairy phos-
phate surplus and farms that do not have a dairy phosphate surplus. The level of dairy 
phosphate surplus is calculated by subtracting the level of production of phosphate in the 
reference year 2013 and the application norm for phosphate, from the total production of 
phosphate in that specific year. Farms are obliged to process part of this dairy phosphate 
surplus. The amount that they are allowed to process depends on their production level of 
phosphate in the reference year 2013 and the growth of phosphate production since then. 
Farms need to buy extra land for the part that cannot be processed, or they need to decrease 
(phosphate) production. 
The percentages of phosphate production that needs to be processed and the part of phos-
phate production that needs to be handled on extra land depends on the dairy phosphate 
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surplus per ha. Farms with a dairy phosphate surplus of 20kg per ha (or less) are obliged 
to process 100% of their surplus. Farms with a dairy phosphate surplus between 20kg and 
50kg per ha are obliged to process 75% of their surplus and need to buy extra land for the 
other 25% (or decrease in production). Farms with a dairy phosphate surplus of 50kg per 
ha (or more) are obliged to process 50% of their surplus and need to buy extra land for the 
other 50% (or decrease in production) (National Organization for Enterprises Netherlands, 
2016). Figure 5.2 summarizes the classification of Dutch dairy farms according to their 
manure surpluses.
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Figure 5.2 Manure surpluses on Dutch dairy farms
Source: own elaboration
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5.3 Data
Our sample data exist of 1193 observations on 334 Dutch dairy farms. The data cover the 
period 2008 to 2012 and is obtained from the Dutch Farm Accountancy Network Data (FADN, 
Wageningen Economic Research) and the LMM-database (Landelijk Meetnet Mestbeleid, 
Wageningen Economic Research). The data form an unbalanced panel and only 132 farms are 
all years in the panel.
Table 5.1 provides an overview of the data used in this study. The number of dairy cows is 
taken directly from the LMM-database and measured in average numbers per farm per year. 
We gathered data on the value of milk production (in euros) from FADN and divided this 
value by the quantity of milk production (in kilos) of farmers as reported in the FADN as well. 
This way we obtained the actual milk price farmers received on average for their produc-
tion each year. This price differs per farm per year, as all farmers receive different prices 
based on quality differences (i.e. fat- and protein content). The market price for a dairy cow 
was obtained from the database of Wageningen Economic Research (2017). In order to take 
into account the depreciation of a cow (on average a cow is used for milk production for five 
years), we divided this market price by 5 (Boer and Zijlstra, 2013). Information on labour is 
taken directly from the FADN and measured as the time (in hours) worked on the farm by the 
farmer, (hired and fixed) employees and volunteers. The values on different types of (new) 
capital are reported directly in the FADN. Capital used for milk production is measured as a 
compound new value (in euros) for installations and buildings. For land we take the total agri-
cultural land area (grassland and land for fodder production) as reported in the LMM (in ha). 
Data on animal manure production were obtained from the LMM-database. We calculated 
the total on-farm animal manure production by summing the manure production in m³ of 
the dairy cows, calves and heifers on the farm. Next, the animal manure surplus is derived 
by adding the total on-farm animal manure production, the initial stock of animal manure 
and the on-farm supply of animal manure. From this amount we subtracted the final stock 
of animal manure and the farm specific manure application norm (all in m³). The result is 
139
5
the animal manure surplus; when the result is positive, the farm is constrained by manure 
application norms. And when the result is negative, the farm is unconstrained by manure 
application norms.
5.4 Recent developments in the Dutch dairy sector
In this paragraph we describe developments in the Dutch dairy sector using our sample data. 
Eventually we want to answer the question whether or not the manure policy was already 
limiting the growth of farms in the past. In order to answer this question, we will first have 
a closer look at the manure production and the development of manure surpluses on Dutch 
dairy farms. Between 2008 and 2012, there were 109 farms in our dataset that always had 
a manure surplus, and 96 farms which never had a manure surplus. Table 5.2 shows the 
percentage farms that had a manure surplus. The percentages increase every year. This is not 
only due to the (slightly) increase in milk and manure production, that can be seen in table 
5.2 as well, but it is mainly due to a decrease in manure application norms for phosphate as 
well. In 2008 and 2009 the manure application norm for phosphate was on average 100kg per 
hectare, whereas in 2010, 2011 and 2012 it was on average 95kg per hectare.
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis
Variables Dimension Sample mean (st.dev.)
Dairy Livestock number * 101 9.596 (5.358)
Milk price euros 0.338 (0.050)
Price of dairy cow euros * 102 1.897 (0.422)
Labour hours * 103 4.508 (2.134)
Capital for milk production euros * 105 7.173 (4.541)
Land ha * 102 0.563 (0.326)
Manure production m3 manure* 103 3.541 (1.962)
Manure Surplus m3 manure * 101 8.643 (100.835)
n farms (N observations) 334 (1178)  
Source: own elaboration 
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Next, we analyse the farms that expanded production and see if different strategies can be 
distinguished. Farm expansion can be measured in different ways; one way is to measure 
the development of the number of livestock or level of milk production. Another way is to 
measure the change in the number of hectares a farm has. In context of the manure policy, 
in which manure application norms determine the maximum level of phosphate farms are 
allowed to apply per hectare, both measures are interesting to look at. Farms can follow 
different  expansion strategies; a farm that increases the number of livestock and level of milk 
production while keeping the number of hectares constant follows an intensification path. 
Contrarily, a farm that increases the number of hectares while keeping the number of live-
stock and milk production constant follows an extensification path. The intensity of farming 
is measured by the level of milk production per hectare. An extensive farm has a relatively 
lower level of milk production per hectare than an intensive farm.
Table 5.3 shows the average growth in livestock and land per year. Between 2008 and 2012, the 
average percentage growth in number of livestock was 2.5% per farm per year and the average 
percentage growth in land was 1.4% per farm per year. Through the years, farms increased in 
both livestock and land. However, the percentage increase in land is relatively low. Land is 
relatively scarce in The Netherlands and therefore requires significant investments of farms 
to obtain. Still, every year farms stop farming and their land becomes available to other farms.
Farms with 
manure surplus
(in %)
Average milk 
production
(in 105 kg)
Average manure 
production
(in 103 m3)
2008 38.2 7.120 (3.909) 3.258 (1.743)
2009 47.5 7.536 (4.233) 3.468 (1.908)
2010 55.8 8.136 (4.550) 3.692 (2.009)
2011 62.8 7.973 (4.594) 3.612 (2.008)
2012 68.0 8.046 (4.749) 3.631 (2.040) 
a Standard deviation between brackets
Source: own elaboration 
Table 5.2 Manure surplus and average milk and manure productiona
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A distinction can be made between farms that were producing more manure than their manure 
application norm and farms that were not. Although the application norms are not really 
restricting the milk and manure production of farms (since it is possible to process the surplus 
manure outside the farm), for simplicity we will refer to manure constrained and manure 
unconstrained farms in this chapter. From the farms that increased in livestock, 32.4% were 
unconstrained and 39.2% were constrained in manure production. Similar results are found 
for farms that increased in land area; 28.4% were unconstrained and 29.9% were constrained 
in manure production. Although some farms were constrained in manure production, they 
still increased in livestock. This could indicate that these farms were producing an even higher 
manure surplus per hectare. However, some farms also increased in land area, which increases 
the application space for manure. In total 22.6% of the farms increased livestock while not 
increasing land. Of these farms, 62.4% were constrained by manure  application norms. These 
farms became more intensive, while already facing a manure production surplus. In total 
9.3% of the farms increased in land, while not increasing in livestock. Of these farms, 51.4% 
were constrained by manure application norms. These farms already became more extensive, 
but still face a manure production surplus. 
Figure 5.3 provides a closer look into the development of the average number of livestock 
per hectare of these two types of farms that follow different strategies. Not surprisingly, 
the number of livestock per hectare is higher for an intensive farm than for an extensive 
Table 5.3 Growth of livestock and land areaa
Year
Average number 
of livestock
Average % growth 
livestock
(wrt previous year)
Average number 
of hectares
Average % growth 
land
(wrt previous year)
2008 88.4 (47.281) 54.1 (30.524)
2009 93.3 (51.587) 2.1 (7.833) 55.4 (30.914) 0.9 (10.196)
2010 98.4 (53.267) 2.4 (8.077) 57.3 (31.651) 0.9 (8.943)
2011 97.5 (54.272) 2.9 (18.652) 56.3 (31.228) 2.3 (17.960)
2012 99.0 (55.793) 2.5 (6.224) 55.6 (30.925) 1.6 (9.960)
a Standard deviation between brackets
Source: own elaboration 
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farm. Between 2009 and 2010 both types of farms increase in livestock. In the next years the 
average number of livestock on intensive farms increases further, whereas the livestock on 
the extensive farm is relatively stable.
Figure 5.4 shows the development of the phosphate production per hectare for the two types 
of farms. The dashed line shows the maximum application norm per hectare. As can be seen, 
the intensive farms are producing at a manure surplus, and are even increasing the average 
Figure 5.3 Number of livestock per hectare
Source: own elaboration
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phosphate production per hectare between 2010 and 2011. However, between 2011 and 2012 
the phosphate production per hectare is decreasing again. The extensive farms are producing 
below the application norm. The figure shows that the extensive farms are even decreasing in 
phosphate production per hectare.
5.5 Model specification and estimation
Assume that dairy farmers maximize the following expression for total profits, which includes 
manure processing costs for farmers that have a manure surplus:
Π = ( ) − ⋅ ( ) − ⋅  ⋅ >( )pi p w Li Z c Mp Li y Man La I Ms, , , , 0 (1)
where Π is total profits including manure production costs, π is short-run profits of dairy 
farming, which is a function of output prices (p), variable input prices (w), dairy cows (Li), and 
a vector of quasi-fixed factors Z that includes labour, capital and land. Farms that have a 
manure surplus, which is indicated by the indicator function I(Ms>0) having a value 1, have 
manure processing costs, which is a function of the per unit processing costs c and the total 
manure surplus. The latter is the difference between total manure production Mp(Li, y), which 
depends on the number of dairy cows (Li) and the milk production per cow (y) (Remmelink 
et al., 2012: 2-44), and the quantity of manure that can legally be applied to the land, equal-
ling the product of the manure application norm (Man) and the amount of land (La) the dairy 
farmer has. Note that dairy farms with no manure surplus have a value 0 for the indicator 
function. From this expression the shadow price of livestock (dairy cows) can be derived:
s
Li
c Mp
Li
I MsLi =
∂
∂
− ⋅
∂
∂
⋅ >( )pi 0 (2)
Besides livestock it is assumed that the short-run profit function is a function of the milk price 
farmers receive (pm) and three quasi-fixed inputs, viz. labour (Lb), capital (K) and land (La). 
Using a flexible quadratic functional form for π and the expression for calculating the amount 
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of manure per dairy cow as given by Remmelink et al. (2012: 2-44), Mp = (13.44+0.019·y)·Li 
gives the following empirical expression for the shadow price of dairy cows:
s p Li Lb K La c y I MsLi m= + + + + + − ⋅ + ⋅( ) ⋅ >( )α α α α α α0 1 2 3 4 5 13 44 0 019 0. . (3)
Shadow prices are not observed but are usually calculated based on the parameters of the 
flexible functional form for π. Alternatively, if we assume that farmers choose their number 
of cows optimally, we can set the shadow price equal to the one-year price of dairy cows (wLi) 
and solve for the optimal number of cows. After reparameterizing this yields the following 
demand function for cows that can be estimated:
Li p w Lb K La y I Msm Li= + + + + + + ⋅ + ⋅( ) ⋅ >( )β β β β β β β0 1 2 3 4 5 6 13 44 0 019 0. . (4)
This expression allows us to test whether the manure surplus costs had a negative impact on 
the number of dairy cows for farms that had a manure surplus or not by testing whether β6 is 
negative and significantly different from zero.
The data are available for 334 dairy farms in the period 2008-2012, but due to the unbalanced 
nature of the data there are only 1178 observations. Nevertheless, the panel structure allows 
for estimating equation (4) using panel data techniques. A fixed effects procedure is chosen 
allowing for farm-specific intercepts β0i in the equation, reflecting unobserved differences in 
e.g. management or technical characteristics of farms.
5.6 Results and discussion
The parameter estimates for the livestock demand function are provided in the second column 
of table 5.4. All estimates are significantly different from zero. The own price effect of a dairy 
cow to the supply of a dairy cow is negative which is according to neo-classical economic 
theory. All other variables have a positive influence on the livestock demand. The milk price 
has a positive effect on livestock demand; the higher the milk price, the more livestock is 
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wanted. This makes sense as a farmer can earn relatively more income by increasing livestock 
at increasing milk prices, than at stable or decreasing milk prices. The positive signs of capital 
for milk production and labour indicate that both are complements to livestock demand; 
the more capital and/or labour, the more livestock can be handled on dairy farms. The most 
interesting is the positive result for the manure surplus constraint. Apparently this constraint 
does not put a limit on livestock demand. Instead, we estimate that it even increases the 
demand for livestock.
The goal of the applications norms was to keep the phosphate production of the dairy sector 
within limits and the total phosphate production below the national ceiling. When a farm 
exceeds its maximum phosphate application level, it needs to pay a fine for every kg of phos-
phate production in excess. The costs of these fines however, turned out to be relatively 
low compared to the extra income generated by the milk production (Samson et al., 2017). 
Number of Livestock
FE
All farms
REb
Strategy intensification
REb
Strategy extensification
Milk price 1.699**
(0.684)
2.675
(2.007)
3.699**
(1.712)
Price of dairy cows -0.162**
(0.065)
0.458
(0.317)
-0.684**
(0.339)
Labour 0.464***
(0.051)
0.268***
(0.092)
0.315**
(0.124)
Capital 0.169***
(0.017)
0.299***
(0.040)
0.192***
(0.068)
Land 6.316***
(0.477)
11.622***
(0.661)
10.580***
(0.922)
Manure surplus 
constraint
0.008***
(0.002)
0.017***
(0.007)
0.047***
(0.010)
Intercept 2.322***
(0.335)
-1.914***
(0.647)
-0.359
(0.980)
Within R2 0.47 0.08 0.27
F-test slope parameters 22.88*** - -
n (N) 329 (1178) 188 (266) 99 (109)
a Standard errors between parentheses. Significance level: *** 0.01; ** 0.05; * 0.10 
b FE estimation is not convenient here because there is few variability in data as there are not many observations 
per group. Instead we use RE estimation.
Source: own elaboration 
Table 5.4 Estimation results for number of livestocka
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Even taking into account all other types of costs, it seemed that the additional costs of the 
fine could not diminish the increase in the number of livestock. This might be a possible 
 explanation for the effect we find here.
In column three and four of table 5.4 the estimation results for livestock demand are provided 
when the sample is divided into two groups; farms that follow an intensification path and 
farms that follow an extensification path, respectively. As can be seen, results are very similar 
to the estimations of the sample as a whole. For intensive farms, the sign for the market 
price of a cow is positive, but this is not significant. Also these estimates show a positive 
significant effect of the manure surplus constraint on livestock demand. Apparently there is 
no  difference in their approach to livestock demand between intensive and extensive farms.
However, compared to the sample as a whole and the intensive farms, extensive farms have 
a slightly stronger response on the manure surplus constraint. In figures 5.3 and 5.4 we saw 
that the number of livestock per hectare and the phosphate production per hectare were 
decreasing. Extensive farms were on average producing less phosphate than the application 
norm allowed. This means that farms have space to increase in milk and manure production 
within limits of their application norms for phosphate.
5.7 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we focused on the period 2008 and 2012, when the Dutch manure policy 
consisted of only the system of application norms, and analysed whether or not this manure 
policy was restrictive for the dairy farms to increase in livestock. We found that the manure 
application norms did not restrict milk and manure production in the past. Instead we found 
that it had a positive effect on the demand for livestock. Moreover, the same results were found 
for farms using different growth strategies. Although, this positive effect is counter intuitive, 
it may be explained from a correlation between large numbers of cows and a manure surplus.
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Which lessons can be learned and used in context of the actual debate on the new manure 
policy legislation in the Netherlands? Apparently application norms alone were not  sufficient 
to keep phosphate production in the Netherlands below the overall national ceiling. In fact, 
the manure surplus constraint was not even restricting livestock demand, and therefore 
missed its purpose to control phosphate production. An explanation is that the manure 
processing costs are too low to really restrict manure surplus farms in expanding. As was 
pointed out in this chapter, the Dutch government introduced extra regulations later on. 
However, the Dutch phosphate production is still not below the limits set by the EU. The 
Dutch government needs to find a manure policy regulation that effectively limits livestock 
demand significantly. When they succeed, this will put a stop to the increase in the number of 
livestock per farm, and eventually it might lead to a decrease in the total phosphate produc-
tion of the Dutch dairy sector.
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Synthesis
 
This final chapter reflects on the thesis as a whole. It starts with discussing the general 
research objective and research questions. Next, the main conclusions and their implications 
are presented. The chapter ends with a critical reflection on this PhD research and the thesis 
as a whole.
6.1 Research objective and questions
Already since the 1960’s, the Dutch dairy sector has been subject to changes in European and 
national agricultural and environmental policies. Dutch dairy farmers, which are  considered 
to be among the most productive and competitive farmers in EU dairy production, are 
 challenged to adapt their farming strategies to cope with growing global competition and 
societal demand for sustainable production. 
This thesis concentrates on analysing Dutch dairy farmer response in this changing environ-
ment in the period 2000 until now. More specifically, it focuses on responses to three main 
policy issues, namely the changes in the Common Agricultural Policy with respect to the direct 
payment system, the abolishment of milk quotas in Europe, and the Dutch manure policy.
The general objective of this research is to analyse the responses of Dutch dairy farmers 
in the situation of changing agricultural and environmental policies (i.e. transition from 
DP system to a flat-rate payment system, milk quota abolishment and the reformed Dutch 
manure policy), thereby taking into account economic as well as non-economic factors. This 
objective is explored in four separate research papers, presented in chapters 2 through 5.
6
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Chapter 2 focuses on the first research question, i.e. “What is the effect of a transition from 
the direct payment system to a flat rate payment system on the farm income and farming 
strategies of Dutch dairy farmers?” For the analysis, an economic simulation experiment is 
used. Two main findings are drawn from this paper. First, the study shows that it is most likely 
that the transition has a negative effect on the income of Dutch dairy farmers. Moreover, it 
shows that the dairy farmers make their short-run decisions within a longer run strategy- 
choice framework. Second, it is found that the economic simulation experiment is a  flexible 
methodological approach. Its main valuable characteristics are the relaxation of some 
neo-classical economic assumptions and the flexibility towards incorporating heterogeneity 
among farmers in the analysis. It also allows for taking the effects of social variables and 
environmental policy into account.
Research question 2 “Which economic and non-economic factors determine milk production 
expansion by Dutch dairy farmers?” is assessed in chapter 3. The model used here combines 
economic, social and environmental variables to analyse farm-level expansion decisions. It 
shows that purely economic approaches are too narrow in understanding developments in 
expansion decisions at the farm level. It is found that several market conditions, variables 
relating to farmers’ values, goals and strategies, and (social) farm characteristics are impor-
tant drivers in farmers’ expansion decisions. However, the results also show that economic 
variables are still very important in farmers’ decision making processes.
Chapter 4 addresses the third research question, i.e. “What are the interactions between Dutch 
milk and manure production and how can these relations be integrated in one  modelling 
approach to analyse the effects of agricultural policy changes?” The developed model opens 
up possibilities to further analyse the farmers’ potential responses to the abolishment of the 
milk quotas, taking into account the heterogeneity between farms with respect to being quota 
and/or manure constrained. It is found that at the margin and at prevailing input and output 
prices and manure processing costs, it will be generally attractive for dairy farms to expand 
milk production, unless regulatory constraints will prevent them from doing so.
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Research question 4 “Was the system of manure application norms restrictive for the dairy 
farms to increase in livestock?” is assessed in chapter 5. It is analysed using a microecono-
metric approach in which a shadow price function for dairy cows is derived from a profit- 
maximization problem and estimated using FADN data. The results show that farmers’ 
stocking behaviour was not significantly constrained by manure application norms. It is 
found that the system of manure application norms was not effective in preventing expansion 
of dairy cows on surplus farms in the period 2008 to 2012. 
6.2 General conclusions and implications
Although dairy farmers were facing different agricultural policy regulations, their  behaviour 
was rather consistent over the years. When studying the behaviour of intensive and  extensive 
farms separately, no significant differences in strategy are found. Generally it is found 
that active Dutch dairy farmers, which continue farming in the future as well, followed an 
expansion strategy. Even when land is scarce and major investments are required, there is 
a  development towards an increase in farm-scale as well as an increase in the number of 
livestock.
Chapter 2 shows that in farming strategies economic motives, such as income preservation, 
increasing labour productivity and technological innovation, play a significant role. However, 
this thesis also investigates the added value of taking social and environmental aspects into 
account, and finds that these factors matter as well (chapters 3 through 5). Examples of social 
variables that are important in farmers’ decision making on production expansion are diver-
sification, such as landscape management, and their goals and attitude towards the manage-
ment of livestock. 
The environmental aspects of farming became increasingly important when milk quotas 
were abolished and farms increased milk production and as a result also their manure 
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production. This led to more farms facing a manure surplus which needed to be disposed at a 
cost. However, even when already having a manure surplus, farms were still expanding their 
milk production. This study finds that in the period 2001 to 2012 a key factor in the decision 
making process of farmers to expand in production has been the availability of slack stable 
capacity. When stable space is available, farms can increase in livestock relatively easily and 
at low costs. It is found that the (extra) manure disposal costs are too low to put a limit to the 
increase in production in this period. 
Currently the problem of overproduction of manure in the Dutch dairy sector is serious 
(in 2015 phosphate production of the Dutch dairy sector exceeded its allocated sectoral phos-
phate ceiling of 84.9 million kg phosphate by about 9 per cent). This study shows, in chapter 5, 
that not the manure disposal costs but rather regulatory constraints with respect to manure 
production and application on own land can affect the possibilities for future milk supply 
growth in the Netherlands. The newly introduced policy regulations of the Dutch government 
require that dairy farmers, if they want to expand their dairy herd, also need to buy additional 
land (as of 1 January 2016). Buying land, assuming that it is available, is expensive and will 
therefore almost solely be an option for the relatively larger farms which in general have 
better access to external capital.
The newly introduced policy also contains a system of phosphate production rights as of 
January 2018. The number of phosphate production rights assigned to a farm is based on the 
number of livestock a farm has at 2 July 2015 minus 4 percent (correction for manure produc-
tion in excess of the phosphate ceiling). For many Dutch dairy farms this implies they need 
to reduce their number of livestock. This reduction is expected to solve (part of) the problem 
of phosphate overproduction per ha, which reduces the need to increase land areas. In 
 anticipation of this system the government introduced several supporting measures in order 
to encourage farmers to reduce livestock stable capacity (Dutch government, 2016). One of 
these measures is the awarding of a premium per dairy cow that is eliminated from the farm. 
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This measure seems to be successful; the total livestock number decreased by 40  thousand 
dairy cows in the first months of 2017 already.
So, what to expect from the Dutch dairy sector in the future? Most likely the expansion path 
that many Dutch dairy farmers took will continue. Maintaining a high labour productivity 
and competitive production structure is needed in order to sustain in the future. For smaller 
dairy farms, the future will be challenging, even if they just want to continue farming without 
expanding in production. Just like in the past some farmers will be forced to stop farming, 
either because they retire or because they cannot compete. 
However, this thesis shows that most Dutch dairy farmers proved to be very innovative and 
adaptive to changing policy circumstances. For example, some farmers diversified farm 
 activities and integrated landscape management or recreational activities in their daily 
routine in order to diversify income. Although this may not be an option for large and highly 
specialised farms, it may provide opportunities for additional income generation for smaller 
producers. Moreover, during the milk quota period the Dutch dairy sector was one of the top 
producers in Europe. When the milk quotas were abolished the farmers managed to keep their 
prime position in European dairy farming; together with Ireland the Netherlands showed a 
large expansion in terms of milk production, irrespective of the low milk prices prevailing in 
2015 and 2016 (Rabobank, 2017). This supports the findings of this thesis.
In addition, initiatives were taken to cooperate with the business sector. In 2015, one such 
initiative was the reduction of phosphate production by lowering the content of phosphate in 
compound feed (Nederlandse Zuivelorganisatie, 2017a). Another important initiative is the 
agreement on the phosphate reduction plan of the dairy sector. In this plan representatives of 
the dairy farmers (trade union of the Dutch dairy sector) and several leading dairy companies 
(such as FrieslandCampina and Arla Foods) propose a package of measures to reduce phos-
phate production in the Dutch dairy sector in 2017 (Nederlandse Zuivelorganisatie, 2017b). 
In a slightly different way this plan has been imposed on the dairy sector (Dutch Phosphate 
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production Reduction Decree). Furthermore, the Netherlands introduced a dairy farm retire-
ment program (Dutch government, 2016). The target of this program is a reduction of 1000 
dairy farms (having an estimated average herd size of 60 dairy cows) and a reduction of the 
Dutch dairy cow herd by 60 thousand livestock units. Most likely more initiatives in order to 
reduce overproduction of animal manure will arise in the future.
6.3 Discussion
This section describes the decisions, and their implications, made in executing this research. 
Moreover, the difficulties encountered during this research are discussed. 
6.3.1 Policy selection
One of the main issues to deal with in this thesis are the rapidly changing agricultural and 
environmental policies while doing research. In order to do a reliable and thorough study, 
it takes time to develop models and run tests. When the model is finished, there is a fair 
chance that the policy under investigation is already adapted again. An example is the inves-
tigation of the possible impacts on the Dutch dairy farmer behaviour of proposal for the 
European Common Agricultural Policy as of 2013, which is assessed in chapter 2. By the time 
this chapter was published, the Common Agricultural Policy was already implemented. For 
this reason, when writing a new chapter, I focused on the actual issues being discussed at 
that time. The focus of chapter 2 is on changes in the first and second pillar of the Common 
Agricultural Policy, whereas in chapter 3 I focus on the abolishment of the milk quotas and in 
chapter 4 and 5 changes in the environmental policy are analysed. 
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6.3.2 Sample selection
In The Netherlands, there is a variety of dairy farms that can be distinguished. For example, 
besides traditional dairy farms there exist organic dairy farms and farms that gain their income 
partly from dairying and partly from other activities (such as care farming or a camping site). 
Although the occurrence of these farms is increasing (CBS, 2017), these farms are excluded 
from the analysis in chapters 3 through 5.
The main reason to exclude them is that this thesis focuses on analysing the behaviour of 
traditional dairy farmers. Organic farms generally have different farming strategies than 
traditional dairy farmers. Also their milk price is different. Farmers that gain their main 
income from other activities as well cannot be compared to the farmer behaviour of tradi-
tional dairy farmers, since their farming goals are different. Investigating differences between 
these types of farms and traditional dairy farms could be an interesting extension of this 
research, but is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Not only the used production method distinguishes farmer behaviour. In chapter 2 it is 
found that there are differences in farmer behaviour between farmers from different regions 
of The Netherlands as well. In order to draw more specific conclusions, it would have been 
 interesting to further incorporate these differences in the other chapters of the research as 
well. However, location data is only available for a small selection of the farms in the sample. 
Using only these observations would severely reduce the available sample such that it would 
not be representative anymore. 
6.3.3 Data
Like in most empirical research, some limitations came across when accessing the data. First, 
the data used is obtained from the Dutch FADN and LMM-databases. These databases provide 
the most detailed and useful information for this study. Since the Dutch FADN-database is 
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a sample selection of dairy farms, not all Dutch dairy farms are included in the analysis. 
Moreover, when synchronising the FADN-database with the LMM-database, some farms 
cannot be matched, which decreases the sample size somewhat more. Also, due to the time 
needed for processing and updating the database, it is decided to have 2012 as the latest 
year, although it is recognized that after that date a number of interesting developments 
took place.
Second, one of the main findings at the start of this thesis is that, besides economic variables, 
social and environmental variables are also important factors in the decision making process 
of Dutch dairy farmers (chapter 2). In the third chapter I therefore incorporate these variables 
explicitly into the analysis. Nevertheless, economic variables are found to still matter most in 
farmers’ decision making processes. In chapter 4 and 5, where I focus on technical relations 
between milk and manure production, I choose to use economic variables only. Using only 
these variables still yields relevant results. 
6.3.4 Research method
In this thesis I primarily choose to use econometric research methods to investigate the 
research questions. An exception is chapter 2 in which I use experimental economics. This 
chapter shows that experiments put some of the assumptions of neoclassical economic 
methods at stake, and therefore add value to the more traditional economic research methods 
(such as econometrics). In particular with respect to measuring heterogeneity among 
personal (or emotional) characteristics of farmers, which are difficult to quantify in tradi-
tional economic methods, experiments are very useful. 
For this reason it would have enlarged the scope of this research to incorporate experimental 
research techniques in the other chapters as well. Unfortunately, due to several reasons it 
is not possible to use these techniques throughout the thesis. One reason is that experi-
ments are very costly and time consuming. The selection of a proper sample population that 
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is representative for the whole Dutch dairy sector is rather complex. Also, carrying out experi-
ments is labour intensive. During this project there was not enough finance, labour and time 
available to execute experiments. As a result, the data collected would have been incomplete, 
and reliable conclusions on the whole dairy farmer population could not have been drawn.
Econometric research methods are particularly useful in situations where historical data are 
available. Based on historical data it is possible to analyse changes over time. A potential 
drawback of econometric methods is that relations between variables are predetermined; 
optimal solutions are fixed and conclusions are drawn on these specific relations. Since 
I assume farmers rationale behind decision making is static over time, at least in the research 
period of this thesis, using econometric research methods is still applicable. 
 Another method which is often used to analyse these type of research questions is mathe-
matical programming. Mathematical programming is useful to analyse situations in which 
historical data are scarce and the aim is to analyse possible effects of policy changes that 
are not yet implemented. However, historical data are largely available, and the purpose of 
this study is not to focus on future policy changes, but on changing farmer behaviour under 
current policy. Moreover, a drawback of mathematical programming is the possibility of corner 
solutions, which implies that trade-offs between variables cannot be made. Furthermore, 
mathematical programming models have a strong optimization focus and may overestimate 
the speed of adjustment of farmers relative to what is observed in reality. The econometric 
approach, which takes into account an error term and accepts that farmers may not behave 
fully in accordance with economic theory and its profit maximization assumption, is then a 
preferred approach. This especially holds for chapters 4 and 5, where a microeconomic model 
is developed aimed at analysing trade-offs between milk, feed and manure production as they 
have been observed from (past) farmer behaviour. 
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6.3.5 Manure production
In this thesis, a distinction is made between farms with and without a manure surplus. In order 
to calculate this manure production surplus, the farm application norms for nitrogen and 
phosphate are compared with the actual level of on-farm nitrogen and phosphate production. 
Although data on manure production at the mineral level are available, it is not possible to 
obtain reliable data on the mineral content of compound feed and fodder. Therefore the inter-
action between feed intake and manure production at the mineral level is not investigated. 
However, if these data would have been available, the effectiveness of reducing the phosphate 
production by lowering the content of phosphate in compound feed could be  investigated. 
This is one of the initiatives of the dairy sector in cooperation with the business sector 
(Nederlandse Zuivelorganisatie, 2017a). Although chapters 4 and 5 still analyse interesting 
and relevant research questions, I would like to investigate this ‘feedtrack’, as I think it is one 
of the most interesting ambitions of the dairy sector as a solution to the problem of phos-
phate overproduction. 
 Moreover, the analysis on manure production can be extended by incorporating a market for 
manure. Even more so since phosphate production rights will be tradable in the future which 
makes this a very relevant area to investigate. However, in the Netherlands, this manure 
market is complex. Besides the formal market, there exist many ‘shadow’ markets due to 
mutual arrangements between farmers. For example, dairy farmers may trade their manure 
with neighbouring horticultural farmers against a self-negotiated price. This means that a 
‘real’ market price is hard to measure. Also precise data on the amount of manure transferred 
are hard to obtain, which makes the manure market difficult to investigate.
So, at the end of this thesis, it can be concluded that the Dutch dairy sector is an interesting 
topic to analyse as it is influenced by all kind of changes and developments in agricultural and 
environmental policy. This sector provides exciting opportunities to further explore in future 
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research. Especially in the context of manure production, which will be regulated by a system 
of phosphate production rights as of next year. One such interesting topic to  investigate 
can be the introduction of these rights and the different within (and over) sector tradability 
regimes. Another topic can be the analysis of the environmental efficiency of farms in the 
context of different farm management options. Furthermore, a long-term assessment of 
(agricultural and environmental policy) developments in de Dutch dairy sector and its impact 
on farmer responses can be investigated.
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Summary
 
The Netherlands is one of the main dairy producers in the European Union (EU). The Dutch 
dairy sector can be characterized as a highly productive and competitive sector. The sector 
is affected by the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and European environmental 
policies, such as the European Nitrate Directive. Already since the start of the CAP in the 
1960s, there have been many changes and revisions of this policy in order to cope with a 
changing, and challenging European agricultural environment. These changes also had 
their impact on the Dutch dairy sector. In order to protect their competitive position in the 
European Union, the Dutch dairy farmers are challenged to adjust their farming strategies. 
A notable example of the CAP impacting the dairy sector is the milk quota system, which was 
introduced in 1984 and abolished in 2015. The abolishment provided dairy farmers with the 
option to expand in milk production. However, when farmers increase milk production their 
animal manure production increases as well. The Dutch manure policy includes limitations 
and obligations to the use of (animal) manure exist. This affects the farmer behaviour with 
respect to optimizing production. They have to take decisions on optimal land allocation and 
manure processing costs into account as well.
This thesis focuses on analysing the Dutch dairy farmer behaviour in this changing  political 
environment. The general objective of this research is to analyse the responses of Dutch 
dairy farmers in the situation of a changing agricultural and environmental policy context 
(i.e. changes in the subsidy payment system, milk quota abolishment and the reformed Dutch 
manure policy), thereby taking into account economic as well as non-economic factors. The 
objective leads to four research questions, which are assessed in separate chapters of this 
thesis. It contributes to the literature in two ways. First, by analysing farmers strategies and 
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choices it takes into account non-economic factors such as social characteristics of farmers 
and changing policy regulations. Second, the interaction between milk and manure produc-
tion is integrated in the modelling approach.
Chapter 2 deals with the first research question “What is the effect of a transition from the 
direct payment system to a flat rate payment system on the farm income and farming  strategies 
of Dutch dairy farmers?” The impact of proposed policy changes on the  behaviour of farmers 
is a highly discussed topic in European policy analysis. Most often traditional neo-classical 
economic research methods are used for the analysis. But one of the limitations of these 
methods could be that they do not take the relevant natural environment into consideration, 
which might reduce the predictive contents. In order to bridge the gap between economic 
theory and observed farmer behaviour one can use experimental economics. 
This chapter examines the value of experiments for assessing the impact of the proposed 
Common Agricultural Policy of 2013 on farm income and farming strategies. Hereby the focus 
is specifically on the impact of an alternative direct payment system based on a flat rate and 
green payments. An economic simulation experiment was used to analyze Dutch dairy farmer 
behaviour towards the provision of public goods under an alternative direct payments system. 
The economic simulation experiment used in this chapter was developed by Wageningen 
Economic Research (former Dutch Agricultural Economic Research Institute(LEI)) and 
carried out in November through December 2010. In total 35 dairy farmers were selected to 
 participate in the simulation experiment. 
The results show that in farming strategies economic motives, such as income preserva-
tion, increasing labour productivity and technological innovation, play a significant role. 
Moreover, it is shown that the suitability of and rewards for the provision of green services 
play a  significant role in their uptake by farmers. Moreover, this research compared the char-
acteristics of the experimental research method to more traditional microeconomic research 
approaches. It is concluded that using an economic simulation experiment in analysing Dutch 
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dairy farmer behaviour adds value in several ways. In addition to neo-classical economic 
research methods, the simulation experiment adds a more flexible approach. For example it 
does not presume cost minimization or profit maximization. Also homogeneity of production 
factors is not assumed, and it allows for heterogeneous price expectations. 
Chapter 3 analyses the second research question “Which economic and non-economic 
factors determine milk production expansion by Dutch dairy farmers?” A conceptual model 
is  developed that shows how policies, market conditions, and farmers’ values and goals affect 
the expansion decisions of Dutch dairy farmers. This conceptual model shows that not only 
economic, but also social and environmental variables are important factors in expansion 
decisions of Dutch dairy farmers. Zooming in on the dynamic decision making process itself, 
three investment theories are combined to explain investment decisions. This framework 
is the basis for a dynamic random effects probit model that is used to estimate the effects 
of various economic, environmental and farm structural factors on farmers’ expansion 
behaviour. 
The results show that production intensity matters when analysing production expansion 
behaviour of Dutch dairy farms. Compared to extensive farms, intensive farms have a higher 
probability for milk production expansion. The availability of land however is an important 
precondition. Production diversification, which is usually found at extensive farms, decreases 
the probability for milk production expansion. Although the findings do not directly show 
an increase in milk production during the sample period (farmers still respected their quota 
limits), the results indicate that Dutch dairy farms can potentially increase milk production 
in the future. In 2010 farms underutilized their stable space, as the occupancy of stable space 
was only 71%. After milk quota abolishment farms can therefore increase livestock herd and 
milk production with limited investments.
Chapter 4 deals with the third research question “What are the interactions between Dutch milk 
and manure production and how can these relations be integrated in one modelling approach 
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to analyse the effects of agricultural policy changes?” Using Fixed Effects (Instrumental 
Variable) Generalized Method of Moments (FE(-IV)-GMM), production  functions for milk, 
feed and roughage are estimated taking into account prevailing milk quotas and manure 
constraints. Together with an equation for manure production these production functions 
are used to calculate the costs and benefits of dairy livestock expansion. The model opens 
up possibilities to further analyse the farmers’ potential response to the abolishment of the 
milk quotas, taking into account the heterogeneity between farms with respect to being quota 
and/or manure constrained. The results suggest that at the margin and at prevailing input 
and output prices and manure processing costs, it will be attractive for dairy farms to expand 
production, unless regulatory constraints prevent them from doing so. 
Chapter 5 analyses the fourth research question “Was the system of manure application norms 
restrictive for dairy farms to increase in livestock in the period 2008 to 2012?” It is analysed 
whether different growth strategies between dairy farms can be distinguished. Moreover, 
differences in characteristics between farms that increased in livestock while producing more 
phosphate than the application norm and farms that increased in livestock while producing 
within the application norm of phosphate are investigated.
Assuming short-run profit maximization including manure processing costs for dairy farms 
with a manure surplus, a shadow price equation for dairy cows is derived that is estimated 
using panel data techniques. A parameter test shows that the marginal processing costs of 
additional manure did not lower the shadow price of dairy cows for surplus farms, suggesting 
that in the period 2008 to 2012 this policy was not limiting expansion of dairy cows on surplus 
farms. Instead it is found that it had a positive effect on the demand for livestock. Moreover, 
the same results were found for farms using different growth strategies.
In order to study the research questions 2 through 4 (chapters 3 through 5), yearly data (from 
the period 2001 to 2012) on various economic and non-economic variables were gathered 
from two databases; the Dutch Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) and the National 
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Monitoring Network Manure (LMM). The final dataset included 1193 observations on 
334 Dutch dairy farms and formed an unbalanced panel.
The four separate research questions provide input to assessing the general research  objective 
of this study. Although the dairy farmers were facing different agricultural policy regula-
tions, their farmer behaviour was almost consistent over the years. Generally it is found that 
active Dutch dairy farmers, which are expected to continue farming in the future, followed an 
expansion strategy. There is a development towards an increase in farm-scale as well as an 
increase in the number of livestock. 
Currently the problem of overproduction of manure in the Dutch dairy sector is serious 
(in 2015 phosphate production of the Dutch dairy sector exceeded its allocated sectoral phos-
phate ceiling of 84.9 million kg phosphate by about 9 per cent). This study shows that not the 
manure disposal costs but rather regulatory constraints with respect to manure production 
and application on own land can affect the possibilities for future growth in milk supply in 
the Netherlands.
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